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A. Introduction
"Das Wesen des Konzerns hat etwas unbestimmt Schillemdes. Es wird vergebene Muhe 
sein, eine allgemein verwertbare juristische Definition herausarbeiten zu wo lien, "*
The group o f companies (Konzern) is characterized by the unity of the whole and the
*
variety of its members.1 2 The members are different companies, all legally independent 
and with their own legal personallity. They are unified in a group since -according to 
the German definition- the parent company manages the group on a unified basis,3 
while the subsidiaries are controlled by the parent company according to the original 
English4 and French5 definitions. The original English and French definitions took a 
more formal approach in describing the group phenomenon. Control was mainly 
considered to exist if the parent company had the majority of the subsidiary company’s 
voting rights or the right to appoint the majority of the directors on the board of the 
subsidiary.6 Some years ago the 7th EC Directive7 on Company Law (with regard to 
consolidated group accounts) has taken a broader approach to define the group. By 
transforming the direction, French legislation included further means of exercising
1 H a c h e n b u r g  in  D ü r i n g e r / H a c h e n b u r g  ( e d s . ) ,  Das Handelsgesetzbuch ( 1 9 3 4 ) ,  3 r d  e d . ,  V o l .  3 , 
i n t r o d u c t i o n ,  n o t e  1 3 8 .
2 S e e  c l a s s i c a l  f o r m u l a t i o n  b y  R a i s e r ,  " D i e  K o n z e r n b i l d u n g  a l s  G e g e n s t a n d  r e c h t s -  u n d  
w i r t s c h a f t s w i s s e n s c h a f t l i c h e r  U n t e r s u c h u n g e n " ,  Schriften des Vereins für Socialpolitic N . F .  3 3  ( 1 9 6 4 ) ,  
p . 5 4 :  " E i n h e i t  d e s  G a n z e n  u n d  V i e l h e i t  d e r  G l i e d e r " .
■' S e e  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  in  t h e  Aktiengesetz, Gesetz vom 6. September 1965 (BGBL 1 p. 1089), 
h e r e i n a f t e r  c i t e d  as AktG, §  1 8  ( 1 )  f o r  a  "Konzern", t h i s  d e f i n i t i o n  i s  v a l i d  f o r  a l l  c a t e g o r i e s  o f  c o m p a n i e s  
b u t  i s  r a t h e r  l i m i t e d  in  i t s  f i e l d  o f  a p p l i c a t i o n ;  s e e  a l s o  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  in  t h e  Handelsgesetzbuch, Gesetz 
vom 10. Mai 1897 (RGBL p. 219), h e r e i n a f t e r  c i t e d  a s  HGB, a s  a m e n d e d  b y  Gesetz vom 19. Dezember 
1985 (BGBl I p. 2355), §§ 2 7 1  ( 2 ) ,  2 9 0  f o r  a c c o u n t a n c y  p u r p o s e s  ( a s  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  o f  t h e  7 t h  E C  
D i r e c t i v e  o n  C o m p a n y  L a w ) .
4 See the definitions of "parent undertaking" and "subsidiary undertaking" in Companies Act from 
11 March 1985, hereinafter cited as CA 1985, s. 258, amended by Companies Act from 16 November 
1989, hereinafter cited as CA 1989, s. 21, only for consolidated group accounts; and the definitions of 
"subsidiary company" and "holding company" in CA 1985 s. 736, 736A, inserted by CA 1989 s. 144, in 
general for all other fields of applications; "group" consists of a subsidiary and a holding company as 
given in CA 1985 s. 736, see CA 1989 s. 53 (1).
5 See the definition of "filiale" in Lot n* 66-537 du 24 Juillet 1966, hereinafter cited as Loi 1966, 
art. 354; new definition of "controle" in Loi 1966, art. 355-1, as amended by Loi n° 85-705 du 12 juillet 
1985, and art. 357-1, as amended by Loi n° 85-11 du 3 janvier 1985, only for a consolidated group 
account, art. 355-1 has a limited field of application, e.g. with regard to the cross-holding of shares and 
duties to inform other shareholders about the own participation.
* See CA 1985 s. 736 and Loi 1966 art. 354, 355.
7 83/349/EEC - OJ EC No 193, 18.2.1983, p. 1.
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co n tro l in to th e  d efin itio n  o f  a  g ro u p , the E n g lish  d e fin itio n  to o k  ev en  up th e  term  
"u n ifie d  m a n a g e m e n t"  {einheitliche Leitung). T h e  le g a l o rd e rs  do n ot thus o n ly  p o in t to 
n arro w ly  d e fin e d  leg a l m ea n s fo r  d e fin in g  the p h e n o m e n o n  but to a c c e p tin g  (d e  fa c to )  
co n tro l by  w h ic h  m ean s so e v e r  a s  th e  d e c is iv e  p o in t f o r  th e  group stru ctu re .8
T h e s e  d e fin itio n s  h av e d iffe r e n t  sta rtin g  p o in ts a n d  can  b e  ap p lied  o n ly  to  
lim ited  and  p a rtia lly  d ifferen t f ie ld s . T h e y  do n o t g ra sp  th e  phenom enon  p r e c is e ly , the 
m ost illu m in a tin g  d escrip tio n  s t i l l  se em s to b e  that a  grou p is b ased  o n  a  u n ified  
m a n a g em en t o f  the d iffe re n t m e m b e r  co m p a n ie s . T h is  is  n o t a w e ll-d e fin e d  le g a l term  
and h as b e e n  taken  from  the e c o n o m ic  sp h ere  in to  la w ; sch o lars o f  th e  d iffe re n t 
co u n trie s  a g re e  that it is  a m in im u m  criterio n  fo r  a g ro u p  that the m em b e r c o m p a n ie s  
are su b m itte d  to a s in g le  d e c is io n -m a k in g  p ro ce ss  -  o n  w h atev er m ean s th is  is  b a se d .9 
T h e  le a d in g  ro le  in this p ro ce ss  is g iv en  to the grou p  m an ag em en t w h ich  in flu e n c e s  the 
m an ag em en t o f  the co n tro lled  c o m p a n ie s  and g iv e s  a d v ic e  to them  in ord er to  estab lish  
a m o re  o r le ss  u niform  m a n a g e m e n t.10 H o w ev er, d esp ite  th ese  d e sc r ip tio n s  the 
q u estion  rem a in s open to w hat e x te n t  -on  the sp e ctru m  b etw een  co m p le te  ce n tra lisa tio n  
and c o m p le te  d ecen tra lisa tio n - th e  m em ber c o m p a n ie s  m ust be co o rd in a te d  and the 
su b s id ia r ie s ’ co m p an ie s  m a n a g em en t m ust b e  in flu e n c e d  to com p ly  w ith  th is term . 
M o re im p ortant is the e c o n o m ic a lly  assum ed e f fe c t  o f  the unified m a n a g e m e n t w h ich  
is to b e  d e scrib e d  by the term  "u n ifie d  m a n a g e m e n t": the group as a w h o le  is v iew ed  
in e c o n o m ic  term s as a u n iform  en terp rise , d esp ite  the m em ber c o m p a n ie s  b e in g  
sep arate  e n t it ie s .11 A s a c o n se q u e n c e , the m ere  h o ld in g  o f  shares o f  on e c o m p a n y  by
* See the inclusion of "dominant influence" and "managed on a unified basis" in CA 1985 s. 258, 
amended by CA 1989 s. 21. In Loi 1966 art. 357-1, as amended by Lot n° 85-11 du 3 janvier 1985, the 
exercise of control by a control contract or by provisions contained in the undertaking’s memorandum or 
articles is included.
g See for France, Guyon, "The Law on Groups of Companies in France", in Wymeersch (ed.) 
Groups o f  Companies in the EEC (1993), p. 141; for Great Britain Gower, Principles o f  Modern 
Company Law (1992), 5th. ed., p. 121, 126ff.; for Germany Wiedemann, Die Unternehmensgruppe im 
Privatrecht (1988), p. 6f.
10 See the economic definition of unified management by Scheffler, "Konzemleitung aus 
betriebswirtschaftlicher Sicht", Der Betrieb 38 (1985), p. 2005, "the coordination and influencing of the 
member companies’ management according to plan".
11 See Gower (1992), supra note 9, p. 126-129; Ripert/Roblot/Germain, Traité de Droit 
Commercial (1993), 15th ed., p. 581; Wiedemann (1988), supra note 9, p. 6; Immenga, "The Law of 
Groups in the Federal Republic of Germany", in Wymeersch (ed.), Groups o f  Companies in the EEC  
(1993), p. 97f.; for the connection between economic unity of the group and unified management see 
Slongo, Der B egriff der einheitlichen Leitung a Is Bestandteil d es Konzernbegriffs (1980), p. Iff.,
m n n n n n m R D a
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an o th er as a p u re  fin a n cia l in v e stm e n t is  not s u ff ic ie n t  to  fu fil the n otion  o f  a g ro u p , 
n o tw ith sta n d in g  the fa c t  that u n if ie d  m an ag em en t o f  a group is  m ostly  b a se d  on  
m a jo r ity  sh a re h o ld in g . A ll  th e se  d e scr ip tio n s  do n ot re su lt in  a c le a r  d e fin itio n , b u t th ey  
sh ou ld  b e  s u f f ic ie n t  to illu stra te  th e  p ro b le m .* 12
T h e  v ie w  o f  the grou p  as a  u n ity  and as a  s in g le  e c o n o m ic  a c to r  p o ses  p ro b lem s 
fo r the n o tio n  o f  a com p an y  in trad itio n a l co m p an y  la w . T h is  co n ce p t, w h ic h  is the 
startin g  p o in t fo r  the com p an y  la w s  o f  a ll co u n tries, is  ch a ra c te rise d  by  the m o d el o f  the 
co m p a n y  as a sep arate le g a l e n t i ty .13 T h e  le g a l en tity  is co n stru cted  as e c o n o m ic a lly  
in d ep en d en t w ith  an au to n o m o u s o rg a n isa tio n  w h ich  is  d irected  by  a w ill fo rm e d  o n ly  
am o n g  its m e m b e rs . T h e  g u id e lin e  fo r  all co m p an y  a c t iv it ie s  is the co m p an y  in terest, 
w h rereb y  th e  prim ary in terest o f  the co m p an y  is to  em p lo y  resou rces to  m a x im iz e  
p ro fits . T h e  m an ag em en t o f  the co m p a n y  is bou n d  b y  th e  com p an y  in terest and is not 
a llo w ed  to ta k e  ou tsid e in terests  in to  c o n s id e ra tio n .14
T h is  c o n c e p t can n o t, h o w e v e r , b e  su c c e ss fu lly  ap p lied  to co m p an ie s  w h ich  are 
m em b ers  o f  a group. T h e s e  are no lo ng er e c o n o m ic a lly  independent s in c e  a lin k  - 
u su ally  b ased  on the p are n t’s h o ld in g  o f  an a ffilia te d  c o m p a n y ’s sh ares, a lth ou g h  it can 
also  b e  b a sed  on other m ean s su ch  as in terlo ck in g  d irecto ra tes o r c o n tra c ts - ex ists  
b etw een  the co m p an ies fo r e c o n o m ic  p u rp oses. T h e  p re cise  aim  o f  the grou p  is to 
c o m b in e  the reso u rces o f  its m e m b e r  co m p a n ie s  to e n a b le  them  to co o p era te  c lo se ly . 
T h e  cen tra l grou p  m an ag em en t d eterm in es -m o re  o r  le ss- the m an ag em en t o f  the
especially p. 94f.; see for the scene in the United States Blumberg, The Law o f  Corporate Groups, 
Substantive Law (1987), p. 4.
12 The description of the economic phenomenon may bring out the problems of this organisational 
form. For the impossibility to develop a comprehensive legal definition of the group (Konzern) due to its 
indefinite essence, see the quotation at the beginning by Hachenburg (1934), supra note 1, and CREDA, 
Les Groupes de Sociétés - Une Politique Législative (1975), p. 193, the title of part 2, section 2; "La 
Vaine R echerche d ’une Definition du G roupe en Droit Français" and its explication.
11 For Great Britain Gower, supra note 9, p. 97ff.; for France Guyon, Droit des A ffaires (1990), 
6th ed., p. 128f.; for Germany Wiedemann, Gesellschaftsrecht (1980), Vol. 1, p. 196f.
14 See for the concept of traditional company law, its implications, and its conflict with the group 
structure, each of them on a comparative basis, Geßler, "Die rechtlichen Möglichkeiten internationaler 
Untemehmensverbindungen in der EWG", in Lutter (ed.), Recht und Steuer der internationalen 
Unternehmensverbindungen (1972), p. 13, 20; Druey, "Aufgaben eines Konzern rechts", in Schweizerischer 
Juristenverein, Referate und Mitteilungen 114 (1980), p. 303-313; Immenga, "Company Systems and 
Affiliations", International Encyclopedia o f  Comparative Law (1985), Vol. XIII, ch. 7, note 3.
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a ffilia te d  c o m p a n ie s ; their d ire c to rs , w h o  le g a lly  are a lo n e  re sp o n sib le  fo r  the 
m an ag em en t o f  th e  co m p a n y , d o no lo n g e r  (e n tire ly ) take th e  m a n a g em en t d e c is io n s  fo r  
th e  a ffil ia te d  c o m p a n ie s . T h e  g e n e ra l a s s e m b ly  is  n o rm a lly  e n tire ly  d o m in ated  b y  the 
p arent co m p a n y , a s  w e ll as a su p e rv iso ry  b oard  i f  it e x is ts . T h e  o rg an isa tio n a l o rd e r  o f  
the co m p an y  w h ic h  is  a  grou p  m e m b e r  is  th e re fo re  c h a n g e d , s in c e  it  is no lo n g e r  
d irected  b y  an in d ep en d en t d e c is io n -m a k in g  p ro ce ss  b u t is  su b o rd in ated  to  (q u a s i)  
in stru ctio n s o f  th e  p aren t co m p a n y  -  a ll th is  in s tr ik in g  c o n tra s t  to th e  s in g le  e n tity  
d o c tr in e . T h e  c h e c k s  and b a la n c e s  in  th e  co m p a n y  a c h ie v e d  b y  the d if fe r e n t  
co m p e te n c e s  o f  th e  com p an y  in s titu tio n s  are th e re fo re  d isto rted  by  the d o m in an t 
p osition  o f  the p a re n t in th em .
J T
T h e  co m p a n y  in terest m ay a ls o  b e  no lo n g e r the u ltim a te  g u id e lin e  for the 
d ecis io n s taken  b y  the a ffilia te d  c o m p a n y ’s d ire c to rs . A s  th e  parent co m p an y  p u rsu es 
its ow n s p e c if ic  en trep ren eu ria l in te re s ts , it w ill a lso  d e te rm in e  -to  a g re a te r  o r  le sse r  
ex ten t- th e  in te re s t o f  the a ffilia te d  c o m p a n y ; an ou tsid e in terest m ay su p ersed e  the 
in terest in the co m p a n y . T h e  p ro fit m a x im iz a tio n  p rin cip le  on  w hich  all sh a reh o ld ers  o f  
a co m p an y  n o rm a lly  agree and  w h ich  a ls o  se rv e s  the in te re s ts  o f  the c red ito rs  m a y  b e 
d ifferen t in the c a s e  o f  grou p s: m a x im iz in g  p ro fits  on b e h a lf  o f  the g rou p  is not a lw a y s  
sy n o n y m o u s w ith  m a x im iz in g  p ro fits  fo r  the a ffilia te d  co m p a n y . S u c h  a sh ift  o f  the 
su b s id ia ry ’ s p ro fits  (and a ss e ts )  m a y  b e  fa c ilita te d  by  the o ften  c lo s e  e c o n o m ic  
co o p era tio n  in th e  g rou p  w h ich  a llo w s  the tran sfer o f  p ro fits  and assets  in the fo rm  o f  
norm al b u s in e ss  tra n sa ctio n s. H o w e v e r, this v iew  on ly  o f  the dangers o f  the g ro u p  fo r 
the com p an y  is ra th er o n e-sid ed  as it d o e s  not m ak e a llo w a n c e s  fo r  the p o ss ib le  ( la rg e )  
ad v antag es fo r th e  a ffilia ted  co m p a n y  resu ltin g  from  its b e in g  part o f  a group. T h is  is 
sim ply  a sh ort su m m ary  o f  how  the n o tio n  o f  a u n ified  m a n a g em en t an d  the e c o n o m ic  
unity o f  th e  g ro u p  c a n  ch a n g e  the c o n c e p t  o f  the co m p a n y  as a sep arate legal e n tity  and 
m ay ca u se  d a n g ers  fo r  the o th e r  p a rtie s  w h ich  h av e a s ta k e  in the a ffilia te d  c o m p a n y .15
IS Groups also provide an institutional distortion at the level of the parent company, see especially 
the Lutter school, Lutter, "Organzuständigkeiten im Konzern", in Festschrift für Walter Stimpel (1985), 
p. 825ff.; Timm, D ie A ktiengesellschaft als Konzernspitze (1980); Hommelhoff, Die 
Konzernleitungspflicht (1982); however, as this study will not deal with this problem a further analysis 
is not necessary.
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In ord er to  s e e  how  re lev an t th e  p ro b lem  is in re a lity  and  to w h at e x te n t th e  
g rou p  has rep la ced  th e  m od el o f  the in d ep en d en t co m p a n y , it  is  u sefu l to tak e  a lo o k  at 
d ata  abou t the im p o rta n c e  o f  grou p s in  the e c o n o m ic  li fe  o f  F ra n ce , G e rm a n y , and  
G re a t B r ita in , re p re se n ta tiv e  c o u n trie s  o f  the M e m b e r  S ta te s  o f  the E u rop ean  U n io n .
I. The Importance of the Group in Economic Life
D u e to the poor d e fin itio n  o f  the g rou p , its great f le x ib ili ty  and  d iv ersità  there a re  n o  
co m p re h e n siv e  and  co m p a ra b le  o ff ic ia l  s ta tis tics  ab ou t th is  p h en om en on .
In G e rm a n y , 5 1 1  grou p s w ere o b lig e d  to se t up a c o n so lid a te d  g ro u p  a c c o u n t in 
1 9 8 6  fo llo w in g  an at that tim e a p p lic a b le la w ; 2 8 0  o f  th o se  c o n tro lle d  5 5 8 2  su b s id ia r ie s , 
thus on av erag e  a b o u t 2 0  p er parent. T h e  total tu rn ov er o f  th ese  g ro u p s w as 1 1 0 0  
b illio n s  D M , 2 .2  b ill io n s  D M  per g ro u p , and th e ir  sh are  o f  the total tu rn ov er o f  a ll 
G erm an e n te rp rise s  w a s  a p p ro x im ate ly  2 8 % . T h e  n u m b er o f  th e  groups in total d id  n ot 
grow  very  m uch b e tw e e n  1 9 7 0  and 1 9 8 6 , alth ou gh  the n u m b e r o f  the su b s id ia r ie s  p er 
parent g rew  ra p id ly .16 A cco rd in g  to a rough es tim a te , b e tw een  7 5 %  and 9 0 %  o f  the 
p u blic  co m p a n ie s  (A G s ) in G erm an y  a re  m em b ers o f  a g rou p , at least the sam e a m o u n t 
as the private lim ite d  co m p an ie s  (<GmbHs) . 17 G e n e ra l o p in io n  is th e re fo re  th a t fo r 
m ed iu m -size  or la rg e  en terp rises the g ro u p  is the m o st w id e ly  used stru ctu re .18
A  sim ilar situ atio n  can  be fou nd in F ra n ce . L in k s b e tw een  co m p a n ie s  are  v ery  
co m m o n  and the e c o n o m ic  sc e n e  is d o m in ated  by  larg e g ro u p s. It is estim ated  th at the 
m a jo r  grou ps h o ld  on av erag e  ab o u t 4 0 0  su b s id ia r ie s19. In recen t y e a rs , the g ro u p  
stru ctu re has no lo n g e r  been  used o n ly  by  larg e c o m p a n ie s ; m ed iu m -siz e  and sm a ll 
fam ily  b u sin e sse s  a lso  m ake use o f  th is  tech n iq u e  o f  o rg a n isa tio n , in w h ich  a ll fo rm s
10 (Callfass, "Ökonomische Analyse der Konzembildung", in Mestmäcker/Bchrens (eds.), D as  
Gesellschaftsrecht der Konzerne im internationalen Vergleich (1991), p. 20-23.
17 Ordelheide, "Der Konzern als Gegenstand betriebswirtschaftlicher Forschung", 
Betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung und Praxis 38 (1986), p. 294; Theisen, Der Konzern (1991), p. 1.
18 Wiedemann (1988), supra note 9, p. 7; Theisen, "Konzernorganisation", Die Betriebswirtschaft 
46 (1986) p. 747; Ordelheide, ibid., p. 294.
19 Cf. the study of 32 groups in France and their holding of shares in other companies,
CREDA (1975), supra note 12, p. I3ff., 341 ff,; for a survey cf. Antunes, Liability of Corporate Groups
(1991), p. 71.
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of companies can be involved20.
A study of the situation in the United Kingdom shows that in 1981 the 50 
largest British groups each had on average 230 subsidiaries, partly on many different 
levels and in extremely complex structures.21 A survey from 1993 listed 100.000 UK 
registered companies, which were part of groups headed by a UK company.22 British 
scholars have therefore concluded that there might be some evidence to suggest that the 
use of the group form may be more widespread in the United Kingdom than in other 
comparable economies.23
T h is  su m m ary  show s th e  o v e rw h e lm in g  im p o rtan ce  o f  the group form  fo r  
n ation al e c o n o m ie s . S t ill  g re a te r  is the s ig n if ic a n c e  o f  the group stru ctu re  fo r 
in tern ation al b u sin ess  o rg an isa tio n s. S e tt in g  up su b sid iaries a lm o st is the o n ly  p o ss ib ility  
fo r an en terp rise  to carry ou t b u s in e ss  on its ow n in fo re ig n  m arkets, th e re fo re  the 
g rou p  is the m o st im portant o rg a n isa tio n a l stru ctu re  fo r  in tern ation al e n te rp rise  
co o p e ra tio n  and fo r in tegratin g  m a rk e ts  (w ith  e x c e p tio n  o f  the m ark et i t s e l f ) .24 
F u rth erm o re , it sh o w s that in rea lity  th e  m od el for e c o n o m ic  o rg an isa tio n  is no lo n g e r  
the s in g le  in d ep en d en t co m p an y , bu t th e  g rou p  stru ctu re  w ith  several su b s id ia r ie s  - at 
least fo r m e d iu m -s iz e  and larg e e n te rp rise s .
II. Groups between Economic Organisation and Legal Structure
T h e  law  h as rea cted  to the o v e rw h e lm in g  im p o rtan ce  o f  g ro u p  stru ctu res by m e a n s  o f  
n ation al and E u rop ean  leg isla tio n  fo r  d iffe re n t Fields, e s p e c ia lly  in tax law , b a n k in g  and 
cap ita l m ark et law , labou r law , and -a lre a d y  m en tion ed - a cco u n ta n cy  law . In co m p a n y  
law  -a s  th e  o rig in a l fie ld  for the c la s s if ic a t io n  o f  g ro u p s- su ch  d ev elo p m en ts d id  not
20 Guyon (1993), supra note 9, p. 142f.
11 Tricker, Corporate Governance (1984), Ch.5.
22 Kompass, The Authority o f  British Industry - Parents and Subsidiaries 199311994 3rd ed. 
(1993), especially the introduction.
13 See Hadden, The Control o f  C orporate Groups (1983), p. I, 11; Prentice, "A Survey of the 
Law Relating to Corporate Groups in the United Kingdom", in Wymeersch (ed.), Groups o f  Com panies 
in the EEC (1993), p. 279.
24 See fourth reason for the draft proposal of the Ninth Directive in Company Law from 1984; 
published in Zeitschrift fiir Unternehmens- und Cesellschaftsrecht 14 (1985), p.446.
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take place to a great extent; in 1965, Germany enforced a special regime which 
acknowledges the unity of the group but is only applicable for groups in which A G s  are 
subsidiaries, only Brasil, Portugal, and Hungary followed its example. The German 
approach was thought to be comprehensive for A G s , but proved to be incomplete and 
in some regards insufficient even in its limited field of application.25 In other countries 
where no special regime for groups has been established, legislation has been adopted 
for a few, very specific points regarding groups, but, in general, in these countries and 
to a large extent also in Germany the phenomenon of the group is still dealt with by 
traditional company laws, in modified in part by courts. The question therefore still 
remains as to what the guiding considerations for company law with regard to groups 
should be. Different approaches can be found in order to determine the functions and 
the tasks the law has to fulfil in dealing with groups.
One approach which is mainly based on legal considerations views the group 
primarily as a distortion of company’s legal structure and the just balance of interests 
produced by these structures, as shown above. It is therefore especially concerned with 
the interests of minority shareholders and creditors of the affiliated company. As it is 
no longer possible to prohibit the formation of groups, especially by forbidding the 
shareholding of one company in another company, the protection of the affiliated 
company and, at the same time, of the interests of creditors and minority shareholders 
against the -at least detrimental- influence of the parent is to be seen as one way of 
assuring this; detriments which have arisen have to be copensated by the parent. This 
solution holds to the model of the company as an autonomous entity, whose 
independence should also be maintained by company law in a group. Consequently, the 
situation in which the company would be if it were not member of a group is reference 
point for balancing detriments, as a form of extending liability on the parent.
25 This approach accepts a unitary view of the group for groups based on contracts, AktG 
§§ 291 ff.; the provisions for de facto groups are oriented on the model of the company according to 
traditional company law, AktG §§311 ff. No allowances are made for changes by the group structure on 
the level of the parent company, see for the shortcomings of the treatment of groups in the AktG  1965 
Schneider, "Der Konzern als Rechtsform für Unternehmen1', in Mestmäcker/Behrens (eds.), Das 
Gesellschaftsrecht der Konzerne im internationalen Vergleich (1991), p. 563-565.
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Another approach is especially concerned with large enterprises and in particular 
groups as powerful private institutions whose power for "private government" is not 
publicly or democratically legitimized. Here, the managers strive in particular for an 
increase o f their power and use their managerial discretion for the unregulated creation 
of industrial empires. The main task for the law with respect to groups would thus be
the establishing of a strict legal control over these or to integrate representatives of all>
affected interests, especially representatives of the public interest, in the decision­
making process o f the group.26
A more modest approach would take the function o f the group as a starting 
point, namely that it is a form of business organisation. From the economic point of 
view, a business organisation especially serves reasons o f efficiency27; thus the main 
purpose of a business organisation is to provide an organisation for an efficient28 
allocation of resources, in a market economy efficient business organisations are 
especially characterised (and, at the same time, their efficiency is measured) by their 
success in the market(s) and a maximization of their profits by market transactions. 
Business organisations may also serve further goals, but their structure has to be aligned 
particularly to the predominant goal o f efficiency and market success.
By providing the economic organisations which are necessary for an efficient 
resource allocation, the power which is inevitably inherent in a large enterprise/group
26 For the corporation see Mason, The Corporation in M odem Society (1960), p. 7-9; Steinmann, 
"The Enterprise as a Political System", in Hopt/Teubner (eds.), C orporate G overnance and  
D irectors’Liability (1985), p.401ff.; for groups Hadden (1983), supra note 23, passim; id., "Inside 
Corporate Groups", 12 International Journal o f  the Sociology o f  law  (1984), p. 271 ff.; Bercusson. "The 
Significance of the Legal Form of the Group Enterprise in the United Kingdom", in Sugarman/Teubner 
(eds.), Regulating Corporate Groups in Europe (1990), p.267ff.. With a different starting point 
Hommelhoff (1982), supra note 15, p. 499, who attempts to use internal organisation law for the group 
in order to install checks and balances for the power inherent in the group, especially by granting greater 
competences to the general assembly in all questions which are relevant for group matters.
27 See only Williamson, "The Modem Corporation", 19 Jou rn al o f  Economic Literature (1981), 
p. 1537f., 1564.
28 For the main definitions of efficiency by Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks see Posner, Econom ic 
Analysis o f  Law  (1992), 4. ed., p. 12-14; Kiiblcr, "Effizienz als Rechtsprinzip", in Baur et al. (eds.), 
Festschrift Steindorff (1990), p. 694f. In this study the term "efficiency" will be used in the sense of the 
Kaldor-Hicks concept, therefore an allocation of resources is efficient if the benefit of the winners is 
greater than the harm done to others, so that the winners could compensate the others. For a special 
treatment of efficiency regarding organisations see below note 35.
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and necessary for fulfiling its taks is economically and therefore socially justified; the 
group is therefore legitimized by pursuing the goal of efficiency.29 These goals o f 
efficiency and profit maximization by transactions in the markets also control the 
exercise of power by the group. The group is not an instrument for the accumulation of 
power for use by the management in an arbitrary way afterwards but is only entitled to 
use its power for a specific purpose - to secure an efficient resource allocation. 
Competition in the various markets which the group is exposed to -especially product 
markets, financial markets and the market for corporate control, and markets for Ioans- 
ensures that the enterprise pursues the legitimizing goal of efficiency. Further internal 
control mechanisms, in addition to the checks and balances already established by 
company law, especially the integration of further interests into the company as 
proposed in the previous approach, should be secondary only to the control exercise by 
the market. New internal control mechanisms are only necessary if it can be shown that 
the market forces are not strong enough to control the group and to compel it to focus 
its activity on the achievement of efficiency and market success. This would be 
especially the case if competition were lacking.30 However, this primarily is a task for 
anti-trust law rather than for company law.31
See Buxbaum, "Corporate Legitimacy, Economic Theory, and Legal Doctrine", 45 Ohio State 
Law Review (1984), p. 518f.
cf. Buxbaum, ibid., p. 515ff.. especially p. 518f., 520-525. For market and competition as 
main controlling device see the representatives of the ordo-liberal school Streit/Mussler, "The Economic 
Constitution of the European Community - from Rome to Maastricht", EU f Colloquium Papers, DOC.IUE 
72/94 (1994), p. 6; Hayek, "The Corporation in a Democratic Society: In Whose Interest Ought It To and 
Will It Be Run?", in Studies in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (1967), p. 300ff., who argues for the 
profit principle (only in favour of the shareholders) as only goal of the enterprise in order to exercise 
control over it. In a similar respect critical regarding Hommelhoff’s approach (supra note 26) Rittner, 
"Konzemorganisation und Privatautonomie", Archiv der civilistischen Praxis 183 (1983), p. 306f., 307f., 
as a strict legal determination of the group organisation by company law would not lead to better control 
of the company, but would prevent the interested groups from searching autonomously for their own 
solution.
Jl The group form is well-suited to concentration in the economy; according to one approach, the 
law for groups of companies therefore should -among others tasks- avoid advantages of concentration in 
a group structure, cf. Monopolkommission, Hauptgutachten Vil (1986187), note 796ff.; Kübler/Schmidt, 
Gesellschaftsrecht und Konzentration (1988), p. 7ff., 16ff.; very critical see Rittner, "Gesellschaftsrecht 
und Unternehmenskonzentration. Zu den Vorschlägen der Monopolkommission", Zeitschrift fü r  
Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht 19 (1990), p. 203ff. However, it seems to be preferable not to 
superimpose the values of anti-trust law on company law for groups as the latter does not discriminate 
between groups which are able to avoid competition and those which choose the group as a suitable form 
for their business purposes or even find their origin in déconcentration purposes. See for a very 
straightforward subordination of the law for groups under antitrust law Emmerich/Sonnenschein, 
Konzernrecht (1993), 5th ed., p. 19, who want to deduce from the German and European antitrust law
[
28
Company law must take the main aims of companies, namely of being business 
organisations and o f carrying out efficient economic activity, as a basis in order to 
shape a legal structure for them.32 Its fundamental task is to enable a number of people 
to combine their resources and to participate collectively in economic activity. It sets up 
rules for an expedient adjustment of the shareholders’ behaviour, but it also has to take 
into account the other groups which have a stake in the company, such as creditors, 
employees, and the public.33 Company law structures the company in order to provide 
for an equal and just balance of the affected interests and has to safeguard these 
interests against typical dangers. Translated into the language of economics, there must 
be incentives for the different groups of stakeholders to make available the necessary 
resources; the law has to provide these incentives by establishing mechanisms which 
safeguard the resources against misuse by other groups afterwards. Thereby, law defines 
a suitable general standard for the protection of affected interests, whose subjects can 
have confidence in the fairness of the defined standard, and avoids high (transaction) 
costs which would occur if the necessary protection had to be individually re-negotiated
that the law for groups in tendency has to be unfavourable for groups and want to justify the primacy of 
the protection of the creditors and affected shareholders from this starting point. However, it does not 
seem to be reasonable to incorporate a general statement of antitrust law as a value into the law for 
groups without taking over the differentiations in antitrust law. Moreover, there seem to be no reasons to 
derive the protection of creditors and minority shareholders from quasi metaphysical values of the 
economic order, if, instead, the relevant criteria can be taken from the tasks and function of company law 
in this specific field. In general, company law is not a value-free, only neutral organisational law without 
effects on the economic order, but it seems to be too narrow to view company law mainly under the 
aspect whether the legal structures of companies further concentration or not. company law has to take 
into account mainly other values out of other relations, not only the standing of the company in 
competition. Therefore the principle of free competition in a decentralised economic order with small 
economic units is not the main aspect for the design of companies by company law, it may be taken into 
account as one aspect among others, see Wiedemann (1980), supra note 13, p. 725-730. By showing that 
the group leads to economic efficiency one may help to reduce prejudices against this organisational form, 
see Teubner, Recht als autopoietisches System (1989), p. 154.
n  A further aspect for determining the tasks of company law can be distributive justice, see 
Behrens, "The Firm as a Complex Institution", Journal o f Institutional and Theoretical Economics 141 
(1985), p. 62ff. However, it is not clear in favour of which groups of stakeholders (only creditors and 
shareholders are relevant for this study as the affected parties in a narrowly defined field of company law, 
excluding employees) and in which fields company law has to consider effects of distributive justice and 
inhowfar these effects cannot at the same time be expressed in efficiency considerations. See in general 
for the limits of the efficiency principle in law, but also for its possible wide range of application, 
especially in such economically formed areas as company law, Kiiblcr (1990), supra note 28, p. 687ff.; 
for a limited competence of economics in a discussion of the legal system in this respect even Posner
(1992), supra note 28, p. 14.
33 Lehmann, "Das Privileg der beschrankten Haftung und der Durchgriff im Gesellschafts- und 
Konzernrecht", Zeitschrift fur Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht 15 (1986), p. 346.
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for each transaction of resources. It is in this way that company law is able to serve 
efficiency.34
Company law not only forms relationships between the affected groups 
efficiently but also provides for legal structures by which the goal of business 
organisations can be performed efficiently, to carry out various kinds of economic 
activity.35 Company law provides for a number of different legal structures to be 
chosen by economic organisations according to their needs - the requirements which 
make it possible for the concrete firm in question to carry out efficient economic 
activity.36 It not only provides for different types of business organisations, so that 
enterprises can select the most suitable for their purposes, but it also shapes the internal 
legal structure of the company so that efficient economic activity can be carried out; 
thus that companies are able to achieve the purposes for which they are set up without 
unnecessary legal restrictions.
In both respects the function of the law does not seem to perform a leading role 
in inventing new structures for enterprises, but rather to accomodate economic 
developments and to stabilize organisational forms which already have been 
developed.37 The structures of collective participation in economic activity were 
shaped by economic realities before being transformed into legal structures. As a later 
development of company law (at least in Germany) the combination of different legal 
forms also derived from particular economic realities for which the legal sphere then 
established rules.38
34 cf. Posner (1992), supra note 28, p. 396f.
35 See for the difference between the general resource allocation efficiency and the efficiency of the 
organisation itself Milgram/Roberts, Economics, Organization, and Management (1992), p. 23f.; Scholz, 
"Effektivität und Effizienz", in Frese (ed.)T Handwörterbuch der Organisation (1992), 3rd ed., columns 
533f., the efficiency of organisations is measured with regard to the outcomes the organisations generate, 
more precisely the relationship beween inputs and outputs is measured, particularly in comparison to other 
organisations performing the same task.
36 See Schanze, "Recht und Ökonomie des Unternehmens", Zeitschrift für die gesamte 
Staatswissenschaft 137 (1981), p. 695-698.
37 In general for these goals as main task of "enterprise constitutional law" Teubner (1989), supra 
note 31, p. 151 f.
38 cf. Schanze (1981), supra note 36, p. 698.

\T h e  in tern a l o rg a n isa tio n  o f  a c o m p a n y  is  m o re  d eterm in ed  by  e c o n o m ic  a n d  
o rg a n isa tio n a l co n s id e ra tio n s  th a n  by  a  g iv e n  le g a l stru ctu re  to  the co m p a n y , a lth o u g h  
th e  le g a lly  p ro v id ed  in te rn a l stru ctu re  c le a r ly  p red eterm in es th e  o rg a n isa tio n a l s tru c tu re  
to  so m e  ex te n t. T h e  le g a l ru les sh o u ld  n o t in te rfe re  w ith  the req u irem en ts o f  an e f f ic ie n t  
e c o n o m ic  o rg a n isa tio n ; rath er, they  h a v e  to  adapt to  a p rio rly  d ev elo p ed , e f f ic ie n t  
co m p a n y  o rg a n isa tio n  and  to s ta b ilis e  th is  by  le g a l m ean s - w ithou t, o f  c o u rs e , 
n e g le c tin g  o th er in te re s ts  w h ich  m ust b e  p ro tected . T h e re fo re , th is ap p roach  d oes n o t 
im p ly  that th e  law  h a s  to a c c e p t ev ery  d e v e lo p m e n t c o m in g  fro m  the e c o n o m ic  sp h e re  
e v e n  i f  the d e v e lo p m en t w ou ld  per s e  en d an g er th e  p ro tectio n  o f  the in te re s ts . 
N e v e rth e le ss , by a d o p tin g  an e f f ic ie n t  in tern a l o rg a n isa tio n  and  fo rm u la tin g  it in to  
g e n e ra l legal ru les w h ic h  fu lfil th e  req u ired  e c o n o m ic  fu n ctio n s , the law  se ts  a g e n e ra l 
stan d ard  and d ire cts  the g en era l d e v e lo p m e n t o f  the o rg a n isa tio n a l stru ctu re tow ard s a 
m o re  e f f ic ie n t  o rg a n isa tio n .
T h e s e  co n s id e ra tio n s  ab o u t e f f ic ie n c y  as the m a in  task  o f  com p an y  law  can  a ls o  
b e  em p loy ed  for th e  grou p  stru ctu re . T h e  im p o rta n ce  o f  g ro u p s e n jo y in g  ad eq u ate  
co n d itio n s  fo r an e f f ic ie n t  e c o n o m ic  a c tiv ity  fo r th e m se lv e s  and -on  a m acro  le v e l- fo r  
th e  w h ole  eco n o m y  ca n  b e  seen  in the s ig n if ic a n c e  o f  grou p stru ctu res fo r  e c o n o m ic  
l i fe . B e c a u se  o f  th e  w ide d iffu sio n  o f  grou p  stru ctu res in rea lity , it m ay  a lso  b e  
su rm ised  that they are  e s p e c ia lly  su itab le  fo r  m any e c o n o m ic  p u rp oses as e n terp rises  
c h o o s e  the group stru ctu re  am o n g  v a rio u s  c o m p e tin g  co m p an y  form s. C o m p an y  law  
sh o u ld  th erefo re  a c c e p t the stru ctu re  o f  the grou p  as a  norm al type o f  o rg a n isa tio n a l 
stru ctu re  for a b u sin e ss  e n terp rise . T h e  o th e r  a lte rn a tiv e , s tric t ad h eren ce to the m o d el 
o f  the au tonom ou s and in d ep en d ent co m p a n y  and the attem p t to e n fo rc e  it fo r  
su b s id ia r ie s  is a c o n c e p t  ill-su ited  for g ro u p s and d o es not fit  th e  real d e v e lo p m e n ts .39 
T h e re fo re  the first, b e fo re  m en tion ed  ap p ro a ch  for d ea lin g  w ith  groups, w h ich  w a s  
m a in ly  co n cern ed  w ith  legal c o n s id e ra tio n s , is u n ab le  to d eal ad eq u ately  w ith  the 
p o s itio n  o f  a co m p an y  in a grou p  and to  d ev e lo p  an ad equ ate leg a l stru ctu re  fo r  the 
g ro u p . M o reo v er, a s  g rou p s per se  are n o t forb id d en  by  co m p an y  law  in the d iffe re n t 
c o u n tr ie s , it w ou ld  b e  a co n tra d ic tio n  if, o n  the o th er hand, co m p an y  law  se t c o n stra in ts
3 0
39 S e e  G e f l le r  ( 1 9 7 2 ) ,  s u p r a  n o te  1 4 , p. 1 3 , 2 0 f .
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on  grou p s, h in d erin g  th e  e f f ic ie n c y  o f  th e ir  o rg a n isa tio n  o rg a n ise d  and k ee p in g  th em  
a w a y  from  p e rfo rm in g  e f f ic ie n t  b u s in e ss . T h e  law  h as a lso  to  g iv e  atten tion  to its  
e f f ic a c y . I f  e c o n o m ic  la w  is  d ire c tly  o p p o se d  to  the g a in s  o f  e f f ic ie n c y  by  th e  e c o n o m ic  
a c to rs , it  runs the r is k  o f  not b e in g  a c c e p te d  by the actors a f fe c te d  and th e re fo re  o f  
b e in g  e ffe c t le s s . In  th e  d ire c t  c o n fro n ta tio n  b etw een  the la w  and  the e f f ic ie n c y  (o r  
p ro fit)  p rin cip le , there  is  a  hu ge in c e n tiv e  fo r  the e c o n o m ic  a c to r  to fo llo w  the la tte r ; 
th e  law  cou ld , th e re fo re , lo se  its ch a n c e  to  h ave an im p a ct on th e  ac tiv ity  o f  g ro u p s.40 
O n  the other hand, a c c e p tin g  the grou p  fo rm  d oes not m ean  th at th e  law  sh ou ld  p ro vid e 
it  w ith  a legal p e rso n a lity  o r  a lig n  the g ro u p  to g iv en  le g a l fo rm s  o f  co m p a n ie s , b u t it 
sh o u ld  take the grou p  se r io u s ly  as on e  fo rm  o f  b u s in e ss  o rg a n isa tio n , s ta b ilise  it, an d  
d raw  up - i f  n e c e ssa ry - sp e c ia l ru les fo r  it .
T h e  q u estion  a r is e s  as to w h at the req u irem e n ts  fo r  an e f f ic ie n t  law  o f  co m p an y  
g ro u p s are . O n the o n e  hand, su ch  law  h a s  to  se cu re  the in terests  o f  the a c to rs  w ho a re  
a f fe c te d  by the grou p in o rd er to  avoid  th e  e x te rn a liz a tio n  o f  c o s ts .  On the o th er hand, 
it has to provide fo r a d eq u ate  le g a l co n d itio n s  so  that the g rou p  a s  an o rg an isa tio n  ca n  
w o rk  e ffic ie n tly . T h e  k ey  fo r e ff ic ie n t  g ro u p  activ ity  se e m s to  lie  in the pu rpose fo r  
w h ich  they are fo rm ed : to c o m b in e  the re so u rce s  o f  the d iffe re n t co m p a n ie s  in ord er to  
re a c h  com m o n  g o a ls  w h ich  co u ld  not b e  attained  if  the co m p a n ie s  w ere  s till 
u n co n n ected , and to b e  ca p a b le  o f  actin g  a s  a uniform  e c o n o m ic  u nit. T h is  co m b in a tio n  
o f  reso u rce s  is a ch ie v e d  by  su b stitu tin g  (a t  least p artly ) a m ark et re la tio n sh ip  b etw een  
th e  co m p an ies by in tern a l o rg an isa tio n  . T h e  internal o rg a n isa tio n  and the d e c is iv e  lin k  
b e tw e e n  the co m p a n ie s  is  p rod u ced  b y  u n ified  m an ag em en t, e x e rc ise d  o v e r  all the 
g ro u p  m em bers. T o  re a c h  th ese  co m m o n  g o a ls  the co o rd in a tio n  o f  m em b ers  and a 
u n ifo rm  org an isa tion  is need ed .
T h e  cru cia l p o in t w ith  reg ard  to co m p a n y  law  se e m s to b e  the q u estio n  w h eth er 
it le a v e s  enou gh  room  fo r  a cen tra l m an ag m en t so  that th e  grou p  can  a ch ie v e  the g o a ls  
o f  co o p era tio n  for w h ic h  it has b een  fo rm e d . T h e  c o n c e p t o f  trad itio n al co m p an y  law
40 T e u b n e r ,  " U n it a s  M u l t ip le x ”, Zeitschrift fü r Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht 2 0  ( 1 9 9 1 ) ,  
p . l 9 2 f . ;  H ü b n e r , " R e c h t  u n d  O r g a n is a t io n " ,  in G r o c h l a  ( e d .) ,  Handwörterbuch der Organisation ( 1 9 8 0 ) ,  
2 n d  e d . ,  c o lu m n  2 0 0 7 .
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is  m ore o r le ss  o p p o se d  to u n ified  m a n a g e m e n t; as a resu lt th e  cen tra l m a n a g em en t 
se e m s to b e  im p ed ed  in  its  g o a l to a c h ie v e  th e  b e n e fits  o f  a  co m b in atio n  o f  th e  
co m p an ie s* re so u rce s . N e v e rth e le ss , to b u ild  up a  u n iform  o rg a n isa tio n  and e x p lo it  th e  
a d v a n ta g e s  o f  c o m b in e d  re s o u r c e s , v a r io u s  d e g re e s  b e tw e e n  a c e n tra liz e d  a n d  
d ecen tra liz ed  m a n a g e m e n t seem  to  be p o s s ib le . In  ord e r not to  d ism iss  the co n ce p t o f  
co m p a n y  law  from  th e  v e ry  b e g in n in g  in  the a n a ly s is  o f  w h eth er  the co n c e p t an d  
p ro v isio n s o f  co m p an y  law  are c o m p a tib le  w ith  an e f f ic ie n t  e c o n o m ic  activ ity  o f  th e  
g ro u p , w e m ust take th e  m in im u m  o f  c e n tra l m a n a g em en t as a p o in t o f  co m p ariso n , an d  
e s ta b lish  the m in im u m  d eg re e  w h ich  is n e c e ss a ry  to a ch ie v e  the advantages o f  th e  
re so u rce  co m b in a tio n . F o r  the resu ltin g  o rg a n isa tio n a l stru ctu re  w e  m ust ask  w h eth er it 
ca n  be b a lan ced  w ith the leg al c o n ce p t, the s in g le  en tity  d o c tr in e , and w hether the le g a l 
p ro v isio n s can  be in terp reted  in su ch  w ay th at they are c o m p a tib le  w ith this e c o n o m ic  
o rg a n isa tio n a l form .
T h is  d o es not m ean  that th e  o n ly  ta sk  o f  co m p an y  law  is , by dealin g  w ith  
g ro u p s, to fa c ilita te  u n ified  m an ag em en t to an ap p rop riate  e x te n t fo r  the e f f ic ie n t  
a c tiv ity  o f  th is o rg a n isa tio n a l fo rm ; but it sh o u ld  a lso  p ro v id e an  e ff ic ie n t  stru ctu re  fo r  
the in terests o f  o th er g ro u p s w h ich  h ave a  s ta k e  in the c o m p a n y .41 A t the ou tset, th e  
s in g le  entity  d o ctrin e  h as b een  d ev e lo p ed  to  g u aran tee  a b a la n c e  betw een  the a ffe c te d  
a c to rs  in the in d ep en d en t co m p a n y . G iv e n  the situ ation  has c h a n g e d  and the grou p  h as 
in rea lity  b e c o m e  the p re v a ilin g  m od el th e  a b o v e -d e fin e d  e c o n o m ic  stru ctu re m ay b e  
su ita b le  as a b a s is  to d e term in e  h o w  a d e v ia tio n  to th is e x te n t fro m  the legal c o n c e p t  
c h a n g e s  the p osition  o f  the a ffe c te d  a c to rs , and  to  d ec id e  w h eth er the trad itio n al c o n c e p t  
o f  co m p an y  law  is s t il l  ca p a b le  o f  p ro v id in g  a  b a la n c e  o f  th e  a ffe c te d  in terests  o r  
w h eth er add itional m e a su re s  for th ese  a re  n e ce ssa ry . A s  an a lte rn a tiv e  to the so lu tio n  
that com p an y  law  sh o u ld  adapt to  the c h a n g e d  situ a tio n  one c o u ld  c la im , as the f irs t , 
e a rlie r-m e n tio n e d  ap p ro ach  d oes, that it sh o u ld  e n fo rce  the c o n c e p t  o f  the co m p a n y  as
41 c f .  K a l l f a s s  ( 1 9 9 1 ) ,  s u p r a  n o te  1 6 ,  p . 4 8 ,  w h o  a r g u e s  fo r  a  s e le c t iv e  le g a l  f r a m e w o r k  w h ic h  
m a k e s  th e  e x p lo i ta t io n  o f  e c o n o m ie s  p o s s ib le ,  b u t  p r e v e n ts  o th e r  c o n c e r n e d  a c t o r s  fr o m  b e in g  n e g a t iv e ly  
a f f e c t e d  b y  th is  o r g a n is a t io n a l  fo rm . F o r  a n o th e r  t y p ic a l ly  e c o n o m ic  p o s it io n  w h ic h  w a n ts  to  l im it  th e  
g o a l  o f  c o m p a n y  la w  g r a n t in g  a c o n s id e r a b le  la t itu d e  to  c o m p a n ie s  in  o r d e r  to  g iv e  th e m  th e  p o s s ib i l i t y  
o f  b u i ld in g  an  e f f i c i e n t  in te r n a l  o r g a n is a t io n  W i l l i a m s o n ,  " T h e  E c o n o m ic  A n a ly s is  o f  In s t i tu t io n s  a n d  
O r g a n iz a t io n s  - in  G e n e r a l  a n d  w ith  R e s p e c t  to  C o u n tr y  S tu d ie s " ,  OECD Working Papers, N o . 1 3 3  ( 1 9 9 3 ) ,  
p .5 3 .  N e v e r th e le s s ,  h e  is  a l s o  c o n c e r n e d  w ith  l im it in g  m a n a g e r ia l  d is c r e t io n .
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an independent entity, object to the central management of groups, and protect the 
affected interests in this way. However, as company law does not forbid groups per se 
this solution seems to be highly unrealistic, for not to say unreasonable. Thus company 
law should adapt its concept to protect other interests in the given situation and should 
not try to capture reality.42
III. Structure of the Study
E c o n o m ic  and le g a l s tru c tu re  o f  th e  group a re  to b e  an a ly sed , th u s e c o n o m ic  and  leg a l 
co n s id e ra tio n s  d e te rm in e  the stru ctu re  o f  th e  stu d y . T h e  grou p  is  a  p h en om en on  w h ich  
c a n  b e  p laced  o n  the b o rd e rlin e  b etw een  e c o n o m ic s  and  law , a s  it co n sis ts  o f  leg a lly  
in d ep en d en t co m p a n ie s  w h ich  are linked  b y  an e c o n o m ic  and o rg an isa tio n a l co n n e c tio n ; 
b o th  d isc ip lin e s  have to  co o p e ra te  fo r u n d erstan d in g  th e  p h en o m en o n . T h e  law  has to 
ta k e  in to  a cco u n t the e c o n o m ic  p re co n d itio n s  o f  the g ro u p  and th e  e c o n o m ic  ad v an tag es 
o f  its  fo rm atio n  in ord e r to an a ly se  legal q u e s tio n s  reg ard in g  the ro o m  for cen tra l grou p 
m a n a g e m e n t granted  b y  the law , the c h a n g e  o f  the s in g le  en tity  d o ctrin e  by the group, 
an d  th e  im pact th is c h a n g e  has on the p o s it io n s  o f  the v ario u s a ffe c te d  a c to rs .43 I f  the 
law  d o es not c o n s id e r  the e c o n o m ic  a s p e c ts , it w ill not b e  a b le  to p erce iv e  the 
c o n se q u e n c e s  o f  the le g a l p ro v isio n s and w ill  fa il to  p ro v id e  fo r  an e ffic ie n t (a n d  ju s t )  
re g u la tio n  o f  the grou p  p h en o m en o n .44
In its e c o n o m ic  se ctio n  this paper w ill start by e x a m in in g  w h at gain s in 
e f f ic ie n c y  can  b e  a ch ie v e d  through c o o rd in a tio n  o f  re so u rce s  w ith in  en terp rises ; thus,
13 S e e  G e ß le r  ( 1 9 7 2 ) ,  s u p ra  n o te  1 4 . p. 1 3 , 2 0 f . ;  H o m m e lh o f f  ( 1 9 8 2 ) ,  s u p r a  n o te  1 5 , p . 2 2 4  n o te  
3 6 ,  w h o  s ta te s  th a t " i t  is im p o s s ib le  to  e n f o r c e  th e  f a c t u a l  in d e p e n d e n c e  o f  a  c o m p a n y  w h ic h  h a s  b e c o m e  
d e p e n d e n t  o n  a n o th e r  c o m p a n y  b y  th e  m e a n s  o f  th e  l a w " .
43 F o r  th e  n e e d  to  e m p lo y  e c o n o m ic  c o n s id e r a t io n s  in  o r d e r  to  g ra sp  th e  g r o u p  s e e  a lr e a d y  
M e s t m ä c k e r ,  Verwaltung, Konzerngewalt und Rechte der Aktionäre ( 1 9 5 8 ) ,  p . 7 ;  K ir c h n e r ,  " Ö k o n o m is c h e  
Ü b e r le g u n g e n  z u m  K o n z e r n r e c h t ”, Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht 1 4  ( 1 9 8 5 ) ,  p . 
2 1 5 ,  2 1 8 f . ;  H ü b n e r  ( 1 9 8 0 ) ,  s u p r a  n o te  4 0 ,  c o lu m n  2 0 0 7 .
44 F o r  th e  f r u i t f u ln e s s  o f  a n  a p p l ic a t io n  o f  t h e  e c o n o m i c  a n a ly s i s  o f  la w  in  th is  r e s p e c t  K i ib le r  
( 1 9 9 0 ) ,  s u p r a  n o t e  2 8 ,  p .  6 8 7 f f . ,  e s p e c i a l l y  p .  6 9 3 f . ,  7 0 3 f .  S e e ,  h o w e v e r ,  R e u t e r ,  " D i e  
P e r s o n e n g e s e i l s c h a f t  a ls  a b h ä n g ig e s  U n t e r n e h m e n " ,  Zeitschrift für Handelsrecht 1 4 6  ( 1 9 8 2 ) ,  p . 2 6 - 2 9 ,  
a r g u i n g  fo r  a  c o m p le te  p r im a c y  o f  le g a l  v a lu e s  w i t h o u t  ta k in g  in to  a c c o u n t  e c o n o m i c  c o n s id e r a t io n s  o r  
c o n s e q u e n c e s  b u t o n ly  f o r  ta k in g  in to  a c c o u n t  t h e  l im its  o f  e c o n o m i c  k n o w le d g e  s o  th a t  e c o n o m i c  
c o n s id e r a t io n  s e e m  to  b e  a b s o lu te ly  u s e le s s  fo r  th e  l e g a l  d e a l in g  w ith  th e p r o b le m ;  th e  q u e s t io n  r e m a in s  
w h e t h e r  it  is  r e a l ly  e n o u g h  i f  th e  la w  d e s ig n s  a r t i f i c ia l  c o n s t r u c ts  w ith o u t  r e f e r r in g  to  ( e c o n o m ic )  r e a l i ty .
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the ad v an tag es that an  in tern al c o o rd in a tio n  o f  re so u rce s  m ay h a v e  o v er  m ark et 
co o rd in a tio n . T h e n , it  w ill  fo c u s  on th e  in te rn a l o rg a n isa tio n  o f  e n te rp rise s  and a n a ly se  
in w h ich  w ay a d e c e n tra lise d  m a n a g em en t c a n  a ch ie v e  th e se  g o a ls . G e n e ra l p attern s o f  
an e f f ic ie n t  in ternal o rg a n isa tio n  w ill b e  w o rk e d  ou t, w h ereas th e  o rg an isa tio n a l 
c o n ce p ts  o f  d iffe ren t en te rp rise s  w ill v ary  in  d eta il as th ey  adapt th e ir  o rg an isa tio n  to
in d iv id u al need s. S p e c ia l a tten tion  w ill b e  p a id  to the n eed s o f  m ed iu m -sized  o r  larg e>
en terp rises  as th e se  m o stly  c h o o se  th e  g ro u p  stru ctu re .
A fte r  th is, it w ill b e  show n h ow  th is  e c o n o m ic  o rg a n isa tio n a l form  fits  the 
stru ctu re  o f  the gro u p  -c o n s is tin g  o f  d iffe re n t le g a l e n titie s - and in  w h ich  w ay grou p s 
m u st b e  in tern ally  o rg a n ise d  in ord er to re a c h  the g o a ls  o f  e f f ic ie n c y  o f  a firm  w ith  a 
m in im u m  o f  u n ifica tio n  and u nified  m a n a g e m e n t. In th is  se ctio n  the p osition  o f  the 
co m p a n ie s  w ithin  the g rou p , the task s w h ich  th ey  m ust perform  and  how  grou ps can  be 
stru ctu red  in g en era l w ill be ex a m in ed . F u rth e rm o re , it w ill b e  d em on strated  how  
m an ag em en t re sp o n sib ilit ie s  are d iv id ed  b e tw e e n  the top  o f  the grou p  and the s in g le  
a ff il ia te d  co m p an ie s  in ord er to en su re  th a t the group as a w h o le  can  a ch ie v e  the 
ad v an tag es o f  firm  co o rd in a tio n  o r , to put it  m o re  s im p ly , the d eg re e  to w hich  u n ified  
m a n a g em en t is n eed ed . T h e  tasks o f  the c e n tr a l grou p m an ag em en t w ill be d e fin e d  in 
m o re  d eta il, the areas o f  d e c is io n -m a k in g  w ith  w h ich  it is  co n ce rn e d , how  s p e c if ic  its 
d e c is io n s  can  be in the d ifferen t f ie ld s , and th e  m ean s it u ses  to p rep are  and e n fo rc e  its 
d e c is io n s . In a fin a l s tep  in the e c o n o m ic  p a rt it w ill be sh ow n  w hy the o rg a n isa tio n  in  
a g ro u p  stru ctu re is e s p e c ia lly  e f f ic ie n t  fo r e n te rp rise s  and how  the d iv is ion  o f  b u sin e ss  
a c tiv ity  upon d iffe re n t leg al co m p a n ie s  is p a rticu la rly  appropriate fo r  e ffic ie n t fo rm s o f  
e c o n o m ic  o rg an isa tio n .
T h e se  fin d in g s m u st be be co m p a re d  w ith  co m p an y  law in ord er to s e e , in 
w h ich  fie ld s com p an y  law  (in  the in terp re ta tio n  o f  the co u rts ) a lread y  c o m p lie s  w ith  the 
e c o n o m ic  req u irem en ts o f  e ff ic ie n t  o rg a n isa tio n  and w h ich  o f  th e se  can  b e  in terp re ted  
a c c o rd in g  to th o se  req u irem en ts. A s  m e a n s  o f  co m p ariso n , the co m p an y  law  o f  the 
G e rm a n  GmbH w ill b e  u sed . T h e  c o n c e p t a n d  the p ro v isio n s -w h ich  restric t th e  u n ified  
m a n a g e m e n t and the a c tiv ity  o f  the grou p  w ith  a GmbH as an a ffil ia te d  co m p a n y - w ill 
b e  co m p a re d  to the e c o n o m ic  c r ite r ia  d e v e lo p e d  re ferrin g  to w h ich  a re a s  and in w h ich
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way a minimum of unified management should be performed. Furthermore, references 
to other legal orders will be made if there are solutions which have been developed for 
comparable legal problems.
Next, the extent to which the described organisational structure with a minimum 
of unified management can affect the position of a company's creditors will be 
examined. In this field it will be analysed whether the limited liability of an affiliated 
company in a group can be justified, and therefore whether the legal precautions are 
still sufficient for the creditors, i.e. whether their risk is unpredictabe and increased by 
the simple fact that the company is member of a group, and whether the privilege of 
limited liability can still be justified for members of a group in general. Since the 
assuming liability on the parent for the debts of a subsidiary can be understood as a 
restriction on the unified management and a sanction on a too far-reaching 
determination of the activity of the subsidiary by the parent, the extent to which a 
unified management is compatible with the limited liability of the affiliated companies 
is also important for the group. If an organisational model can be developed according 
to which the parent company is in all cases exempted from liability for a subsidiary, the 
parent can adjust its planning to this structure. This would also increase the legal 
certainty in this field. Particular attention will be paid to recent cases of the 
Bundesgerichtshof (BGH) in which it adjudicates on piercing the corporate veil and 
assigning liability to the parent company for debts of the subsidiary, and which have 
not fixed precisely the circumstances in which the liability should be extended to the 
assets of the parent. Regarding this point a comparative method will also be used.
B. Economic Organisation of an Enterprise
I. Market and Hierarchies in Terms of Efficiency
Markets and firms represent alternative methods of coordinating production, and more
I
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generally, of coordinating the allocation of resources.45 In the market, the allocation of 
resources is coordinated without any central planning, and instead prices direct the use 
of the resources in the market. Prices in this case are adjusted by the forces of supply 
and demand and are such that supply equals demand for each good. The resources are 
led to its actual use by a series of exchange transactions in the market. Within the firm, 
on the contrary, market transactions are eliminated, and the price mechanism is usually 
replaced by the decision of the entrepreneur. The allocation of resources is no longer 
dependent on the changes of relative prices; instead, the management formulates general 
strategies and goals, develops specific plans to realize these goals, and then directs 
people to carry out their specified roles using the resources they have been allocated, 
administrative processes and procedures are instituted to guide activity. The 
supersession of the price mechanism seems to be the distinguishing mark of the firm. 
As firms and markets are alternative modes for allocating resources, or -to put it in 
another way- for organising the same transaction, an explanation for the choice is 
needed. The question of why all the allocation of resources are not determined by prices 
and why firms build such a costly administrative structure to perform in the same way 
as the market arises. In general, the question is therefore why are there firms at all?46
If the market were in all instances the most efficient organisation for the 
allocation of resources, there would be no need for any other economic organisations. 
These organisations can be thought of as arising and supplanting the market when they 
offer more efficient mechanisms for coordinating economic activity and if the market 
does not lead to efficient outcomes. Thus, to answer the question one should examine 
which goals of efficiency can be served by firm co-ordination of resources rather than 
by market coordination, or -to put it in another way- under which circumstances a firm 
can coordinate resources at less cost than the market. There may be other reasons for 
a firm co-ordination of economic activity apart from those of efficiency, such as the 
quest for monopoly gains or the wish for power by managers. However, markets and *4
45 The need for various means to coordinate economic activity derives from the concept of 
specialization as the basis of modem economy; this allows for enormous increases in productivity, see c.g. 
Milgrom/Roberts (1992), supra note 35, p. 25f.
44 See Coase, "The Nature of the Firm", Econom ica 4 (1937), p. 388f.
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firms as alternative modes for allocating resources and organising the same transaction 
are competing with each other. Moreover, the firm itself is attached to the market and 
has to prove there that it is able to allocate resources more efficiently than alternative 
methods. As an economic organisation, especially in the long run, will not be viable if 
it is less efficient than another which serves the same purposes, it is assumed that the 
main reason for firm co-ordination is that o f greater efficiency.47 Hence, in the market
r
for institutions the firm can be chosen instead of the market for reasons of efficiency in 
order to allocate resources.48 A greater efficiency is o f benefit to the firm, as it 
strengthens its competitivity in the market, as well to the whole economy, as it leads to 
a more efficient allocation of resources.49
The goals of efficiency which can be achieved by firm coordination of resources 
may not only explain why firms exist but may also determine what a firm does50, 
therefore which functions of the market can be taken over by the firm for reasons of 
efficiency. To refer back to the topic of this study, this may help to understand why a 
unified management of companies in a group may be more efficient than a market 
relationship between them, and which functions may therefore be taken over by internal 
cooperation.
Gains of efficiency by the allocation of resources in a firm can mainly (not 
exclusively) result from exploitation of economies of scale and scope, or from the 
reduction of the costs of the transactions involved. Transaction costs economies are 
closely related to those of scale and scope and they need to be addressed simultaneously 
to understand which goals of efficiency can be achieved by firm coordination.51
47 Williamson (1981), supra note 27, p. 1537, 1564; explicitly for the reliance on competition for 
an evolutionary selection of the more efficient form, id., The Economic Institutions o f  Capitalism (1985), 
p. 17, 22f., 273; more general for efficiency as a positive principle which determines the survival of all 
kinds of organisations, Milgram/Roberts (1992), supra note 35, p. 24f.
** cf. Coase (1937), supra note 46, p. 386ff.
49 Coase, "The Problem with the Social Costs", 3 Journal o f  Law&Economics (1960), p. 15-17.
50 cf. Coase, "Industrial Organization: A Proposal for Research", in Fuchs (ed.), Policy Issues and  
R esearch Opportunities in Industrial Organization (1972) p. 63.
51 Chandler, Scale and Scope (1990), p. 17f.; Williamson (1981), supra note 27, p. 1547-49; 
transaction costs have to be adressed simultaneously with economies of scale and scope as in a world 
without transaction costs economies of scale and scope could be exploited by one firm which as well 
produced for its rivals, see Williamson (1985), supra note 47, p. 92 note 8.
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Further insights for the advantages of firm coordination may also be gained by an 
examination of how the different arrangements deal with information. After this, the 
different explanations for the advantages o f firm coordination will be applied to the 
most common developments of the firm to vertical and horizontal integration.
1. Economies of Scale and Scope
Firm coordination can lead to gains of efficiency over market coordination by exploiting 
economies of scale and scope in all areas in which a Firm operates. Economies of scale 
can be defined as those which result when the increased size of a single operating unit 
handling (especially producing or distributing) a single product reduces the unit cost. 
The decrease of unit costs particularly result from a reduced share of fixed and sunk 
costs per unit and advantages of specialization of equipment and workers.52
At first, economies of scale are based on (normally very capital intensive) 
production technology by means of which a large volume of output can be produced at 
low unit costs. However, a production plant alone is not able to exploit economies of 
scale, but all parts of the firm have to be adjusted to the volume of sales the firm 
anticipates. The firm has to adapt its sales forces, its supply, and distribution facilities 
and equipment to the anticipated scale of operation. Mistakes associated with incorrect 
perceptions of scale by parts of the organisation - e.g. having too few raw material or 
components to keep an expensive factory operating at full capacity or delays in the 
supply of these - can have grave implications on other parts of the enterprise and can 
lead to very high costs. Thus, the management of the firm will make special efforts to 
coordinate the different parts of the firm very precisely or will take care that the various 
units coordinate themselves so that the possible economies of scale can really be 
achieved by close cooperation between the various parts of the firm. Moreover, 
economies of scale do not only depend on the size of the firm, but the management also 
has to reflect the (anticipated) size of the market for the product. If the market does not 
demand the volume of goods produced the unit costs rise rapidly as the sunk costs of
52 Chandler, ibid., p. 17; Biihner/Weinberger, "Cash-Flow und Shareholder Value", 
Betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung und Praxis (1991), p. 198.
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the capital investment and the fixed costs remain independent. Therefore, the 
management will forecast the expected growth of the market by taking into account that 
scale economies make lower prices possible and that this may increase demand and will 
attune the whole firm to the anticipated size of the market.53
Economies o f scope are those cost reductions resulting from the use o f processes
■,r g .
by which more than one product can be produced within a single unit. Cost 
advantages result from the common use of indivisible production factors. These can be 
common components which are cheaper to produce together for several products, they 
can make a better use of management or financial means. Economies of scope entail all 
the needs for coordination as economies of scale; close cooperation is required between 
the parts which make available the common production factor and the parts which use 
it. The coordination problems are frequently even more complex as coordination in 
planning may be required among managers responsible for different products.
Scale (or scope) economies can also appear at the level o f product 
development.3 *5 A firm may acquire generalized expertise in the important skills that 
are required to design and market new products in a set of related markets or using a 
set of related technologies. Modern management theory has labelled such economies 
with the name "core competencies of the firm". Core competencies are in principle a 
shared element of the various products; the particularity of this element is that the cost 
of building up this competency is shared with a series of products that do not yet exist, 
since the gains of the newly acquired capabilities may only come over a longer period 
of time. The different parts of the firm involved have to cooperate closely to achieve 
these common competencies.
Particularly important in relation to this study is that economies of scale and
33 See Chandler, ibid., p. 21-34; Milgrom/Roberts (1992), supra note 35, p. 106f.
M See Tcece, "Economies of Scope and the Scope of the Enterprise", 1 Journal o f  Economic 
B ehavior and Organization (1980), p. 223ff.; Chandler, ibid., p. 17, 21-32; Bhhner/Weinberger (1991), 
supra note 52, p. 198f.; Milgrom/Roberts, ibid., p. 107.
35 See Milgram/Roberts, ibid., p. 106f., p . 554f.; for the importance of these 
competencies for the modern business enterprise from a historical point of view, Chandler (1990), supra 
note 51, p. 41 f.
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scope do not only depend on having the technological facilities which make the mass 
production of a good possible; but for achieving the actual cost advantages the 
management has carefully to coordinate the complementary56 activities all necessary 
to exploit the actual economies of scale and scope in the enterprise. Thus, the actual 
economies depend on management and organisation; the visible hand of administrative 
coordination is able to make more intensive use of resources than the invisible hand of 
market coordination could do.57 Transferred to a group in which the member 
companies fulfil the different complementary functions of an enterprise it shows that 
group management’s coordination is necessary in order to exploit possible economies 
of scale and scope for all the companies together.
2. Economising on Transaction Costs
The coordination of resources by a firm can also lead to gains in efficiency (in 
comparison to market coordination) by economising on transaction costs. The 
transaction cost approach finds its origins in the work of Ronald Coase; it has been 
expaunded and made more operable in the work of Oliver Williamson.
a. Basis of Transaction Costs Economics
Transaction costs economics does not see the firm mainly as a production function the 
size of which is determined by the (technological) necessities o f exploiting economies 
of scale and scope but, rather, focuses on the firm as a governance structure for 
transactions.58 Its basis is a comparative analysis of different organisational forms with 
respect to their ability to govern transaction at lower costs: in the framework of 
transaction cost economics, the firm has a role to play in the economic system if it is 
capable of organising transactions at lower costs than those which would be incurred if
56 See for the complementarity of activities, Milgrom/Roberts, ibid., p. 108.
s7 See for a very impressive historical explanation how management was necessary to achieve 
these gains in efficiency in the modern business enterprise Chandler, The Visible H and (1977), p. 364; id. 
(1990), supra note 51, p. 24-28.
58 See Williamson, supra note (1981), p, 1539f; see also Chandler, supra note (1990), p. 14f. who 
gives more weight to the firm as an instrument to achieve economies of scale and scope.
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the same transactions were carried out through the market. It sees the distribution of 
economic activity between firms and markets as being mainly dependent on their ability 
to economise on transaction costs, the tendency -due to the institutional competition 
between the different organisational forms for the most efficient solution- being to adopt 
the organisational mode which best economises on transaction costs.59 The limit to the 
size of the firm would be set when the scope of its operation has expanded to the point 
at which the costs of organising additional transactions within the firm exceeds the costs 
of carrying out the same transactions through the market or in another firm.60
The transaction, as the basic unit of analysis, occurs when a good or service is 
transferred across a technologically separable interface61 and is mediated by different 
governance structures in different economic organisations. Since this mediation causes 
costs in the economic systems, transaction costs can therefore be defined as the costs 
for running the (respective) economic system.62 Transaction costs economics views ail 
transactions in contractual terms, independent whether they are governed by the market 
or by other economic organisations, especially firms, in order to facilitate a comparative 
analysis. Transaction costs are therefore seen in all possible economic organisations as 
costs related to a contract which may be concluded and executed in the market or 
within the firm.63 These costs can be divided into the ex ante costs of drafting,
59 Williamson, "The Logic of Economic Organization", 4 Journal o f Law, Economics & 
Organization (1988), p. 66; id. (1985), supra note 47, p. 273.
Coase (1937), supra note 46, p. 394ff.; id., "The Nature of the Firm: Meaning", in 
Williamson/Winter (cd.), The Nature o f the Firm - Origins, Evolutions, and Developments (1991), p.48.
61 For the definition of transaction see Williamson, "The Economic Analysis of Institutions and 
Organizations - in General and with Respect to Country Studies", OECD Working Paper No. 133 (1993), 
p.56: Glossary: "Transaction".
ft2 Coase (1937), supra note 46, p. 390ff.
“  Williamson (1985), supra note 47, p. 20. See, however, also id., "Comparative Economic 
Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives", 36 Administrative Science Quarterly 
(1991), p. 271-276, where the firm is no longer viewed only as a nexus of contracts and it is argued that 
each generic form to govern transactions needs to be supported by a different kind of contract law. 
However, the opinion that a transaction is governed by a contract also within firms is not retracted, 
therefore it is not felt that an organisation may be a relationship which is completely different from that 
based on a "market contract” - whereby the organisation, as a company, may also be based on an initial 
contract. Critical in this respect also Filzroy/Kay, "The Corporation in an Uncertain World: Competition, 
Efficiency, and Governance", Sugarman/Teubner (eds.), Regulating Corporate Groups in Europe (1990), 
p. 162 and Tcubner (1989), supra note 31, p. 155ff. Critical of the broad definition of transaction costs, 
which is equally applicable for transactions organized across the market and those organized within a 
firm, as making the transaction costs theory too vague, Demsetz, "The Theory of the Firm Revisited", in 
Williamson/Winter (cds.), The Nature o f the Firm: Origin, Evolution, and Development (1991), p. 161 Ff.
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negotiating, and safeguarding an agreement, as well as to the ex post costs o f 
maladaptation and adjustment which arise when contract execution is misaligned as a 
result of gaps, omissions, and unanticipated disturbances.* 64
The concrete goal of transaction costs economics is to align transactions, which 
have different attributes, with different governance structures, which have different costs 
and competencies, in a discriminating way to economise transaction costs. Accordingly, 
the defining attributes for transactions need to be identified, and competencies 
(incentive and adaptive attributes) of alternative governance structures need to be 
described.65
b. Behavioural Assumptions and Distinguishing Dimensions of Transactions
As the costs of a transaction vary with the characteristics o f the human-decision makers 
and the properties of the transaction, transaction cost economics has first to define its 
behavioural assumptions and the critical dimensions of the transaction. The same set of 
factors which are crucial for determining the cost of a market transaction apply to firms, 
although somewhat differently. Transaction cost economics tries to see "man as he is", 
therefore it takes bounded rationality and opportunism as assumptions about human 
behaviour. As a cognitive assumption, bounded rationality refers to human behaviour 
that is intendedly rational, but only limitedly so.66 The limits of rationality are reached 
only under conditions of uncertainty and/or complexity. Under these conditions all 
complex, especially long-term contracts, are unavoidably incomplete.67 Opportunism 
extends the conventional assumption that economic agents are guided by considerations
He instead differentiates between transaction and management costs (and production costs) which cannot 
be clearly distinguished in reality and have all to be taken into account to define the boundaries on one 
side of which resources are managed within a firm and on the other side of which are price directed 
across markets.
64 Williamson (1985), supra note 47, p. 20f.; id. (1993), supra note 61, p. 56: Glossary: 
"Transaction Costs"; with another discrimination bewcen coordination and motivation costs, 
Milgrom/Roberts (1992), supra note 35, p. 29f,
65 Williamson (1985), supra note 47, p. 18, 41.
66 Simon, Administrative Behavior, 2nd. ed. (1957), p. XXIV; taken up by Williamson, Markets 
and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications (1975), p. 2If.
67 Williamson (1988), supra note 59, p. 68.
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of self-interest, as it involves self-interest seeking with guile. This refers to incomplete 
or distorted informational disclosure, also to outright lying and cheating if the actors 
think it serves their own interest. Promises to behave responsibly that are unsupported 
by credible commitments will not, therefore, be reliably discharged. Differences 
between societies in socialisation can have an impact on both opportunism and bounded 
rationality, but do not ensure that this human behaviour disappears.68 *
Furthermore, it is important to identify the critical dimensions with respect to 
which transactions differ; the most critical dimension for describing transactions and 
aligning them with the different governance structures is the condition of asset 
specifity.^ Parties to a transaction which is supported by nontrivial investments in 
durable, transaction-specific human or physical assets are effectively operating in a 
bilateral trading relation with one another and become bilaterally dependent. Asset 
specifity refers to the degree to which assets can be redeployed to alternative uses and 
by alternative users without any sacrifice of productive value. It is a critical factor 
because competition is eliminated due to the transaction specific investment. In the 
same way, the intertemporal government of contractual relation is complicated. A 
condition with effective competition at the outset can be effectively transformed into 
one of bilateral supply thereafter because rivals cannot be presumed to operate on a an 
equal basis once the substantial investment in transaction specific assets are put in 
place. The relationship of seller and buyer has been transformed into a bilateral 
monopoly, because of asset specifity and transaction-specific savings. As a result, a 
governance structure which attenuates opportunism and otherwise infuses confidence is 
needed.70
These three factors have profound implications for choosing between 
alternative contractual relationships. If one of the behavioural assumptions -bounded
“  Williamson (1985), supra note 47, p. 47f., 68; id. (1993), supra note 61, p. 11, 15f.
w Williamson (1985), supra note 47, p. 30; the other important dimensions for the characterising
transactions are the frequency with which they occur (ibid., p.60f.) and the degree and type of uncertainty 
to which they are subject (ibid., p.56-59). Milgrom/Roberts (1992), supra note 35, p.32f., define two other 
dimensions of transactions, namely difficulty of performance measurement and connectedness to other 
transactions.
™ Williamson (1985), supra note 47, p. 53f., 61-63; id. (1988), supra note 59, p. 77f.

44
rationality and opportunism- were absent, a solution could be found because it could be 
based on comprehensive planning and the efficacy of court adjudication (in the case of 
the absence of bounded rationality), or on the promise to fulfil the contract efficiently 
and to seek only fair returns at contract renewal (in the case of the absence of 
opportunism). In the absence of asset specifity in a situation, the competition of fully 
contestable markets can be relied on.71 If the factors are united, each of the three 
devices fails. In this case the assessment of alternative organisational modes which deal 
with this behaviour in a better way than the market and serve therefore gains of 
efficiency, becomes necessary. As one solution, internal organisation may be proposed 
because it permits economies to be realized in initial contracting, monitoring, and 
building up confidence72.
c. Dimensionalizing Governance and Discriminating Alignment
For transaction costs economics it remains to define the attributes of markets and firms 
(hierarchies) as different governance structures and to assign them to the different kinds 
of transactions. Most characteristic o f market transactions73 is that they take place 
between autonomous traders. For them, the market is a highly flexible instrument to 
adapt their actions on the information which is contained in the price. The market offers 
a high incentive intensity, and changes in efforts expended have an immediate effect on 
the compensation of the parties.
The main feature of internal organisation, on the other hand, is the common 
ownership which spans both sides of the transaction so that the transaction -when 
removed from the market and organised within the firm- is subject to an authority 
relation.74 This authority relation can decide problems between the different sides of
71 Williamson (1985), supra note 47, p. 30-32.
73 Williamson (1975), supra note 66, p. 21-27; id. (1988), supra note 59, p. 68.
73 For the characteristics of market transactions, see Williamson (1985), supra note 47, p. 73f.; 
id. (1991), supra note 63, p. 271-279; id. (1981), supra note 66, p. 1547f.
74 See Williamson (1985), supra note 47, p. 75-78; id. (1991), supra note 63, p. 274-280. It is 
important to note that for internal organisation an authority relationship is necessary, mere unified 
ownership is not sufficient to evoke this effect, see id. (1975), supra note 61, p. 95-102. In Williamson’s 
theory there is no comprehensive treatment of authority, direction, and organisation, see critical in this 
regard, Fitzroy/Kay (1990), supra note 63, p. 162f.; Teubner (1989), supra note 31, p. 155-157.
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the transaction definitely, invoke fíat in the case of disputes, and can adapt the different 
sides to each other by consequential decision-making. The relationship in internal 
organisation is characterised by more cooperation and normally by a greater confidence, 
and is furthered by the lower incentive intensity in a firm. Instead of the higher 
incentive intensity of the market, unwanted side effects can be checked as hierarchy can 
exercise administrative control and has its own incentives. The employees of the firm, 
especially the managers, are subject to an internal auditing and evaluation procedure.75 
Bureaucratic costs are the price which the building of the hierarchy causes. Moreover, 
since the hierarchy frees the units from the strict control of the market and its high 
incentive intensity, this may lead to losses of efficiency.76
Especially due to the bureaucratic costs which arise with building a hierarchy, 
it is plausible to assume that transactions will be organised by markets unless market 
exchange gives rise to serious transaction costs. Markets can also exhaust more fully 
economies of scale and scope and can aggregate uncorrelated demand in the case of 
nonspecific transactions. Therefore, the market is appropriate for nonspecific 
transactions of both the occasional and recurrent kinds.77 78
As asset specifity for governing recurrent transactions deepens and a bilateral 
dependency results, internal organisation enjoys advantages over market contracting 
with regard both to contract-writing and contract-execution stages.8 For safeguarding 
their specific assets both parties of the transaction will insist upon contractual 
safeguards, which are costly to negotiate. During the stage of executing, the contract 
disturbances may appear, especially in case of necessarily incomplete long-term 
contracts, and a need for adaptations arises. Among autonomous traders costly self- 
interested bargaining or even court adjudication is likely to take place. The authority in 
internal organisation, on the other hand, allows adaptations to be made in a
75 Sec Williamson (1975), supra note 66, p.35f.
76 These reasons are mainly responsible for the limits of firm co-ordination, Williamson (1985), 
supra note 47, ch.6, p. 131-162; id. (1988), supra note 59, p.80-83.
77 Williamson (1985), supra note 47, p.73f.; id. (1981), supra note 27, p.l547f.
78 For the advantages of internal organisation, see Williamson (1981), supra note 27, p.l548f.; id. 
(1991), supra note 63, p.278f.; id. (1985), supra note 47, p.76-80.
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consequential way, without the need to consult, complete, or revise interfirm agreements 
- this makes a faster adaptation on the environment possible. Where a single ownership 
entity spans both sides of the transactions, a presumption of joint profit maximization 
is warranted. Furthermore, the authority can handle internal relations, especially 
disputes, more appropriately than arbitrators or courts, as it has easier and more 
complete access to the relevant information.
To sum up, the market is apt to govern nonspecific occasional or recurrent 
transactions whereas internal organisation is the more efficient means for recurrent and 
highly specific transactions. Referring back to the topic of this study, by substituting a 
market relationship for internal organisation in the above described conditions 
economies on transaction costs are possible, therefore joining companies together in a 
group relationship would lead to a more efficient resource allocation. Between markets 
and hierarchies as polar modes there are hybrid modes which can be the more efficient 
governance structures for transactions whose attributes lie inbetween.79 These modes 
will not be analysed as this study is only interested inhowfar a submitting the group 
companies to a hierarchical decision-making process can be more efficient than a 
market relation between them.
3. Implications of Information for the Choice of the Organisation
Some insights for the choice between markets and firms as different means to allocate 
resources may be given by their ways of dealing with information. Information and 
knowledge80 are fragmented among members of society; there is no knowledge shared 
by all of them and no member of society can possess all existing knowledge and 
information.81 Economically relevant information and knowledge is both localized and 
dispersed throughout the whole economy. This fragmentation of knowledge forms a key 
problem in allocating resources for their most efficient use and in adapting it to
79 For a complete survey, Williamson (1991), supra note 63, p. 269ff.
80 Knowledge will hereinafter be used to indicate stored and applied information.
81 See Hayek, "The Use o f  Knowledge in Society", 35 American Economic Review  (1945), p. 
519f.
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changing circumstances. The allocation of resources to its most efficient use depends on 
planning; the question, thus, is how an allocation of resources can be performed if the 
knowledge which is necessary for the planning is dispersed among separate individuals. 
The problem then is to find a way of utilizing knowledge which is initially dispersed 
among the individuals, in order to build an efficient plan for the whole system and to 
communicate to the individuals the parts of the plan which are relevant for them and on 
which they can base their plans and decisions. The question with regard to markets and 
organisations in this respect is how they can deal with the fragmented information and 
knowledge, and which system -under which circumstances- leads to more efficient 
economic activity and to a more efficient allocation of resources. The efficiency of the 
procedure depends especially on whether the system is always able to reach an efficient 
decision, how much information has to be transmitted for efficient planning, how 
precisely and rapidly the information is transferred, which system can make the fullest 
use of existing information, and how changes are communicated so that the system can 
be adapted to them.
Also with regard to informational aspects, the market is a very decentralised 
system for allocating resources. The decisions about the use of resources are left to 
individual consumers and productive units with whom the local knowledge of 
preferences, endowments, and production technology and possibilities resides. The 
additional information which is needed for these individuals to adjust their plans with 
those of others and to fit their decisions into the whole system is conveyed by prices. 
The (changing) prices -resulting from changes in offer and demand- coordinate the 
resources in such a way that an efficient allocation is achieved as prices in competitve 
markets express the value of a good in its best use.82 The local knowledge of 
consumers and producers does not have to be transmitted in detail to a central planning 
office - which would then coordinate resources with respect to the information 
transmitted in order to achieve an efficient allocation of resources so that only the 
relatively small amount of information represented by prices and offers to buy and sell 
is transmitted. The price system also communicates by changes in relative prices the
H2 See Posner (1992), supra note 28, p. I3f.
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economically relevant information about changes in reality, expressed in changes of 
offer and demand. Everyone can adjust their plans to these changes and in this way 
coordinate them with others. In this way, the price system leads to an efficient 
allocation of resources again, and the coordination of resources is achieved 
automatically.83
In situations in which no other information than prices is needed for an 
efficient resource allocation (for different circumstances see below) the market therefore 
in general permits an efficient allocation of resources with a minimum of information 
transmitted under full exploitation of local information and knowledge. It is therefore 
extraordinarily efficient for communicating the relevant information. As changes in the 
economy are immediately translated into changes in the relative prices, the market is 
also an effective means to rapidly adapt to a changing reality.
Organisations deal with information in a different way to that of the market. 
Organisations, especially firms, can be viewed as repositories, with specialized stocks 
of productive information and knowledge.84 Business firms are organisations which 
know how to do things, and they can accumulate common information about the nature 
of technology, the product involved, about the necessary resources and capabilities, and 
so on/5 In reality, it is mostly not difficult to identify and distinguish the areas of 
competence of most of the largest corporations, since a firm normally has a specific 
range of productive knowledge.86 Above mentioned examples demonstrating the 
knowledge of firms are the exploitations of economies of scale which are based on 
learning curve effects and a general greater expertise resulting from an increased
83 Hayek, ibid., p. 519ff.
84 Demsetz (1991), supra note 63, p. 171-174; Winter, "On Coase, Competence, and the 
Corporation", in Williamson/Wintcr (cds.), The Nature o f  the Firm - Origin, Evolution, and Developement 
(1991), p. 189-191; Favereau, "Marchés internes, marchés externes", Revue éconmomique 1989, p. 297; 
Zeleny, Milan, "Management Support Systems: Towards Integrated Knowledge Management", 7 Human 
Systems Management (1987), p. 68.
85 Imai/Itami, "Organization and Market Interpenetration", 2 International Journal o f  Industrial 
Organization (1984), p. 298f.
86 As knowledge and information is costly to create and to maintain the firm has knowledge only 
in a limited field, this limited special knowledge also defines the boundaries of the firm, see Demsetz 
(1991), supra note 66, p. 173.
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number of goods produced and the development of core competencies, together with the 
generalized expertise of firms to design and to market a new product in a related set of 
markets or to use a set of related technologies.87 This productive information and 
knowledge is not merely an economic contrivance of the individuals currently 
associated with the firm, but is established in processes and routines while individual 
human members come and go. Firms can therefore store more information than one 
person can possess over a longer period of time and perform this function largely by 
extending in time the association of inputs, especially human service inputs, with the 
firm.88
Moreover, organisations are also capable of bringing new information into the 
organisation.89 New information can be produced in the organisation itself by its 
members or can come from outside, in the case of firms, especially from the market.90 
The new knowledge is acquired only on the basis of the already existing knowledge and 
is connected with it; innovation is easier for the firm in areas where it already has some 
degree of relevant knowledge. By integrating new knowledge, the organisation is also 
able to adapt to a changing world.
The already-existing knowledge in the organisation can be the basis for a more 
efficient procedure for the coordination of resources than the market. First, processes 
and routines developed in the firm can coordinate the activities of different people in 
the firm very closely without the need for an always new coordination.91 Second, an 
active coordination of resources and activities may be more efficiently performed by the 
firm than by the market. In the markets, the resources are allocated by using (the 
information included in) prices; in the firm, instead, the coordination of resources and 
activities is achieved by hierarchical decision-making or cooperation/communication 
between the involved members/parts of the firm. The organisational coordination of
87 See Milgrom/Roberts (1992), supra note 35, p. 106f.
88 Winter (1991), supra note 84, p. 190f.
w Winter, ibid., p. 189-191; Ladeur, Postmoderne Rechtstheorie (1992), p. 196ff.
90 See Nonaka, "Creating Organizational Order Out of Chaos: Self-Renewal in Japanese Firms", 
30 California Management Review  (1988), p. 59-62.
91 Milgrom/Roberts (1992), supra note 35, p. 92.
T*
1,
i

50
resources can perform especially better if there is already some specialized knowledge 
inherent in the firm for the best solution o f the particular resource allocation problem, 
and slight failures in achieving the right coordination can cause great costs. Among 
others, these can be resource allocation problems in which it is known in advance that 
a very precise coordination of resources or activities in time or in another respect is 
necessary or that there is only one person or unit needed to fulfil a particular task.92
Theoretically, the price system could also be used to coordinate resources in 
such situations but as it does not exploit the knowledge which already exists, it leads 
to unreasonable information demands and works very slowly. Moreover, it may be 
impossible to obtain the relevant information, in order to determine the right prices 
which coordinate the resources in the required way. In such cases, the coordination by 
prices can lead to high costs of asynchronous behaviour or a duplication of activities. 
A coordinator who takes advantage of special knowledge inherent in the organisation 
about the problem can drastically reduce the amount of information required and reduce 
the costs of errors associated with more indirect coordination methods as prices.93 
Therefore, the coordination of resources within an organisation by its generic 
coordinative means of direction, decision, and cooperation may be more efficient than 
that of the market. The inherent knowledge of the organisation can be exploited for the 
best solution of a resource allocation problem and closer coordination can be 
achieved.04
For other resource allocation problems more information is also needed than 
the market delivers by changing prices. If  there are increasing returns to scale, 
information is needed in order to determine the quantity which the market will accept, 
which often cannot be determined with regard to the price as there may be no prices at 
which supply is equal to demand.95 If an optimal decision cannot be based on local 
knowledge and on the information conveyed by prices alone, external information is
1.2 See the for explanation in detail Milgrom/Roberts (1992), supra note 35, p. 91-93.
1.3 Milgrom/Roberts, ibid., p. 103-106.
1.4 cf. Demsetz (1991), supra note 63, p. 172.
,,s For a detained explanation see Milgram/Roberts (1992), supra note 35, p. 74f., 99f.
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needed. For these decisions, too, organisations may help to gather the necessary
information and to store it so that it is available -at least partly- for future
* * 06opportunities.
The storing and producing of information in the organisation marks the great 
difference with respect to the market, which generates and transmits information about 
the best use of resources only at a certain point of time by* the means of (changing) 
prices.97 The advantage of this normally lies in its ability to adapt immediately to 
changes in the economy by changes in relative prices and to induce a rapid change of 
individuals by transferring this information rapidly. Organisations can solve resource 
allocation problems for which knowledge about the best solution is required on the 
basis of the knowledge inherent within them and can achieve closer coordination. They 
are less flexible than the market in adapting to rapid change; nevertheless, they are also 
able to change by creating and integrating new knowledge and combining it with what 
already exists. The market as a very decentralised resource allocation mechanism has 
the general advantage that only a very little information has to be transmitted, while the 
firm performs a more centralized mechanism which is more appropriate for the above- 
described circumstances. However, how centralised or decentralised the decision-making 
mechanism in a firm is depends on its internal structure; this question will be treated 
below. Thus, by submitting different companies to a hierarchical decision-making 
process the information and knowledge of the different companies can be combined 
very closely by organisational means so that a much larger basis of existing knowledge 
is created for decisions about the allocation o f resources in the future.
4. Results for the Functions of an Enterprise
Through these explanations the functions of the market which the firm can take over for 
reasons of efficiency can be described and justified. The main forms in which a firm 
takes over functions from the market are those of vertical and horizontal integration. 
These two developments show how a firm supersedes the market mechanism by
n
Milgrom/Robcris, ibid., p. 92f., 113.
cf. Favereau (1989), supra note 84, p. 298f.
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subordinating functions to administrative decision-making. By taking over the functions 
of the market in this way, the modern business enterprise began to emerge in the last 
century, and has remained the dominant form of business organisation until today.98 
These fields are also the most important areas for cooperation between companies in a 
group.
Another form of combination of different units in an enterprise is the 
conglomerate. Its advantages are often felt to be a puzzle in the economic literature. As 
the units o f the conglomerate are active in unrelated fields of business, the advantages 
of firm coordination can only appear with regard to the inputs, especially capital. 
However, it seems likely to assume that such inputs can be more efficiently coordinated 
by the market.99 As the conglomerate does not seem to show the above- stated 
advantages of firm over market coordination, and a strong coordination of its different 
units does not seem to be necessary, the problems which are posed by the coordination 
of companies in a group form also do not appear to a significant extent. Hence, this 
form will not be dealt with.
The various functions which the firm internalises by vertical integration can still 
be seen in the structure of the firm as it builds various units for different functions. 
These units are subordinated to a managerial hierarchy, which coordinates and controls 
the functions instead of the market; and frequently for each function a special 
department of the enterprise is established.100 A similar situation for groups of 
companies is common, and the companies are coordinated as the different units of the 
the enterprise.
Taking the production unit o f an enterprise as the starting point, a very common
98 See Chandler (1977), supra note 57, p. 376.
99 Sceptical about the advantages of the conglomerate form, see Kallfass (1991), supra note 16, 
p. 27; for a positive approach which explains the advantages of the conglomerate by the better 
information which inside managers have about the different parts of such an enterprise in comparison to 
the fragmantary information of the capital market, see Williamson (1975), supra note 66, p. 158-162.
100 For the quintessence of the structure of the modern business enterprise from a historical view see 
Chandler (1977), supra note 57, p. 287-289. Descriptions of firms in different branches p.289-304; 
summarized in Chandler (1990), supra note 51, p. 14.
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step for an enterprise is to integrate forwards into marketing and distribution, and to 
form a sales department.101 Independent sales organisations can enjoy economies of 
scale and scope together with specialized knowledge as they handle the products of 
different manufacturers and different product lines, and are specialized in their sales 
activity. However, in modem economies, firms often offer highly specialized products. 
The advantage of the independent sales organisation has diminished as these products 
need specific investments, particularly specialised storage and transportation facilities 
and specialised skills in selling, installing, and maintaining the product. If the 
independent intermediary makes these product-specific investments, its ability to exploit 
economies of scale and scope is reduced and transaction costs are increased due to asset 
specifity. An integrated sales force allows for closer coordination and a better 
adjustment to the specific product. The special knowledge of an internal sales force can 
also be utilized to report back effectively on customer reaction, needs and suggestions; 
the additional information which cannot be obtained only by market prices is especially 
important in order to obtain and hold a market share large enough to assure the 
economies of scale in production. This information helps the enterprise to build core 
competencies in this field. Moreover, internal organisation can provide for better 
control, by that is able to protect against externalities and to provide for weaker 
incentives which are adequate if it is difficult to evaluate performance and nonselling 
activities.
The reasons for the enterprise to integrate backwards by building a purchasing 
organisation to take the place of the commercial intermediaries or by manufacturing its 
own inputs are fairly similar.102 The advantages of scale and scope of the independent 
suppliers are reduced when the necessary inputs for the product require highly specific 
investments, which would increase transaction costs. Planning for specialized products 
in an integrated organisation entails consultation between those who sell the product, 
those who make it, and those who supply parts or systems for it. Together they can
101 cf. for the reasons for forward integration, Chandler (1990), supra note 51, p. 28-31; 
Williamson (1985), supra note 47, p. 105-114; Milgrom/Roberts (1992), supra note 35, p. 552ff.
102 For the reasons for backward integration see Chandler, ibid., p. 31; Williamson (1985), supra 
note 47, p. 114-120; Milgrom/Roberts (1992), supra note 35, p. 552ff.
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achieve a close coordination and can make use of the necessary knowledge from all the 
fields involved. The internal organisation may also allow for more precisely scheduled 
flows to the processing plants. Any further backward integration seems to be more due 
to strategic purposes.
Another important step for business enterprises is the integration of research& 
development activity and the installation of a department for it. Research&development 
activity is one of the most significant in those enterprises operating in technologically 
advanced industry. As most research&development activity is product-specific, possible 
economies of scale and scope by independent research firms are diminished. Necessary 
product-specific skills and facilities increase asset specifity and therefore transaction 
costs. Furthermore, research&development for a special product line needs close 
coordination between marketing, plant, and laboratory personnel and the facilities 
handling the product. The knowledge built up by the development of new products in 
the field in which the firm is active belongs to the core competencies of the firm, and 
it is on this basis that the firm can decide upon the allocation of resources for new 
projects and for the future activity of the firm.103
The firm mostly integrates other activities such as traffic, engineering, legal 
services, real estate, personnel, and public relations if the volume of these is very high; 
if they are product-specific or especially necessary for running an enterprise, such as 
finance and accounting.104
Horizontal integration, the entering into new but related fields of business or 
the acquisition or merger of enterprises producing competitve products, provides another 
opportunity for the enterprise to grow. Horizontal combination can serve gains of 
efficiency by a better exploitation of economies of scale and scope (especially in 
production and distribution, less in other fields, e.g., in mere common financing)105
1 0 3  See for the integration of research&development activity, Chandler (1990), supra note 51,
p. 32f. For the central importance of research&development for the future of the firm and its future 
competitivity see Monopolkommission, Hauptgutachten VUI (1988/89), note 935.
1 0 4  See Chandler, ibid., p. 33.
1 0 5  Buhner/Weinberger (199t), supra note 52, p. 198f.
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but often the incentive is to gain a more effective control of output, price and markets. 
Long-term viability of mergers and acquisitions is generally attained only when a 
centralised administrative control is quickly established over the merged or acquired 
firms and then the facilities and personnel are rationalised to better exploit the actual 
economies of scale and scope. If, instead, the acquired or merged firms continue to 
operate autonomously, as before, the enlarged enterprise remains little more than a 
federation of firms and the resulting cost advantages are minimal.106 An important 
horizontal boundary of the firm, i.e. the fields in which it has special expertise, form its 
core competencies, as it is much more difficult for the firm to move into fields where 
it does not already possess relevant knowledge. Other reasons for a limited horizontal 
scope of the firm are the increasing coordination costs and greater difficulty of 
managing larger firms.107
Through the internal organisation of vertical functions and horizontal activities 
in an enterprise, resources can be more efficiently used than by market coordination. In 
order to do so managers have to coordinate, monitor, and plan for the business in the 
different units of the enterprise and in this way substitute for the market. By performing 
effectively the two basic functions of management -coordinating and monitoring of 
current activity, and allocation of resources for the future108- managers can make more 
efficient use of resources than the market, and can exploit economies of scale and 
scope, economies of transaction costs, as well as taking more efficient decisions for the 
allocation of resources on the basis of the knowledge inherent to the firm. The feature 
of the group structure lies in superseding the market relationship between the member 
companies by the group management, therefore the group can exploit the advantages of 
internal direction and the direction of the companies by the group management can be
1 0 6  See for the historical evidence of these developments, Chandler (1977), supra note 57,
p. 315-339; summarised by Chandler (1990), supra note 57, p.37. A good example is also the cooperation 
of the insurance companies Colonia AG and Nordstern AG, which were until 1991 under common 
ownership, but did not coordinate their activities closely. Now as the administrative functions are merged 
and the products are harmonised, savings of 150 million DM per year are expected, see FAZ from 16 
March 1994, p. 23.
1 0 7  See Milgrom/Roberts (1992), supra note 35, p. 570-572; Williamson (1985), supra note 47, 
ch. 6 , p. 131-163.
1 0 8  See for the basic functions of management Chandler (1977), supra note 57, p. 450, for the 
result of management coordination ibid., p. 364.
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more efficient than a market relationship between them would be.
II. Internal Organisation of an Enterprise
Gains of efficiency can be reached by the coordination of resources within a firm, as 
shown above, but removing the coordination from the market does not guarantee that
J
the activity will be efficiently organised thereafter; instead, the problem is transformed 
into one of organisation and management. Bounded rationality and opportunism are also 
present in the firm, and the problems presented by both vary with changes in internal 
organisation.109 Therefore, an analysis of how far the internal organisation of an 
enterprise can serve gains of efficiency needs to be made. In doing so, it should be 
borne in mind that for a group the aim is to find an efficient organisation with a 
minimum of unified management. Therefore, the organisation of an enterprise with a 
minimum of direct hierarchical decision-making will be analysed.
The most efficient form for the internal organisation of large enterprises has 
been shown to be the multidivisional-form (M-form).110 It was first used at the 
beginning of the 1920s in the organisation of General Motors and DuPont and has since 
become the leading organisational form for large enterprises in the United States, while 
in Europe it became the most important form after I960.111
1. Multidivisional-form
The M-form112 was developed out of the unitary structure (U-form). The U-form is
,IW Williamson (1981), supra note 27, p. 1550.
110 Chandler, Strategy and Structure (1962/1991), 17th printing, p. 382f.; id. (1977), supra note 
57, p. 460ff.; Williamson (1981), supra note 27, p. I55 5 ff.; in an empirical perspective and including 
other factors Palmer et ah, "The Economics and Politics o f Structure: The Multidivisional Form and the 
Large U.S. Corporation”, 32 Administrative Science Quarterly (1987), p. 25ff.
111 Bühner, "Spartenorganisation", in Frese (ed.), Handwörterbuch der Organisation (1992), 3rd 
cd., column 2275.
1,2 See for the description of the M-form from a historical perspective Chandler (1962/91), supra 
note 110, p. 382ff; examples of Du Pont, p. 104ff., and of General Motors, p. 133ff. From the point of 
view o f transaction costs economics Williamson (1981), supra note 27, p. 1555ff; in general 
Milgrom/Roberts (1992), supra note 35, p. 79ff., 540ff.
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characterised by a centralised organisation along functional lines, each function 
administered by a separate department. The top decision-making unit is normally 
composed of the major functional departments and one or two other members without 
direct departmental responsibility. The middle managers in the functional departments 
co-ordinate and monitor the activities of the lower-level managers, who administer the 
enterprise’s operating units.
This structure is no longer appropriate for a large and diversified enterprise 
which is active in several markets (multiproduct firm). The operations of such a firm 
are much too varied and extensive for any single group of executives to manage 
closely. The top management empowered to take decisions is too far removed from the 
action and cannot have relevant information in adequate time. Even if all the relevant 
information could be quickly and accurately conveyed to the head office, its volume 
and complexity would overwhelm the central decision-makers. Therefore, top 
management has neither the time nor the necessary information to fulfil its tasks in this 
structure, to handle both long-run, strategic, and short-run, operational administrative, 
activities. As they are unable to cope with the administrative and informational overload 
and even loose control over operative affairs, top managers try to regain control at least 
of the operating matters, concentrate on the more immediate problems of day-to-day 
operations and neglect long-term planning and appraisal. A consequence of their 
function as departmental specialists is that they do not judge company policy from the 
point of view of the enterprise of a whole, but from their specialists’ point of view.113
in order to cope with these problems, comprehensive decision-making in a large 
organisation must involve considerable delegation of authority to lower levels of the 
organisation. The concept of the M-form separates strategic management from operative 
affairs and delegates the decision-making in the operative affairs to the management of 
the specific unit. An M-form enterprise is characterised by a decentralised structure with 
several quasi-autonomous operating divisions which are organised mainly along product 
or geographical lines. Each division manages its operating affairs separately with its
113 For an illustration on the example of Du Pont sec Chandler (1977), supra note 57, p.453.
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own general manager and staff; the general manager is fully responsible for the 
division’s performance and profits. For the M-form, it is not only the decentralised 
structure which is important, but also the existence of a general office which consists 
of top managers as general executives who are assisted by a large advisory and 
financial staff.114 They are responsible for the strategic management of the enterprise 
as a whole, not for the day-to-day work; this includes coordinating divisional activity, 
engaging in strategic planning and allocating resources between the divisions, and in 
monitoring divisional performances.115
a. Effects of the M-form for the Top Management
The separation of strategic and operative management helps to solve the, especially 
informational, problems of the U-form. Top management is relieved from operative 
affairs and has the time, information, and psychological commitment for long-term 
planning and appraisal.116 As top managers are no longer specialised in working for 
one department, it can be presumed that they act in the interest of the enterprise as a 
whole and do not favour operational subgoals. The clear separation of strategic and 
operative activities therefore helps to overcome limits of bounded rationality and to 
prevent opportunistic behaviour, which can at least partly be seen in the pursuit of 
subgoals by departmental managers.117
Strategic planning and control are also facilitated by the financial and advisory 
staff of the strong general office in the M-form. The financial staff uses comprehensive 
accounting and auditing procedures to provide for a constant flow of information.118 
This information does not encompass all the information needed for running a division 
but is delivered on an appropriately abstracted level so that an informational overload
1,4 In general for centralisation and decentralisation in economic activity and especially with regard 
to organisation, see Beuermann, "Zentralisation und Dezentralisation", in Frese (cd.), Handwörterbuch der  
Organsatiort (1992), 3rd. ed„ column 261Uf.; Milgrom/Roberts (1992), supra note 35, p. 114.
113 See for these as centrai tasks of the general management in the M-form, Milgrom/Roberts 
(1992), supra note 35, p. 545.
116 Chandler (1962/91), supra note 110, p. 382f.
117 Williamson (1985), supra note 47, p. 133f.; Williamson (1981), supra note 27, p. 1555f.
118 Chandler (1977), supra note 57, p. 461 f.
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of the top managment is avoided. The information allows the top management to 
control continually and evaluate the performance of the divisions and also makes 
control and long-term planning on the basis of long-term projections over years 
possible.119
The clear separation of the divisions and their responsibility for success facilitate 
the evaluation and control o f the divisions and make it possible to ascribe success or 
failure to the particular division and its general manager. An incentive system for the 
divisional manager can thus be linked with the actual performance of the division.120 
If the divisions do not perform well, the general office can assist them with the help of 
the advisory staff.
The flow of the appropriate information is also needed for the allocation of 
resources for the future by the general mangement. The M-form makes it possible to 
simulate an internal capital market, cash flows are not automatically returned to their 
sources but are instead exposed to internal competition. Investment proposals of the 
divisions are evaluated by the general management, and it can attribute cash flows to 
high yield uses. As the decisions of the general management can be based on the exact 
flow of internal information, it may be more efficient in allocating capital than the 
external market.121 In the same way internal markets for facilities, personnel, and 
especially managers can be established.122
Due to the comprehensive informational basis which does not only consist of 
financial data, the central office in the M-form is still able to coordinate the divisions. 
However, top management can only fulfil its function in the M-form if -in general- a 
clear separation between strategic and operative management is maintained. If the 
general management becomes extensively involved in operating affairs, the advantages
119 See Stinchcombe, Information and Organizations (1990), p. 117.
120 See Schweitzer, "Profit Center", in Frese (ed.), Handwörterbuch der Organisation (1992), 3rd 
ed., column 2081; Laux/Liebermann, Grundlagen der Organisation (1993), 3rd ed., p. 31 Of.; for the 
incentive system see Williamson (1975), supra note 66, p. 147f.
121 Williamson (1975), supra note 61, p. 147f.
122 In general for the establishment of market principles within organisations Imai/Itami (1984), 
supra note 85, p. 285ff.
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of the M-form can no longer be expected ("corrupted M-form").123
b. Profit Centre Standing of the Divisions and Responsibilities of their 
Management
The divisions in the M-form have a semi-autonomous standing in the enterprise; they 
function as so-called profit centres. Profit centres have three significant characteristics: 
(1) They are separate units in the enterprise, (2) they are managed mostly in their own 
responsibility, and (3) are evaluated with regard to the profit the unit gains.124 These 
characteristics are closely interrelated, of course; the tasks of the unit, competences of 
its management, and responsibility for the profit have to coincide in general.125
Profit centres are formed by dividing the enterprise into small, manageable and 
clearly separate units so that success or failure can clearly be assigned to the unit.126 
They are commonly formed along (regional or product) markets as only in the case of 
a direct market access can they fulfil their function and be judged by their profits. 
Especially important is the definition of the profit centres in the enterprise; they should 
be formed in such a way that the interactions within a division are strong, while 
between divisions they should be weak so that they can be more or less self- 
contained.127 Relevant interdependencies between divisions appear with regard to 
common resources, common markets, and the internal exchange of goods. Strong 
interdependencies between divisions make it more difficult to evaluate their 
performances since a great number of interventions distort the responsibility of the 
divisions and the accountability of their successes (or failures). Therefore it is easier for 
the divisional management to coordinate activities within a division than for the central 
management to coordinate activities between divisions. By reducing such
123 See for an extensive discussion Williamson (1975), supra note 66, p. 148f.
124 For the characteristics of a profit centre see Bleicher, Organisation: Strategien • Strukturen - 
Kulturen (1991), 2nd ed., p. 696f.; Frese, Grundlagen der Organisation (1993), 5th ed., p. 439f.; 
Schweitzer (1992) supra note 120, column 2078.
125 Schweitzer, ibid., column 2082.
126 Frese, "Organisationstheorie", in id. (ed.), Handwörterbuch der Organisation (1992), 3rd ed., 
column 1727.
127 Frese, ibid., column 1726F.; Bühner, Betriebswirtschaftliche Organisationslehre (1991), 5th ed., 
p. 128.

interdependencies between the divisons, the central management also performs a 
structural coordination on them as the formation of the divisions in such a way reduces 
the need for operative coordination afterwards.128
The divisional management is in principle fully responsible for its profit centre, 
but its autonomy is limited by the intervention o f the central management. The basic 
principle for the assigning of management responsibilities is that the divisional 
management must be able to influence the factors which are decisive for its success, 
and as a result fields which are essential for the success of the division cannot be 
centralized.129 Commonly, divisions as profit centres are administratively independent 
and are responsible for the production and marketing of the product or in the region in 
question. Furthermore, they must have free access to their supply and, in general, be 
able to choose whether they want to purchase their supply from other divisions or from 
external sources. The divisional form with the highest autonomy is called the 
investment center, in which the management can also decide upon investments (mostly 
up to a certain amount, determined by the central management) and upon short-term 
financing.130 Moreover, the degree of autonomy of the division depends on the 
structure of the enterprise at hand, whether interdependencies between the divisions 
make coordination by the central management necessary, and on the size of the 
division, as it is too costly for small divisions to build up a complete administrative 
structure.’31 The central management is in general limited to strategic interventions; 
but these interventions can also influence very strongly the business activity of the 
division.132 This shows the limits of the profit centre concept, since the success of the 
units can always be distorted by interventions of the central strategic management, with 
negative, but also positive, effect. Nevertheless, in the framework which is set by the 
strategic management the profit centre pursues its own business success and its own 
profits; to put it differently, the profit centre pursues its own interest in the (framework
61
128 Bleicher (1991), supra note 124, p. 695.
129 Bühner (1991), supra note 127, p. 128; Schweitzer (1992), supra note 120, columns 2085f.
130 Bleicher (1991), supra note 124, p. 696f.; Weilenmann, "Dezentrale Führung: 
Leistungsbeurteilung und Verrechnungspreise", Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft 59 (1989), p. 938-940.
131 See Bühner (1992), supra note 111, columns 2278f.; Frese (1993), supra note 124, p. 440-442.
Bleicher (1991), supra note 124, p. 698f.132
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of the) interest of the whole enterprise.
The purpose of a profit centre is for the success of its management to be 
measured by its profits. As the management can only be responsible for factors which 
it can influence the relevant profit may only include these elements. The success of a 
division is normally measured by the return on investment (in percent) or by residual 
income (after subtraction of (hypothetical) capital costs). Other factors are often added 
to measure the success of profit centres, such as market shares or turnover.133 As the 
managers are assessed especially by the profits of their unit, they can be tempted to 
focus on a short-term perspective and to neglect the provision for long-term profits and 
for the survival of its division in the future.134 Therefore, the central management has 
to add other criteria to assess the divisions’ provision for the future or has to introduce 
other coordinating measures, especially by determining how much they have to spend 
for research&development, marketing, training of employees, environmental protection, 
etc..
The greatest problem in evaluating the perfomance of a divisional management 
by its profits is the fixing of prices for the exchange of goods between the divisions and 
between divisions and central level.135 As these prices are the basis for the allocation 
of resources between divisions and for the determination of the divisions’ profits they 
should be market prices. In this way, divisions can compete with external competitors 
or with other divisions to make the best offer. However, if the prices of external 
markets do not exist, e.g. in case of intermediary products which are normally not 
traded or specialised internal services, prices must be negotiated or fixed with regard to 
incremental or full costs. In this way, the external market is at best replaced by an 
internal market; but as this internal market is only simulated, the prices often do not 
represent the free floating of offer and demand. Hence, if the exchange of goods
,M See Weilenmann (1989), supra note 130, p. 939ff., based on a study of 80 large Swiss groups; 
Bühner (1992), supra note 111, columns 2283f.
1,4 See Schweitzer (1991), supra note 120, column 2084f.; Bleicher (1991), supra note 124, 
p. 697.
135 For the problem of transfer prices in this concept, see Milgrom/Roberts (1992), supra note 35, 
p. 78-81, 548-552; Weilenmann (1989), supra note 130, p.945ff.; Bühner (1992), supra note 111, column 
2283.
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between divisions is not based on external market prices, the informational value of the 
divisions’ success is much reduced; at the same time, it is difficult to direct the 
allocation of resources between divisions on the basis of purely internal prices formed 
in this way, and therefore this is often still done by means of plans.136 Furthermore, 
a distortion of the success of the divison makes it difficult for the general management 
to allocate resources between divisions on this basis and to determine whether 
transactions should occur within the firm or across firm boundaries.137
c. Advantages of the Decentralised Structure
The decentralisation of decision-making and responsibility by dividing the enterprise 
into small manageable units with a profit centre standing has several advantages.138
First of all, the informational problem of the large multiproduct enterprise 
which operates in markets with different attributes is at least mitigated. As the divisions 
are closer to the market, they obtain directly the necessary information for success in 
the market. The manager of the particular division can gain first-hand knowledge of the 
operations of the division, and therefore possesses the local knowledge relevant for 
running the division and can specialize in it. The functions which are necessary for the 
success of the special product in the market -e.g. engineering, production, marketing- 
are concentrated in the division, and the whole decison-making process can be aligned 
to the success of the divisional product; in the same way, a division can focus on 
regions. Thus, decisions are taken on the level where the relevant information resides, 
and does not need to be transferred to and processed on a higher level; in addition, the 
divisional manager can consult with the central office when this seems necessary and 
can take advantage of the experience and perspectives of the headquarters’ staff.139 On
136 Very critical with regard to the function of internal prices to allocate resources between the 
divisions as the prices are only the result of fictitious markets, see Frese (1993), supra note 124, p. 442ff.; 
Schweitzer (1992), supra note 120, columns 2086f.
137 cf. Milgrom/Roberts (1992), supra note 35, p. 80f.
I3* For the advantages of a decentralised divisional organisation see Schweitzer (1992), supra note 
120, column 2081 f.; Bleicher (1991), supra note 124, p. 697.
139 See Stinchcombe (1990), supra note 119, ch.4, esp. p. 104ff., 116f.; Milgrom/Roberts (1992), 
supra note 35, p. 544f.; Schweitzer (1992), note supra 120, columns 2081 f.
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the other hand, the local knowledge of the divisional manager also makes him prepared 
to recognize new strategic options. Involving the division managers in the formulation 
of plans and strategies permits their knowledge to be used in these processes; however, 
the necessary detailed information for a joint strategic planning does not have to be 
transmitted continually.140 Furthermore, since the paths of communication and 
information are shorter in a smaller division than in the large centralised enterprise, the 
divisions are more flexible and are apt to respond more rapidly to market changes and 
to adapt to a transforming environment.141
Direction and control of the parts of the enterprise are also facilitated by 
introducing a decentralised structure of this type. Profit centres are structurally aligned 
to the dominant goal of the enterprise, to earn profits, by their function in the 
enterprise. The repeated operative alignment by top managment’s instructions is 
replaced by a structural adaptation of the profit centre to this goal of the enterprise. 
This also facilitates the control of the enterprise. The profit centre and its management 
is first and foremost controlled by its profits, which it has to achieve in the market; 
therefore control by the top management with the help of hierarchical means is partially 
replaced by market control.142
Divisions as profit centres also have advantages with regard to their managers. 
The taking over of the quasi-entrepreneurial responsibilty of a division increases in 
general the motivation of managers, which is also furthered by the objective evaluation 
of their work according to the success in the market. As there is a close link between 
divisional success and the performance of its managers, the incentives for them can be 
increased and they usually participate in the success of the divisions - in a financial 
respect as well as regarding their career expectations. This can also be practised for the 
other divisional employees as in their case too the connection between their efforts and 
the measured performance of their (small) units is underlined.143 Moreover, as the
1 4 0  Sec Milgrom/Roberts (1992), supra note 35, p. 545.
1 4 1  Schweitzer (1992), supra note 120, column 2082.
1 4 2  cf. Eccles/White, "Firm and Market Interfaces of Profit Center Control", in Lindenberg et a!., 
A pproaches to Social Theory (1986), p. 204-206.
1 4 3  Weilenmann (1989), supra note 130, p. 942f.; Milgrom/Roberts (1992), supra note 35, p. 545.
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divisional managers fulfil entrepreneurial functions they are best prepared for future top 
managerial positions.144
2. Disadvantages o f Loose Forms of Organisations
The advantages of the M-form can be perceived not in organisational forms which are 
only loose, i.e. those in which the cntral office is not constantly involved in 
management activity. Such loose organisational forms are conglomerates or holding 
companies.145 In these forms the divisions enjoy a high degree of autonomy, the 
general office is small and has no advisory staff. They are unable to achieve economies 
of scale and scope with regard to more than one division as they have no function in 
the central office for this purpose. For the same reason a coordination of the divisions 
does not take place, since the divisions formulate their strategies completely on their 
own. The central office exercises control only regarding financial affairs, not with 
respect to operating activities; they are far less effective in monitoring and evaluating 
divisional performance and in taking actions to improve it and to assist weak divisions 
as they have no advisory staff.146 A transfer of knowledge between the divisons and 
between the central office and the divisions does not take place as the central office 
does not possess specialized knowledge which is interesting for the divisions (with the 
exception, perhaps, of financial knowledge) and there are no links between the divisions 
which -in a conglomerate- are active in very diverse fields.
These forms are more appropriate for pure financial investments; their 
advantage is that they can withdraw easily from an existing investment. Thus, such 
loose organisational forms with highly autonomous divisions and a general office which 
is not involved in strategic control do not lead to gains of efficiency. They seem to 
have no advantage over an arrangement in which the various divisions are fully
1 4 4  Chandler (1977), supra note 57, p. 180f., for such effects of a decentralised structure on 
managers in an example of the American railroads.
cf. Williamson (1975), supra note 6 6 , p. 143f.; Chandler (1977), supra note 57, p. 481 f.; in 
Williamson’s terms the conglomerate is not a loose form of organisation but a diversified kind of M-form 
enterprise, see Williamson (1981), supra note 27, p. 1557-1560.
1 4 6  Chandler (1977), supra note 57, p. 481 f.; for the disadvantages of only loose forms of 
organisations in the American railroads in the 19th century, see Chandler, ibid., p. 182f.
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independent enterprises and are controlled by the capital market.147
3. Conclusion
The M-form enterprise can profit from all the advantages which an internal organisation 
possesses in comparison to market coordination of resources and avoids at the same 
time the disadvantages of a centralized organisation which is no longer able to control 
and direct large enterprises which are diversified in related areas and over several 
markets. The advantage over market coordination presupposes a strong general office 
which performs strategic control and planning over the divisions and "makes the 
enterprise a whole more than the sum of its parts".14* Only with a general office can 
the enterprise have the advantages of firm coordination over market coordination of 
resources, and therefore particularly exploit economies of scale and scope, and 
economies on transaction costs, thereby profiting from the information given in the 
organisation as a whole. On the other hand, the M-form can take advantage of small, 
better manageable units by taking up a decentralised structure and forming divisions 
with a semi-autonomous standing. Their responsibilities are defined precisely so that 
success or failure can clearly be assigned to the division and its management; this 
makes the direction and the control of a large enterprise possible.
For the internal coordination and control of these units the M-form does not 
use only hierarchical decision-making but also establishes market mechanisms within 
the enterprise. It installs internal markets for capital, personnel, managers, and facilities. 
The internal exchange of goods is exposed to market mechanisms and competition as 
well; this guarantees efficient activity in all areas of the enterprise. The M-form, 
therefore, combines the advantages of small autonomous units with those of large 
integrated enterprises and combines the characteristics of hierarchical organisation and 
market mechanisms.
Inhowfar this organisation can be transferred to the group of companies will be
147 Williamson (1975), s u p r a  note 61, p . 144; Chandler (1990), s u p ra  note 51, p . 37. 
See Chandler (1990), s u p r a  note 51, p . 594.
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examined below. Nevertheless, it is already to note that the above shown advantages 
cannot be achieved by a mere common ownership of different companies but only if the 
management of the different companies is centralized to a certain extent with the 
consequence that for an efficient activity of the companies in a group a mere market 
relationship is to substitute by a hierarchical, organisational relationship. Moreover, the 
M-form does not establish a centralized hierarchy for the organisation of the enterprise, 
but delegates authority and responsibility and includes market mechanisms into the 
organisation. By this the M-form accomodates one of the goals of this study, to look for 
an organisational structure with a minimum of unified management in the group.
III. Economic Organisation of the Group
The goal of the economic organisation of a group enterprise -as in the case of any other 
organisation or enterprise- is to coordinate the behaviour of its members and align it to 
the predominant goals of a group.149 The peculiarity of the group as an organisation 
is that its main members are the affiliated companies and not (only) individuals; 
therefore the main organisational problem of the group is to align the subsidiaries’ 
behaviour to the goals of the group as a whole. The number and variety of the 
subsidiaries strengthens the centrifugal forces in the group as the companies are legally 
designed for an independent existence; this is of special importance if the economic 
activities of the subsidiaries are not characterised by a close relationship to the 
parent.150 In order to avert centrifugal forces the group management -the other 
constituting element of the group and the institution which forms the group of 
companies into a uniform enterprise- has to form a strong centre and to secure the 
uniform direction of the group activity by a central decision-making process and a
1 4 9  For the alignment of the members’ behaviour to the predominant goals of the enterprise as the 
first goal of organisation, see Frese (1992), supra note 126, column 1707, an illustration upon the means 
used for aligning individuals* behaviour column 1727; Hübner, "Recht und Organisation", in G roch la 
(ed.), Handwörterbuch der Organisation (1980), 2nd cd., column 2007; for all aspects of coordination see 
Milgrom/Roberts (1992), supra note 35, passim, explicitly for coordination as the main task of 
organisations p. 25f., 49.
,su Everling, "Betriebsabteilung oder Bcteiligungsgescllschaft?", Betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung 
und Praxis 29 (1977), p. 283.
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central control of the enforcement of the decisions.151 The minimum criteria for the 
central management in this respect are that the subsidiaries cannot enforce their own 
goals in case of conflicts.152 Only in this way can the different companies be 
combined for the optimum benefit of the whole; and only by maintaining the attributes 
of firm coordination with regard to the unified management is the group able to achieve
the advantages over market coordination and to reach the efficiency gains for which the
*
resources of the member companies are unified.153
The main goal of the group -the goal which the organisational structure must 
help to achieve- is to be successful in the market and to make profits by market 
transactions, as in case of any other capitalist enterprise.154 Without profits the group 
will not survive over a long period of time. Therefore, it is not only short-term profits 
which are relevant, since it is especially important to prepare the basis for long-term 
profits which often may decrease short-term profits. Only this can secure the existence 
of the enterprise in the future, a basic goal of any enterprise. This may offer a 
perspective not only to pursue direct profit-related goals but also to take into account 
other goals which are relevant for the future of the enterprise.155 Nevertheless, in 
order to enable the group to be successful in the market, to make profits, and thus to 
secure its existence in the present and future, the organisational structure of the group 
has to be efficient.156 Therefore, on the one hand, the organisation of the group has
151 Everting, "Konzernführung durch cine Holdinggesellschaft", Der Betrieb  34 (1981), p. 2552; 
Scheffler (1985), supra note 10, p. 2006. See for illustration the merger of the three Siemens companies 
to the uniform Siemens AG in order to enable it to act in a uniform way, apud Pausenberger, "Konzerne", 
in Grochla/Wittmann (eds.), Handwörterbuch der Betriebswirtschaft (1975), 4th ed., column 2242; and 
the example of the LG.Farben, which even after the merger could not be transformed into a centrally 
managed enterprise due to the lack of a strong general office, Chandler (1990), supra note 51, p. 573ff.
152 Pausenberger (1975), supra note 151, column 2235; Schruff, "Konzern", in Wittmann et al. 
(eds.), Handwörterbuch der  Betriebswirtschaft (1993), 5th ed., vol. 2, column 2274.
153 In the case of groups mostly called "synenergies", see Bühner, "Management Holding”, Die 
Betriebswirtschaft 47 (1987), p. 47.
154 Fresc (1992), supra note 126, column 1707.
155 Long-term profits to finance long-term growth as basic goals of a capitalist enterprise, see in a 
historical perspective Chandler (1990), supra note 51, summarised at p. 17, 594f.; as goals to achieve by 
internal organisation of a firm see Frese (1992), supra note 126, column 1707, 1725f.; for the relationship 
between profits and securing the existence of groups of companies as organisations in the future, see 
Scheffler (1985), supra note 10, p. 2008f. For the interpretation of an enterprise as a system of knowledge 
and memory in time and the danger for this function by taking only short-term interests into account, see 
Ladeur (1993), supra note 89, p. 203.
154 Theiscn (1986), supra note 18, p. 749.
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to make it possible to exploit the advantages of firm-coordination of resources over 
market coordination and to justify the unification of the different companies* resources 
by that. On the other hand, the M-form concept has to be transferred to the group as it 
is an efficient form of internal organisation and in principle complies with the 
requirements of this study for only a minimum of centralized organisation.137 Hence, 
the organisation of the group has to hold the balance between the centralizing of 
functions to form a uniform enterprise and the decentralisation of functions to achieve 
an efficient internal organisation - an organisational task which has to be fulfilled by 
any enterprise157 58 159and for which the group may especially be well suited.
To examine the organisation of the group the legal and economic structure of 
the group and its adaptation to the M-form will first be analyzed; in a second step the 
division of management responsibilities -between the unified group management and the 
subsidiaries’ managment- will be dealt with, and in a last step the advantages of the 
organisation of economic activity in the group will be discussed.
1. Organisational Structure of the Group
The organisational structure of the group is not only determined by economic 
organisational considerations, since it cannot take place without considering the basic 
legal implications.139 By definition, the group consists of legally independent 
companies which are combined under a unified management. The first element, the 
legal independence and separateness of the single companies, has to be borne strictly in 
mind for an economic organisation of the group; the group cannot be organised as if it 
were a uniform enterprise without legal restrictions for the economic organisation, but 
economic organisation has to take into account that principally the group consists of
157 See the appearing conflict o f company law and group organisation and the task of this study to 
assume a minimum of unified management as a starting point in order to accomodate the legal concept 
of the company.
IS* cf. Bleicher, "Konzernorganisation", in Frese (ed.), Handwörterbuch der Organisation (1992), 
3rd ed., columns 1163f.
159 See Schruff (1993), supra note 157, columns 2285f.; see, however, for the advocating of a 
complete primacy of economic considerations for the organisation of groups in order to break legal 
reasoning, Theisen, "Vorüberlegungen zu einer Konzernorganisationslehre", Die Betriebswirtschaft 48 
(1988), p. 282, 285; critical Debus, Haftungsregelungen im Konzernrecht (1990), p. 167 note 4.
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different companies as separate entities.
The other constituting element of the group -unified management- is less 
legally characterised and can be based on very different legal means.160 Most 
commonly a group is based on shareholding or the holding o f voting rights; while 
normally a majority is needed to control the company, often a minority is sufficient if 
the other shares are widespread. Groups are also often based on contracts; in Germany 
control contracts are allowed, in other countries, groups can be based on other contracts 
such as management contracts or business lease agreements. Unified management can 
also be performed by interlocking directorates, but mostly they are also based on 
shareholding. These groups all have in common that one company is subordinated to 
another; however, a group can also be based on a centralized management among 
equals. This is a very rare form in economic reality and will not be treated in this 
study.161 These legal means may have different legal consequences and restrict 
economic organisation in this way but mostly do not per se predetermine the exercise 
of unified management. With the problems which are caused by the various forms of 
unified management for the law and especially for the legal structure of the company, 
it will be dealt later.
For the economical organisation of groups, a short survey over the economic 
criteria to structure groups for various economic purposes will be given, and afterwards 
the adaptation of a company system to the M-form will be discussed.
a. Economic Types of Groups
Groups appear in economic reality in an unlimited variety of structures; thus a great 
number of criteria are relevant for the economic structuring of the group. Which path
160 For a comprehensive survey over the possibilities of forming company systems on a comparative 
legal basis, including public limited companies in -among others- France, Germany, and Great Britain, see 
Immenga, "Company Systems and Affiliations", International Encyclopedia o f  Comparative Law  (1985), 
vol. XIII, ch. 7, note 8-29.
IM From the point of view of economists there are doubts whether this form can really lead to a 
unified management in economic terms, see Bleicher (1992), supra note 158, column 1161.
s;
í
71
a group follows and which functions are assigned to the particular companies in a 
specific group depends on the goal or strategy the particular group pursues, an optimal 
group structure cannot be determined in general.162 Some important categories o f 
dividing groups are described in the following in order to give an illustration for the 
economic use of group structures163; it is impossible to give a comprehensive survey 
as an economic theory of the group does not exist.164
Groups can be differentiated by the products the member companies produce, in 
the vertical type, the group members perform consecutive processes of production, 
distribution, etc.' and the groups benefit from the advantages of vertical integration. The 
horizontally integrated group includes companies offering related products and can take 
advantage of horizontal integration in the different fields. The conglomerate type 
combines companies with heterogenious products and may offer advantages by risk- 
sharing between the different activities and in the financial field.
Groups can also be divided according to the function of the parent company. 
This may be itself active in the product markets or may have limited its role to the 
holding of shares. The holding company can be divided into the mere financial holding 
which only exercises the normal control rights of a shareholder and the holding which 
performs management functions in the group. As the pure financial holding does not 
establish a central group management, it does not fulfil the above-defined requirements 
of a group.
Another criterion to categorize groups is the function which the different 
companies perform in the organisation, therefore the horizontal structure of the group. 
Companies which function as the basic units serve to fulfil concrete tasks of the
162 See for the great number of different criteria Lehmann, "Konzemorganisation", in Grochia 
( e d .) ,  H andw örterbuch d er  O rganisation ( 1 9 8 0 ) ,  2nd ed ., co lu m n s  1 1 0 8 f f . ;  S ig le ,  
"Konzemgestaltungspolitik”, Betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung und Praxis 38 (1986), p. 313.
m  See for the different criteria for the economic organisation o f groups beside the articles in the 
previous note Schruff (1993), supra note 157, columns 2277f.; Bleicher (1992), supra note 158, columns 
1152L , 1155ff.; id., "Gedanken zur Gestaltung der Konzernorganisation bei fortschreitender 
Diversifizierung", Zeitschrift für Organisation 1979, p. 244ff.
164 Pausenberger (1975), supra note 151, columns 2246f.; Scheffler, "Der faktische Konzern", Die 
Aktiengesellschaft (1990), p. 174.
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production or the distribution of a good, but they can also offer services or consultation 
for other members of the group.165 The top unit is the parent company which 
performs the central management of the group. In between may be found intermediate 
units which coordinate and combine the basic units and may also be legally independent 
companies. Multinational groups are often organised in this way, so that intermediate 
companies unite their activities in particular regions.
b. Transfer of the M-form to Groups, and its Developments
The M-form structure as an efficient form of economic organisation for large enterprises 
is rather well-suited to groups. The affiliated companies which fulfil the basic functions 
in the group are the operating units of the M-form, while the parent company performs 
functions of the general office. The enterprise is divided into clearly separate units by 
having subsidiaries for particular business activities; these have a quasi natural profit 
centre standing. Economic tasks and responsibilities can be congruent with the legal 
definition of the company; the assignment of success or failure is facilitated as 
subsidiaries as legally independent companies are accounting units. The semi- 
autonomous standing o f the operating units in the M-form accomodates to the legal 
independence of the subsidiary companies. However, if the divisions do not match with 
the subsidiary companies, then economic responsibility falls apart from the legally 
defined company borders; the economic organisation in this case does not at all accept 
the status of the subsidiary as a legally independent company.166
A special adaptation of the M-form to groups of companies is the holding form 
in which the parent company is not itself active in the product market and has no 
operating responsibility. All operating affairs -divided with respect to markets- are 
carried out by different subsidiaries as legally independent companies. The parent
Pausenberger (1975), supra note 151, column 2241 f.; these legally independent services or 
consulting companies are mostly derived from former central departments of the enterprise, see
166 Bühner (1992), supra note 111, column 2278; Schwark, "Spartenorganisation und 
Großunternehmen", Zeitschrift für Handelsrecht 142 (1978), p. 2Ü3ff.
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company, however, does not limit itself to mere shareholding, as in the financial 
holding, but is actively involved in the strategic management of the group.167 
Therefore, the parent company complies with the requirements of the general 
management in the M-form, it is not only a loose form of organisation.168 It is rather 
a development of the M-form which necessarily presupposes a group structure for the 
enterprise. The goals of the M-form, formed of smaller, more transparent units, the 
separation of strategic and operative management, and coming closer to the markets, 
seem to be strengthened by the separation of management functions among legally 
independent companies.169 This form is mostly called "management” or "strategic 
holding" in the literature.170
The division of the parent company into (mostly wholly owned) subsidiaries has 
become widespread among medium-size171 and large enterprises in Germany in recent 
years.172 For the transformation of enterprises into this kind of structure great
167 See for the varied possibilities of structuring such a holding Keller. "Effizienz- und 
E ffek tiv itä tsk riter ie n  ein er Ifn ternehm enssteu eru ng  mit d ezentralen  H old ingstru kturen", 
Betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung und Praxis 44 (1992), p. 16ff.; Dunsch, "Schnellboote und träge 
Tanker", FAZ from 13 June 1994, p. 13.
16,5 See for this form Everling, "Konzernführung durch eine Holdinggesellschaft", Der Betrieb 34 
(1981), p. 2549ff.; Bühner (1987), supra note 153, p. 40ff.; Keller, "Einrichtung einer Holding: Bisherige 
Erfahrungen und neuere Entwicklungen", D er Betrieb 44 (1991), p. 1633ff.; id. (1992). supra note 167, 
p. 14ff.; Bleicher (1991), supra note 124, p. 653ff.
I6V See for the advantages and drawbacks of such a form Bleicher (1991), supra note 124, p. 654; 
Dunsch (1994), supra note 167, p. 13; see for a classification with regard to the U- and M-form Bühner, 
"Management-Holding", Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium 1993, p. 158f.
170 Bühner (1987), supra note 153. p. 40ff; Keller (1992), supra note 167, p. I4f.
171 For the wide range of applications and especially for the wide diffusion in medium-size industry 
see Keller (1991), supra note 168, p. 1633f.
172 One of the first examples seems to have been PWA AG (Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschaffenburg) 
in the mid 70s, see Blaschka, "Profit Centres in gesellschaftsrechtlicher Form", Zeitschrift für 
Betriebswirtschaft 52 (1982), p. 397ff. and see the theoretical analysis of this development in the note of 
Drumm, "Rechtlich selbständige Geschäftsbereiche - ein allgemeines M odell?", Zeitschrift ß r  
Betriebswirtschaft 52 (1982), p. 404ff., who could not believe in the organisational advantage o f such a 
model and looked for tax reasons. In the last years large numbers of the large German industry have 
adopted this kind o f holding structure, such as Daimler-Benz AG, Veba AG, RWE AG, Thyssen AG, 
Krauss-Maffei AG, MAN AG, see examples apud Bühner (1987), supra note 153, p. 41 f. and apud Theisen 
(1991), supra note 17, p. 55f. The latest examples are Krupp AG after its merger with Hoesch AG, FAZ 
from 2 December 1993, p. 24; also the steel division is to be split up into 5 legally independent 
companies, FAZ from 18 June 1994, p. 15; Kugelfischer AG, FAZ from 4 December 1994, p. 14; 
Lufthansa AG, FAZ from 2 February 1994, p. 14; Grundig AG, divided into 11 legally independent 
companies, SZ from 7 February 1994, p.18; M etallgesellschaft AG, after its near winding-up, FAZ from 
18 February 1994, p. 19; Burda GmbH, split up into 16 legally independent profit centres with a mere 
holding on the top, FAZ from 5 May 1994, p. 20; but also a smaller enterprise as Schwabengarage AG,
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expenditures seem to have been laid out.* 173 The reasons for the choice of this (legal) 
structure seem to lie only in the suitability of its economic organisation, since it does 
not offer tax advantages, which are otherwise normally the reason to choose a (non­
standard) legal structure.174 Thus, while the law provides for a structure in which there 
is enough room for an appropriate economic organisation of the enterprise, the 
economic organisation seems to adapt the form of the group with its legally independent 
companies for its own (economic) ends.
2. Divisions of Responsibilities
The principal problem in the organisation of a group is that of vertical structuring, the 
division of decision-making competences and responsibilities between the central 
management and the management of the affiliated companies.175 The horizontal 
structuring, on the other hand, the assigning of tasks to the particular companies in the 
group, depends on the the purposes of the specific group and does not cause any 
particular legal problems. The basic principle for the vertical division of management 
responsibilities in a group is the decentralisation of management as this is appropriate 
for an efficient organisation and may accomodate the legal perception of the (affiliated) 
company.
The main criterion for the division of responsibilities between central and 
subsidiaries’ management is the separation of strategic and operative management as in 
the M-form.176 Strategic decisions in a group are those which are concerned with the 
group as a whole and are essential for its assets, financial situation, and profits. By 
taking these decisions the central management holds the member companies together in
with subsidiaries for such diverse activities as car selling and financial leasing, .FAZ from 26 February 
1994, p. 15; the same considerations for the organisation of the Hoechst AG, strict separation of strategic 
and operative activities, FAZ from 5 May 1994, p. 24.
173 See the example of the restructuring of the SEL AC, for which costs of more than 100.000.000 
DM are reported, apud Theisen (1992), supra note 17, p. 195.
174 See Keller (1991), supra note 168, p. 1639.
175 See Pausenberger (1975), supra note 151, column 2241; Schruff (1993), supra note 152, column 
2280.
176 Buhner (1987), supra note 153, p. 42; Keller (1991), supra note 168, p. 1635; id. (1992), supra 
note 167, p. 16f.
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the group and combines their resources for an optimum benefit of the whole; these 
management fields cannot be delegated without endangering the group as a unified 
organisation.177 Strategic management includes long-term planning for the whole 
group and the single subsidiaries, the control and coordination of the subsidiaries and 
is closely connected with financial management. In addition, the central office can assist 
the subsidiaries if necessary.178 Besides this, the central office can offer services for 
the subsidiaries and centralize other functions if in this way economies of scale or scope 
can be exploited. If the parent company is itself active in the product market, its 
management is also responsible for the (operative) business of the parent. The 
subsidiary management, on the other hand, performs the operative management, 
according to the general principle of profit centres that they must be responsible for 
everything that is crucial for their profits. Nevertheless, also within the concept of 
decentralised management and the M-form, many different arrangements of internal 
organisation and divisions of management responsibilities are possible, dependent on the 
strategy and composition of the concrete group; however, some elements are necessary 
to achieve the advantages of firm coordination and some standard management 
instruments can be found.
a. Strategic and Financial Management
In the framework of strategic management the central management of the group -above 
all- has to define the strategy and goals of the group as a whole. According to these, the 
tasks of the particular affiliated companies are determined. This includes especially the 
business activities with regard to products and markets and the decisions on main 
investment and research areas. The strategies and goals of the subsidiaries are 
necessarily fixed in (at least) cooperation with them as they have better (local)
177 Scheffler (1985), supra note 10, p. 2006f.; v.Werder, "Delegation im Konzern - Rechtlicher 
Gestaltungsspielraum und organisatorische Konsequenzen im Vergleich zur Einheitsuntemehmung", 
Betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung und Praxis 41 (1989), p. 412.
,7B See Bühner (1991), supra note 127, p. 128; Everting (1981), supra note 168, p. 2551;
Scheffler (1985), supra note 10, p. 2007; as tasks for an M-form enterprise in a historical perspective 
Chandler (1962/1991), supra note 110, p. 8.
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information about market and technological developments in their fields.179 The 
allotment of specific business activities to each subsidiary is also a structural 
coordination of theirs, since this reduces the need for coordination between the 
subsidiaries.180 According to the strategy, the central management has to fix the 
standing and the management responsibilities of the subsidiaries, thus the general 
structure and organisation of the group. By aligning the subsidiaries to the dominant 
goals of the group, they can be directed as a whole and are able to achieve the 
efficiency advantages of internal organisation.181 Thereby, the affiliated companies 
pursue at the same time their different partial subgoals and the goals of the entire 
group. The subsidiaries pursue their entrepreneurial interest in the framework of the 
entrepreneurial interest of the group, and it is in the interest o f the group that the 
subsidiaries as profit centres pursue their self-interest in making profits. Therefore, in 
normal times the interests of the subsidiaries and that o f the group coincide.
One of top management’s most important tasks is the allocation of resources 
necessary for the assigned tasks of the subsidiary. These are in particular financial 
resources, but also others such as personnel, facilities, information, and managers. The 
general management, however, is not only concerned with the allocation of resources 
among existing subsidiaries, but also has to check continually the portfolio of the parent 
and is engaged in acquisition, investment, and divestiture. It has to build up or to 
acquire new fields of business which are economically interesting and to dispose or to 
close others which are no longer suitable for the group. Only such a continuous 
restructuring of the group to meet changing technologies, markets, and environments 
can secure the survival and development o f the organisation -the group- as a whole. It 
is therefore likely that the size and amount of subsidiaries in the portfolio of the 
controlling company will change in time.182
The repeated transfer of economic and social resources which promise high
179 See for these main tasks of the group management Scheffler (1985), supra note 10, p. 2007; 
Bühner (1987), supra note 153, p. 42f.; Bleicher (1991), supra note 124, p. 655f.
180 Bleicher (1991), supra note 124, p. 695.
iBl Bühner (1987), supra note 153, p, 42f.
182 Bleicher (1992), supra note 158, column 1154; Scheffler (1985), supra note 10, p. 2007f.
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yields has to be performed by the central management as only this acts in the interest 
o f the group as a whole. The predominant goal of the group is not to guarantee the 
existence of a specific subsidiary but to secure the group as a whole and to maximize 
its success. Arising conflicts between the interests of one subsidiary and the group have 
to be solved in favour o f the group - at least from an economic point of view. However, 
such sharp conflicts of interest rarely appear.183
Closely connected with the field of strategic management is that of central 
financial management. As financial goals for the subsidiaries in the framework of 
strategic management, the group management has to determine profits or return on 
investment and its use. Moreover, it decides upon the financial basis of the member 
companies, their endowment with equity capital and their degree of indebtedness. 
Furthermore, the central management has to establish whether they have enough 
liquidity for their activities. This minimum of financial management is necessary to 
enforce the goals of strategic management and to perform financial planning and control 
in the group.184
The central management also has to control whether the subsidiaries comply 
with the goals laid down by the strategic and financial management. As the subsidiaries 
have a profit centre standing, the control is mainly performed by assessing their success 
in the market and their profits or return on investment. If the subsidiary does not 
perform well, the central management has to start action and assist it so that it is able 
to reach the given aims.185
b. Management Instruments and Degree of Centralisation
In order to achieve the above-mentioned goals and to combine the companies into a
183 Bleicher, ibid., column 1154; Scheffler (1990), supra note 164, p, 174; Bühner (1987), supra 
note 153, p. 42f.
184 Reintges, "Finanzierungsvorgänge und finanzwirtschaftliche Dispositionen im Konzern", in 
Christians (ed.), Finanzierungshandbuch (1988), 2nd ed., p. 665; Scheffler, "Zur Problematik der 
Konzernleitung", in Havermann (ed.), Festschrift fü r Reinhard Goerdeler (1987), p. 475; Bühner (1987), 
supra note 153, p. 42.
185 See Sigle (1986), supra note 162, p. 315.
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group, different management devices are used and the management can often be more 
or less centralised.
aa. General Management Instruments
In a decentralised organisational structure with subsidiaries as profit centres are the 
dominant management devices are no longer instructions and general rules. Instead of 
this, functional coordination and cooperation in the forms of budgets, plans, 
programmes, and com m ittees are used to influence the the subsidiaries* 
management.186 In this way the strategic and financial goals which the affiliated 
company has to achieve are expressed. These budgets and plans are also no longer set 
up by the central management but they mostly come from the subsidiary’s management 
and have only to be approved by the group management which assesses them regarding 
to their plausibility, their attainability, and their correspondence with the goals of the 
group. Very often larger investments need the consent of the central management if 
they have not been approved in general in the budget - as this can influence the 
financial situation of the whole group.187 Further reaching interference with the 
subsidiaries’ management is not suitable, as this would distort the clear-cut 
responsibility and the very purpose of the profit centre. Only in times when the 
subsidiary does not achieve the given goals or especially when it produces losses will 
the central management interfere more with the subsidiary; its profit centre standing 
steps into the background.
As well as the direction of the subsidiaries by precisely fixed goals in plans 
and budgets, the subsidiaries’ management can be influenced by more informal 
arrangements.188 "Suggestions" of the central management may direct the subsidiary 
in a certain direction, the business strategy of the subsidiary may be worked out in
186 Schweitzer (1992), supra note 120, column 2081, 2083f.; cf. on the other hand AktG § 308 
which only speaks of instructions and shows that it was enforced in 1965; "instructions" in this sense is 
now interpreted to include all forms of influence, see Emmerich/Sonnenschein, Konzernrecht (1993), 5th 
ed., p. 349f.
187 See Scheffler (1985), supra note 10, p. 2007.
188 See Everting (1981), supra note 168, p, 2552.
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common meetings, and such arrangements are often more institutionalized by 
establishing committees. Such committees can consist of members of different 
management levels in the group in order to produce a close link between the parent and 
the subsidiary. The main task o f the cooperation in such committees is not the 
enforcement of hierarchical decisions taken by the top managment, but to transfer 
information which is needed in addition to the number-orientated information delivered
A
by accounting and auditing procedures (see infra) from subsidiaries to the parent and 
vice versa in order to enable the group management to monitor the subsidiaries, assess 
their success, and, above all, to perform the planning for the group and the subsidiaries.
Committees are also often established (by the general management) to bring the 
management of different subsidiaries together in order to help coordinate them, to make 
them work together in specific fields, and simply to further the exchange of information 
between subsidiaries. Such cooperation and exchange of information and knowledge is 
especially important in the field of research&development for technologies which are 
developed by one group member, but which can also be used by other subsidiaries. This 
seems to be one important way to realize the benefits o f the group link between the 
companies; the central management has to install such links between the subsidiaries 
and further cooperation between them for an optimal benefit for the whole.liW
bb. Accounting and Auditing
O f overwhelming importance for this concept is a comprehensive accounting procedure 
as it provides for a constant flow of information between subsidiary and parent (and 
vice versa) and different subsidiaries. Without sufficient information the central 
management is not able to perform long-term planning, allocation of resources, and is 
especially not capable of monitoring the subsidiaries as this is done by shown profits 
and other figures of success. The flow of information is secured by a general 
accounting procedure for setting up a balance sheet, a more comprehensive accounting
l(W Buhner (1987), supra note 153, p. 46f., for this purpose Daimler-Benz AG has installed 
committees with members of different subsidiaries to exploit technological synenergy effects which were 
expected by the consolidation of different companies in the Daimler Benz group.
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and auditing procedure in the form of a general information and report system, and 
more informal ways o f transferring information (see for the last above).
As legally independent bodies, the companies of the group are (in general) 
obliged by law to perform an accounting procedure and to draw up a balance sheet. 190 
The accounting procedure is not only an external duty of the subsidiary as an 
independent company, but in the group it is internally necessary in order to fulfil the 
subsidiary’s function as profit centre. 191 In the balance sheet the assets, the 
profitability, and the financial situation of the subsidiary are shown. Beside the 
obligation of each group member to draw a balance sheet for itself, the parent company 
mostly has to draw a consolidated group account,192 which shows the assets, the 
financial situation, and the profit position of the group as if it were a uniform company 
in order to inform the public, especially shareholders and creditors, about the financial 
situation of the whole group. To set up the consolidated group account, the parent has 
to obtain the necessary information from the subsidiaries; 193 it will also provide for 
an accounting procedure on a unified basis in the group as this avoids different 
procedures for the balance sheet o f the subsidiary on the one hand and the consolidated 
group account on the other. This is also particularly important in order to make the 
balance sheets of the different group companies comparable for internal use.194
As the annual balance sheets of the single companies and the information for the 
group account do not provide enough current information for compehensive planning 
and monitoring of the group members, a more comprehensive accounting and auditing
1 9 0  See for Germany HGB §§ 242, 264.
1 , 1  cf. Busse von Colbe, "Konzemrechnungswesen", in Wittmann et al. (eds.), H andwörterbuch d er  
Betriebsw irtschaft (1993), 5th ed., vol. 2, column 2303-2305; Schweitzer (1992),-supra note 120, column 
2085f.
1 9 2  See 7th EC-Directive for the harmonisation of company law on consolidated group accounts, 
83/349/EEC - OJ EC No 193, 18.2.1983, p. 1 ; transferred into German law by Bilanzrichtliniengesetz 
from 1985 (BGBl. I, p. 2355); see for the German law Busse von Colbe, ibid., column 2287ff.; 
Emmerich/Sonncnschein (1993), supra note 186, p. 528ff.
1 9 3  See for Germany the legal obligation for the subsidiary to deliver the necessary information, 
HGB § 294 (3).
1 9 4  Busse von Colbe (1993), supra note 191, column 2303-2305; Scheffler (1985), supra note 10,
p. 2008.
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procedure is usually installed in the group.195 This includes data as purchases, market 
share, turnover, cash flow, investments, debt equity ratio and a detailed analysis of the 
return on investment in all parts of the subsidiaries. A particularly comprehensive and 
close informational link can be produced by a computer connection between the group 
members. This kind o f information and report system performs a systematic planning 
operation in the group over a long period o f time and simultaneously prepares data o f 
the actual performance of the group and its member companies in relation to the goals 
fixed in advance. If the actual result deviates from the goals to be achieved this data is 
basis for analyzing the causes, giving advice, and improving the performance of the 
subsidiary and the group.
Such comprehensive information is not only necessary for the group 
management (in a highly abstract form) but also serves the management of the 
subsidiary to direct and to control its company, although normally for this even more 
detailed information is needed. Such an information and report system affects the 
autonomy of the subsidiary only very limitedly as it is performed on a uniform basis in 
the group and key criteria for planning will be defined in a uniform way in order to 
make the results comparable within the group.
cc. Personnel Policy
A very important element of the group management for the direction and unification of 
the group is the personnel policy, especially the appointment of the management for the 
subsidiaries.196 With the appointment of a management which is able and willing to 
follow the "suggestions" of the central management and the general goals of the group, 
and by the competence of the top management to sanction non-compliance through 
dismissal, the group can be kept together. Through personnel policy the group 
management can also create a group identity among the subsidiaries* management so
1 9 5  See Scheffler, "Controlling im Konzern unter Beachtung der rechtlichen Regeln für die 
Eigenständigkeit der konzemabhängigen juristischen Person", Die Aktiengesellschaft 1991, p. 256ff.; 
Theisen (1991), supra note 16, p. 198f.
1 9 6  See for personnel policy in a group Bleicher (1991), supra note 124, p. 655f.; Bühner (1992), 
supra note 111, column 2281 f.; Scheffler (1987), supra note 184, p. 481.
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that it is easier to align the subsidiaries to the goals of the group as a whole.197 
Besides this, the group management has to present a systematic policy for management 
trainees in order to have a sufficient reserve of qualified people for the management 
positions in the group. For a systematic personnel policy in some groups the central 
management goes further and also influences the appointment of employees below the 
management level. J
A further means of linking the parent and the subsidiary (or different 
subsidiaries) is that o f interlocking directorates.198 A director of the parent is at the 
same time director of a subsidiary; this secures a constant flow of information between 
the parent and the subsidiary, a taking into account of the subsidiary’s interest by the 
central management, and guarantees the enforcement of the group’s policies on the 
affiliated company’s level. Disadvantage could be that the spheres of responsibilities 
and interests are no longer strictly separated.
Very often the management of the parent instead performs functions of control 
in the subsidiary, e.g. in the two tier system the parent’s directors (Vorstand) are 
members of the subsidiary’s supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat). This solution is used in 
nearly every group, it keeps the functions of (operative) management and control 
separated, but does not produce such a close link between the group members.
dd. Financial Management
The financial management of the group is one of the primary tasks of the central 
management and cannot be completely delegated to subsidiaries as this would endanger 
the uniformity of the group structure. The financial management, however, can be more 
or less organisationally decentralised; this depends on the strategy of the group, e.g.
1 9 7  Scheffler (1985), supra note 10, p. 2010; see the example of General Motors where at the time 
when the M-form was introduced strong directors of the previous more independent brands were 
dismissed so that the newly formed general office was able to unite the different brands as one enterprise, 
Chandler (1962/91), supra note 110, p. 141 f.
l‘M See v. Werder, "Vorstands-Doppelmandate im KozenT, D ie Betriebswirtschaft 49 (1989), 
p. 37ff.; Buhner (1992), supra note 1 1 1 , columns 2231 f.; Theisen (1991), supra note 17, p. 224-229.
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normally more highly decentralised in a multinational group. As the different members 
of the group are financially closely linked, the financial group management often 
includes not only strategic tasks - as in other areas - but also operative activities.199 
In case of extreme decentralised financing, the central management limits itself to the 
above shown financial goals in the framework of strategic management, decides upon 
the group members* profit and its use, the group’s and the single members’ 
indebtedness, and the long-term financing. By determining the group members’ profits, 
the central management directs the single companies, the whole group becomes 
manageable and monitorable. The group management also has to decide on the use of 
the subsidiaries’ profits and to ensure that they return to the parent company as - 
otherwise- the parent would be unable to satisfy its shareholders and creditors and could 
not perform the planning procedure in such a way as to ascribe financial means to 
projects which promise high yields and install a quasi internal capital market.200 The 
general management fixes the group’s and the single member’s indebtedness (e.g. by 
laying down a certain debt equity ratio201 and controlling long-term planning) in order 
to control and limit the risk of the group. It is absolutely necessary for financial 
planning and control in the group in the framework of strategic management to 
determine these figures so that the general management can provide for the central 
goals of financing, liquidity, profitability, and stability in an enterprise.202
The central management defines the equity capital of the subsidiaries and is - 
more or less- involved in the acquisition o f credits for them.201 In a decentralised 
financial management the group management only takes into account a uniform banking 
policy and gives letters of support or formal guarantees for loans in order to improve *2013
m See Reintges (1988), supra note 184, p. 666f.; Scheffler (1985), supra note 10, p, 2008, 2010.
200 For the dangers if the central management no longer receives appropriate financial means, 
see Keller (1992), supra note 167, p. 20f.
201 See for this and other common rules of financing in an enterprise Albach, "Finanzierungsregeln 
und Kapitalstruktur der Unternehmung", in Christians (ed.), Finanzierungshandbuch (1988), 2nd ed., p. 
599ff.
202 See Scheffler (1985), supra note 10, p. 2008, 2010; Reintges (1988), supra note 184, p. 665.
203 See for the whole complex of financing in the group Theisen (1991), supra note 17, p. 315-333.
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the conditions.204 In a more centralised financial management the parent raises credits 
for the entire group and passes them on to the subsidiaries. By such centralisation of 
raising credits economies can be achieved as it is no longer necessary to maintain this 
function at the level o f the subsidiaries and more favourable banking conditions can 
therefore be negotiated. However, in this case the entire provision for the liquidity of 
the subsidiaries has to be fulfilled by the parent.205
The financial management can be more highly centralised by the installation of 
a central cash management. This balances the temporal demand and surplus of liquidity 
by short-term loans between the single subsidiaries and helps the group to achieve 
economies by avoiding interests for bank loans. In its most centralized form the 
subsidiaries do not have their own bank accounts, but this rarely happens. If performed 
with the usual interest rates, this does not distort the success of subsidiaries as profit 
centres, but the parent has comprehensively to provide for the liquidity of the 
subsidiaries.206
For multinational groups the management of foreign exchange is particularly 
important in order to minimize the risks which occur for the group as a whole as a 
result o f currency fluctuations. This is not normally centralized as the subsidiaries have 
to be very flexible in their reactions to currency fluctuations, e.g. in changing their 
prices with respect to fluctuations.207
All these functions do not necessarily have to be performed at the level of the 
parent company; in some groups there are special subsidiaries which perform the 
banking business for the members of the group.208
2tM S c h r u f f  ( 1 9 9 3 ) ,  s u p r a  n o te  1 5 2 ,  c o lu m n  2 2 8 2 ;  in  an  e m p ir ic a l  s tu d y  o n . 8 0  S w is s  g r o u p s  th e re  
w a s  n o  c a s e  in  w h ic h  th e  s u b s id ia r ie s ’ m a n a g e m e n t  c o u l d  h a v e  d e c id e d  o n  th e  r a i s e  o f  e q u ity  c a p it a l  o r  
o f  lo n g - t e r m  c a p ita l ,  s e e  W e i le n m a n n  ( 1 9 8 9 ) ,  s u p ra  n o t e  1 3 0 ,  p . 9 4 0 ,  9 5 3 .
205 R e in tg e s  (1988), s u p r a  n o te  184, p . 672f. F o r  th e  le g a l p r o b le m  w ith  r e g a r d  to  l iq id ity  s e e  
S c h n e id e r ,  " D a s  R e c h t  d e r  K o n z e m f in a n z ie r u n g " ,  Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht 
(13) 1984, p. 532rf.
206 R e in tg e s  ( 1 9 8 8 ) ,  s u p r a  n o te  1 8 4 , p . 6 7 4 f f . ;  S c h e f f l e r  ( 1 9 8 5 ) ,  s u p ra  n o te  1 0 ,  p . 2 0 0 8 .
207 R e in tg e s ,  ib id .,  p . 6 8 1 - 6 8 5 .
208 R e in tg e s ,  ib id .,  p . 6 7 9 - 6 8 1 ;  th e s e  s o  c a l le d  in - h o u s e  b a n k s  a r e  o f te n  in v o lv e d  in  p r o v id in g  
f in a n c in g  o r  le a s in g  s e r v ic e s  f o r  th e  g o o d s  p r o d u c e d  b y  o th e r  g ro u p  m e m b e r s .
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ee. Coordination Instruments
The central management can also be responsible for the coordination of the subsidiaries’ 
activities. The structural coordination, defining the business activity of each subsidiary 
in such a way that most coordinative needs can be met within the unit, has to be solved 
within the framework of strategic management. Continuous coordination of the 
subsidiaries may be needed for operative functions, e.g. research&development. Needs 
for coordination may especially arise with regard to the internal exchange o f goods. 
Since the internal exchange of goods is one of the means for taking benefit of the 
resource combination in a group, the central office should in principle promote it. It 
may be difficult to fix the conditions for the internal exchange of goods, especially 
prices, if market prices do not exist; in this case, the necessary coordination can be 
performed by the central office (at best only advisory) or by the subsidiaries themselves 
through negotiations.209
c. Other Areas of Central Management
Together with the above shown (minimum) instruments of central management for 
keeping the member companies together in the group, the central office can take over 
further management, coordination, and service functions.210
In technologically orientated groups often a central research&development 
department is installed in order to develop technologies which can be used in different 
member companies and which are not clearly related to the work of one subsidiary. 
Besides the development of technologies which overlap the field o f one subsidiary a 
central department of this type can help the central management in its strategic 
decisions regarding new fields of technology in which it would be economically 
interesting to build up new business activities. A central office for production may serve
2m S e e  E v e r l in g  ( 1 9 8 1 ) ,  s u p ra  n o te  1 6 8 ,  p . 2 5 5 2 ;  T h e i s e n  ( 1 9 9 1 ) ,  s u p ra  n o te  1 7 ,  p . 1 9 8 f . ;  f o r  th e  
d i f f e r e n t  c o n c e p ts  f o r  d e te r m in in g  tr a n s fe r  p r ic e s  s e e  T h e i s e n ,  ib id .,  p . 3 3 3 - 3 4 3 ;  W e i le n m a n n  ( 1 9 8 9 ) ,  
s u p r a  n o te  1 3 0 ,  p . 9 4 5 ff .
210 F o r  a  s u r v e y  o v e r  m in im u m  a n d  a d d it io n a l  fu n c t io n s  o f  th e  c e n tr a l  o f f i c e  in  v a r io u s  
o r g a n is a t io n a l  g r o u p  s tr u c tu r e s , s e e  B le i c h e r  ( 1 9 7 9 ) ,  s u p r a  n o te  1 6 3 ,  p . 3 2 8 f f .
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the same purposes. Other central departments which only exist for advisory purposes 
and enable the central office to assist the subsidiaries -if necessary- are often also set 
up; these do not, however, reduce the responsibilities o f the subsidiaries’ 
management.211
Besides such advisory departments, (operative) functions can be coordinated or 
even centralized at the level of the parent or can be attributed to a specific subsidiary 
in order to exploit economies of scale and scope. Most common is a centralization of 
functions for purchasing, production, marketing (especially advertising), and 
distribution. Depending on the type of group often a dominant position of these fields 
may result.212 However, it may be contradictory to the standing of a subsidiary as a 
profit centre if, due to the centralization o f functions, its management can no longer 
influence all the factors which are decisive for its profits. Moreover, it may be 
problematic to fix the internal prices for the transfer of these goods within the group. 
Therefore, attention has to be paid to the tradeoff between the economies achieved by 
such centralisation or coordination of functions and the disadvantages which can result 
for the organisational structure.213
Furthermore, the central office often provides services for the member 
companies, such as central computer facilities, legal and insurance departments, or 
public relations. Such central services may lead to economies, as the subsidiaries do not 
have to build up their own facilities. On the other hand, the determination of transfer 
prices for these services are difficult, as often market prices for such specialized 
services do not exist.214
Due to the contradiction in the profit centre standing, some groups consciously
211 S e e  th e  c e n t r a l  d e p a r tm e n ts  o f  Siemens AG  a n d  BBC AG ( G e r m a n y ) ,  a p u d  S c h w e it z e r  ( 1 9 9 2 ) ,  
s u p r a  n o te  1 2 0 ,  c o lu m n s  2 0 8 2 f.
212 S c h e f f l e r  ( 1 9 8 5 ) ,  s u p r a  n o te  1 0 , p . 2 0 0 9 ;  c a l l e d  " o p e r a t iv e  s y n e n e r g ie s "  b y  B ü h n e r  ( 1 9 9 1 ) ,  
s u p r a  n o te  1 2 7 ,  p . 1 2 8 .  A s  a n  e x a m p le  s e e  th e  t a k e o v e r  o f  th e  d e p a r tm e n t  s t o r e  c h a in  Hertie GmbH  b y  
its  c o m p e t i t o r  Karstadt AG, th is  w a s  e x p l i c i t ly  ju s t i f i e d  w ith  a d v a n ta g e s  o f  c o m m o n  p u r c h a s in g  a n d  
c o m m o n  lo g is t ic s ,  FAZ f r o m  6  N o v e m b e r  1 9 9 3 ,  p . 1 4  a n d  in te rv ie w  w ith  th e  Karstadt AG d ir e c t o r  D e u s s ,  
FAZ f r o m  1 3  N o v e m b e r  1 9 9 3 ,  p . 1 5 .
213 B le i c h e r  ( 1 9 9 1 ) ,  s u p r a  n o te  1 2 4 ,  p . 6 5 5 f , ;  S c h e f f l e r  ( 1 9 8 7 ) ,  su p ra  n o te  1 8 4 ,  p . 4 8 2 .
214 c f .  B ü h n e r  ( 1 9 9 1 ) ,  s u p ra  n o te  1 2 7 ,  p . 1 2 8 .
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renounce the possible advantages of coordinating operative activities or rendering 
centralized services. Especially if the parent is a mere holding company, the subsidiaries 
have to coordinate the necessary fields by themselves and the central management is 
limited to promoting a close cooperation in the group by producing transparency and 
confidence among the group members, its management, and its personnel.215 Another 
possibility for exploiting economies by coordinating operative activities or offering 
services without putting them on the level of the central office is the transfer of certain 
functions to a specially set up group member; examples can be seen in subsidiaries for 
common purchasing or for providing computer facilities.216
3. Advantages of the Group as Organisational Form - Unity and Variety in
Economic and Legal Respects
The group as an organisational form stands between the market and the uniform 
company; in reality these are also the competing organisational forms for the group. 
The advantages of internal organisation in comparison with the market are shown 
above; what remains is to show the advantages of the group structure in comparison 
with the uniform company. The peculiarity o f the group in comparison to the uniform 
company lies in the group’s consisting of parts which are legally independent 
companies, the similarity of group and uniform company lies in their both substituting 
a market relationship by internal (hierarchical) organisation - at least to a certain extent.
In order to see the advantages of an organisation formed as a group an analysis 
should be made which effects the legal independence of the parts of the group have in 
an economic respect. Advantageous aspects o f the group organisation cannot be seen by 
only examining the possibilities which the law allows for (economic) organisational 
structures and the restrictions which the law poses for them; thus the main question in 
this respect is not whether a decentralised organisation is also compatible with a
215
216 E v e r l in g  ( 1 9 8 1 ) ,  s u p r a  n o te  1 6 8 ,  p . 2 5 5 4 ;  B ü h n e r  ( 1 9 9 2 ) ,  s u p ra  n o te  1 1 1 ,  c o lu m n  2 2 7 6 .B le i c h e r  ( 1 9 9 1 ) ,  s u p ra  n o te  1 2 4 ,  p . 6 5 3 ;  P a u s e n b e r g e r  ( 1 9 7 5 ) ,  su p ra  n o t e  1 5 1 ,  c o lu m n s  2 2 4 2 f .
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uniform company217 or whether only the group structure allows this kind of economic 
organisation.218 Instead of simply analysing whether a specific organisation is 
compatible with a particular legal structure the way in which the legal independence of 
the parts can play an active role in the (economic) organisation o f the group and to 
what extent the legal structure supports the goals of economic organisation of the
enterprise must be examined. The question is whether the.legal structure triggers>
organisational consequences which are advantageous in an economic sense. The 
advantages are connected with the topic of centralisation and decentralisation, however, 
not in the (narrow) sense that company law allows for a decentralised organisation only 
in the case of groups and sets restrictions to the same organisation for a uniform 
enterprise. It is rather to ask whether the group structure -with its various legal 
implications- may be especially suitable for helping to achieve the economic goals of 
a decentralised structure, although a decentralised organisation is compatible with both 
forms.
The organisational advantage of the group lies in the fact that the decentralised 
structure is also legally executed and therefore the economic structure is legally 
stabilised. Closely connected with these properties of the group form is the changed 
relationship of market and organisation in a group in comparison to a.uniform company.
217 A c c o r d in g  to  th e  v e r y  p r e d o m in a n t  p o s it io n  d iv is io n a l is a t io n  is  p e rm itte d  in  a  u n ifo r m  e n te r p r is e  
in th e  fo r m  o f  a n  AG , s e e  S c h m id t ,  " A b h ä n g ig k e i t ,  f a k t is c h e r  K o n z e r n . N ic h ta k t ie n k o n z e r n  und 
D iv is io n a l i s ie r u n g  im  B e r ic h t  d e r  U n te r n e h m e n s r e c h ts k o m m is s io n "  Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- und 
Gesellschaftsrecht 1 0  ( 1 9 8 t ) ,  p . 4 7 9 - 4 8 6 ;  f o r  th e  o p in io n  th a t th e re  a re  n o  p r o b le m s  a t  a l l  s e e  
U n t e m e h m e n s r e c h t s k o m m is s io n .  Bericht über die Verhandlungen der Unternehmensrechtskommission 
( 1 9 8 0 ) ,  in  B u n d e s m in is te r iu m  d e r  J u s t i z  ( e d .) ,  n o te  1 7 3 5 f f . ;  fo c u s in g  m o r e  o n  th e  p r o b le m s  s e e  S c h w a r k  
( 1 9 7 8 ) ,  s u p ra  n o te  1 6 6 ,  p. 2 0 3  f f .
218 T h e  e f f e c t s  o f  le g a l  n o r m s  o n  o r g a n is a t io n a l  s t r u c t u r e s  h a v e  b e e n  p a id  o n ly  a  l i t t le  a t te n t io n  in 
th e  e c o n o m i c  l ite r a tu r e , m o s t ly  in te r d e p e n d e n c ie s  b e t w e e n  le g a l  fo rm  and  o r g a n is a t io n a l  s t r u c tu r e  a re  
n e g le c t e d  o r  e v e n  d e n ie d , s e e  f o r  a  s u rv e y  D e b u s  ( 1 9 9 0 ) ,  s u p ra  n o te  1 5 9 , p . 1 6 6 f .  A n  a p p r o a c h  to  
e x a m in e  th e  n o rm s  o f  th e  G e r m a n  p u b lic  l im ite d  c o m p a n y  (AG) an d  th o s e  o f  th e  AG a s  a  s u b s id ia r y  in 
a  g r o u p  w ith  r e s p e c t  to  w h e th e r  w h e r e  th e y  r e s t r ic t  o r  s u p p o r t  a  d e c e n tr a l is e d  ( e r  c e n t r a l is e d )  s t r u c tu r e  
c a n  b e  fo u n d  by  v . W e r d e r , Organisationsstruktur und Rechtsnorm ( 1 9 8 6 ) ,  p . 5 2 - 5 4 ,  1 8 1 - 2 4 6 ,  4 3 8 ;  id . 
( 1 9 8 9 ) ,  s u p r a  n o te  1 7 7 ,  p . 4 1 3 - 4 2 4 .  U n fo r tu n a te ly , h e  o n ly  a n a ly s e s  th e  h ig h e s t  p o s s ib le  d e g r e e  o f  
c e n t r a l is a t io n  a n d  d e c e n t r a l i s a t io n  o f  a  u n ifo r m  c o m p a n y  in  c o m p a r is o n  to d i f f e r e n t  fo r m s  o f  g r o u p s  
a c c o r d in g  to  th e  r e s p e c t iv e ly  r e le v a n t  p r o v is io n s  o f  c o m p a n y  la w  ( ib id .  ( 1 9 8 6 ) ,  p . 2 4 4  n o te  3 )  a n d  o n ly  
c o m e s  to  th e  ( r ig h t)  r e s u lt  th a t  a  h ig h  d e g r e e  o f  d e c e n t r a l i s a t io n  is  a l lo w e d  in a  u n if o r m  c o m p a n y  a s  w e ll  
a s  in  a  g r o u p . H e s o m e t im e s  t o u c h e s  th e  r e a l  p r o b le m , i .e . ,  in  w h ic h  w a y  le g a l  n o r m s  c a n  s u p p o r t  th e  
( e c o n o m ic )  o rg a n is a t io n a l  s t r u c tu r e  to  a c h ie v e  th e  g o a ls  in te n d e d  b y  it, b u t le a v e s  it a s id e  a s  a n  " e m p ir ic a l  
q u e s t io n "  w h ic h  is n o t  d e te r m in e d  b y  le g a l n o r m s , s e e  v .  W e r d e r ,  ib id . ( 1 9 8 6 ) ,  p , 5 3 ,  2 4 4 - 2 4 6 ,  4 4 2 f ;  id ., 
ib id .,  ( 1 9 8 9 ) ,  p . 4 2 4 .  A  m o r e  f r u it fu l  a p p r o a c h  is  p u r s u e d  b y  D e b u s , ib id .,  p . 1 6 7 f .
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Beside these organisational advantages of the group form for a decentralised economic 
structure, advantages derive from the possibility of dividing the ownership of a legally 
independent subsidiary and transfering it easily, as well as those resulting directly from 
the legal personality o f the company.
a. Advantages of the Group Structure for Internal Organisation
By transforming profit centre units into legally formed bodies -therefore by 
transforming a uniform enterprise with a divisionsal organisation into a group- the goals 
of the above described decentralised organisation can be achieved, the semi-autonomous 
standing of the profit centres can be stabilised, and the economic structure can be made 
more transparent. The structure of the enterprise is made transparent outwards as the 
units represent legally formed bodies with legally defined business names.219 The 
borders of the profit centres are also the borders of legally defined bodies.220 The 
profit centre standing is served by the legal construction of the company as an 
accounting unit, and this increases the outwards transparency of the profit centre as the 
balance sheet has to be published. Moreover, by choosing the suitable company form 
and shaping its memorandum and articles, the subsidiary can be designed precisely for 
its specific purpose.221
A main point in stabilising profit centres by transforming them into legal bodies 
is the attribution of competences to different company organs by company law. 
Company law requires the establishing of different organs for a member company of a 
group. These organs have legally defined competences, the competences are divided 
among them and the competences o f each organ are adapted to those of the others. 
Management and control in particular can already be divided by legal means between 
organs or the different members of one organ. The competences are defined in such a
2 1 9  For the legal provisions for the choice of business names in Germany see HGB §§ 17-37.
2 2 0  cf. for a transparent organisation produced by the group organisation and the possibility of 
using the group structure for the contrary Hommelhoff, "Gesellschaftsformen als Organisationselemente 
im Konzernaufbau", in Mestmäcker/Behrens (eds.), Das G esellschaftsrecht der Konzerne im 
internationalen Vergleich (1991), p. 109-112.
2 2 1  Keller (1991), supra note 168, p. 1634f.
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way that in the company a complex and interrelated system of decision-making is 
established and the institutions which exercise the competences build a complex system 
of checks and balances as a whole. This balanced system can be used to stabilise the 
economically desired autonomy of a profit centre, and makes it possible for the 
subsidiary to form a centre of its own economic activity, different from the one on the 
top of the group* although coordinated by it. Moreover, for the members of the organs, 
statutory liability is established with regard to the correct use o f these competences 
which may also help to stabilise the use and division of competences. The design of the 
organs and their competences differ according to the company laws of the different 
countries and different legal forms, and thus the efficacy of such a stabilisation of the 
company by a legal organisational order may vary." 2 Nevertheless, an assignment of 
different tasks in the company to different organs exists for all companies with their 
own legal personality and limited liability; therefore the given legal organisation of the 
company is always designed for such stabilisation to some extent.
■i
; * *,f This does not mean that the above-stated conflict2 23 between the organisational 
order of company law and that of the group is solved. The influencing of the company 
from the outside -by the general group management- still goes against the intended 
organisational order by company law; however, since the tendency of legally formed 
bodies to gain a greater independence from the general management of the enterprise/of 
the group can be used for the purposes of economic organisation, the influencing of the 
company by the general management has to be made compatible with the existence of 
different organs with legally defined competences. In this case the conflict between the 
group structure and the legal construction of the company as an independent entity is 
mitigated. Moreover, this does not mean, either, that in actual groups the concept is 
used in this way and that the subsidiaries are given a this kind of autonomy; groups, in 
reality, may also be directed in a very centralized way without making allowances for 
the system of checks and balances and other requirements of the legal person. However, 
the legally designated division of competences between organs can be used to stabilise
2 2 2  For a description of the checks and balances in the organisational order of the AG and GmbH  
as affiliated companies, see Hommclhoff (1982), supra note 15, p. 224-232.
2 2 3  Sec above A and below C IV.
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economic units and the law can be taken seriously in groups as it fulfils an 
economically desired function.
The (semi-) autonomous nature of the unit may also be stabilised by attributing 
a legal company interest to the company. A purpose or interest o f the company is 
already defined for the company’s original incorporation; this might serve as a guideline 
for the decisions of the company, although it is normally very general. Also, afterwards, 
company law ascribes an interest to a company, also for companies which are members 
of a group.224 As a matter of fact, the interest of a completely independent and 
autonomous company may be different from that of a group member, as the latter 
company may be guided not only by its own interest but also by the interests of the 
group. Thus conflicts between the interest o f the single company and the interest of the 
group may arise; but normally the interest of the company and that of the group 
harmonize with each other as the group is also interested in the well-being of the 
company. Furthermore, it may be in the interest of the company to pursue the interest 
of the group as the cooperation with other group members may endow the company 
with a wide range of new and profitable activities and other advantages of close 
cooperation. Thus in a group, company interest and group interest are normally mixed 
and the interest of the single company cannot easily be isolated from the interest of the 
group - at the most in cases where the company is seriously damaged for the advantage 
of other companies in the group.“ 5
Nevertheless, by also taking into account the group interest a certain self-interest 
on the part of the legally determined company remains, particularly as there are legally 
formed organs of the company (see above) to develop and to pursue this interest. The 
group therefore cannot be seen as pursuing only one interest, fixed at the top of the 
group, since normally the subsidiaries and profit centres pursue their own success and *25
2 1 4  See for the different approaches to define the company interest (of an independent company) 
Teubner, "Company Interest: The Public Interest of the Enterprise ‘In Itself", in Rogowski/Wilthagen 
(eds.), Reflexive Labour Law  (1995).
2 2 5  cf. for the diffculty of separating the company interest from the group interest and the normal 
occurence of the company interest fusing with the group interest Druey (1980), supra note 14, p. 305-308.
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as well as the success of the group.226 Such self-interest serves a profit centre as a 
guideline for pursuing the goal for which it was established: to make profits in the 
market. Thus, the relativised legal self-interest of the company in the framework of the 
group interest may also stabilise the unit in the economic structure and increase the 
economically desired independence of the unit; thus this self-interest may-be used to 
guide the activity of the company for its own benefit and the benefit of the whole 
group. Such legally intensified self-interest of a small(er) unit may also strengthen the 
motivation and identification of managers and employees with the subsidiary: their 
relation to a smaller unit with a prominent interest is probably stronger than it would be 
to the large organisation of a uniform company.227
The legal stabilisation of the economic unit has to be connected with the use of 
the principles of market and organisation in the group. Profit centres are strictly aligned 
to the market; this orientation of a part of the enterprise towards the market can only be 
carried out completely if the separate standing of the enterprise is also valid to the 
outside. This is only possible if part of the enterprise is formed as a company with its 
own legal personality in whose name contracts can be concluded and to which -to put 
it in general terms- rights and duties can be attributed.228 The group structure makes 
a comprehensive decentralisation outwards also possible, the subsidiaries act in the 
market in their own names and the consequences of the activity are directly attributed 
to them as legal persons. This facilitates the function of a profit centre, the 
consequences of its activities need not be ascribed to the subsidiary only by internal 
accounting, as it would be necessary if the profit centre had no legal personality. The 
legal self-interest of the company also serves as a guideline for its activity in the 
market, and it is not necessary to create an interest by organisational means.
A further aspect is the mix o f market and organisational elements in the group.
2 2 6  For those interests in the group see Teubner (1991), supra note 40, p. 200; Wiedemann (1980), 
supra note 13, p. 348; Schneider (1991), supra note 25, p. 574.
2 2 7  For motivational effects see Bleicher (1992), supra note 158, column 1163.
2 2 8  Forms of partnerships without a legal personality are not necessarily excluded, see for 
Germany the oHG and the KG, HGB §§ 105ff., 161 ff., especially § 124; but they are not dealt with in 
this study.
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The separation of market and organisation is no longer as clear in the group as in the 
uniform company without a divisonal structure: in the latter form a hierarchical 
organisation prevails in the company whereas the external relations are governed by the 
market, in the group, the member companies are not completely subordinated to a 
hierarchical structure but always have some properties o f independent companies; the 
group as a whole is defined by hierarchical elements as well as by market elements.229 
The member companies themselves are exposed to the external market, not only as 
parts of the whole enterprise. Therefore, market control can partly be substituted for 
directly hierarchical control. If the company is not completely owned by the parent and 
is quoted at the stock exchange, the control of the company might even be partly taken 
over by the capital market.230 Also within the group there is not only a hierarchical 
relationship between the group members, but also market elements, as there are internal 
markets for goods, projects, capital, personnel, and managers.231 The mix of market 
and organisational elements within the group is not fixed, but flexible according to 
actual needs: the group can choose ad hoc and opportunistically the suitable blend 
between market and organisation, as well as the necessary degree of centralization.232 
Such an organisation is only feasible if the units are formed with legal personnality so 
that they can act in the market as separate entities.
b. Other Advantages
Other advantages of the legal independence of subsidiaries can be seen in the 
possibility of dividing the ownership of the company and transfering it easily.233 The 
possibility of dividing the ownership of the company is important for joint ventures of 
different entreprises, since they often bring together their activities in a special field and 
form a joint undertaking which is more competitive - particularly important for
229 Ordelheide (1986), supra note 17, p. 296.
2:10 See Debus (1990), supra note 159, p. 169.
231 In general for the implementation of market principles into organisation (and vice versa) see 
Imai/Itami (1984), supra note 85, p. 285ff.
232 Kirchner (1985), supra note 43, p. 226; Teubncr (1991), supra note 40, p. 198; Pausenberger 
(1975), supra note 151, column 2243.
233 See for the increased flexibility of the group structure in this respect with examples Biihner 
(1987), supra note 153, p. 45f.; Keller (1991), supra note 168, p. 1634f.
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international markets.234 A subsidiary also makes the participation o f other 
shareholders possible and thereby their status as residual claimants. Thus, local 
entrepreneurs in particular can be given an interest in distribution companies, in which 
the high incentive intensity of the market is decisive.235 In this way also managers and 
employees can hold shares o f .”their" company, and this can increase motivation and 
indentification with the company. If instead, they held shares of a larger parent 
company, normally their efforts would have no effect on the value of the parent’s 
stock.236 Such participation of outside capital in subsidiaries can also facilitate 
financing in a group. By including outside capital in a subsidiary, the entrepreneurial 
acitivity under unified management can be widened without the need for the parent to 
make the whole amount of capital necessary available. This can lead to exploitation of 
minority shareholders and to the complex constructions of groups with different levels 
like pyramids in order to reach a maximum of entrepreneurial control with a minimum 
of capital. However, this longstanding problem is today not found to any great extent 
in developed countries.237
The easy transfer of the ownership of companies makes it possible to change the 
composition of the subsidiaries according to the situation in the market and the current 
strategy of the group.238 This can be used for a diversification of the enterprise in 
order to balance the risk of different lines of business in the sense of portfolio 
management;239 it is also useful to build up new fields of business in related areas and 
to acquire suitable firms for this so that the advantages of close cooperation can be 
exploited. Through this possibility of changing the composition of the subsidiaries the 
group as a whole gains flexibility as it can easily adapt its strategy to changes in the 
environment which are so grave that it would not be enough if only the single
234 See, e.g., the splitting up of the steel division of Krupp AG in 5 legally independent companies 
in order to form joint companies in several fields with different partners, FAZ from 18 June 1994, p. 15.
235 See examples apud Kallfass (1991), supra note 16, p. 29f.
236 See the example of Rolm apud Milgram/Roberts (1992), supra note 35, p, 572f.; other example 
for the shareholding of the subsidiary’s management apud Keller (1991), supra note 168, p. 1636.
237 Kallfass (1991), supra note 16, p. 38f.; Pausenberger (1975), supra note 151, column 2236f.
2341 See for the actual need of the enterprises to adapt to changes in the environment by
transforming the composition of the subsidiaries Buhner (1987), supra note 153, p. 45; Bleicher (1992), 
supra note 158, column 1154.
239 See for portfolio planning Eccles/White (1986), supra note 142, p, 206-213.
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subsidiaries reacted to it. The spinning-off of divisions is much more difficult if the 
divisions are not formed as subsidiaries, and often the transformation of divisons into 
subsidiaries is the first step in order to sell them.240
Besides such advantages there are other advantages which come directly from 
the legal form, such as a subsidiary having its own business name. The limited liability 
of a company could also belong to these advantages, but this feature of the legal form 
of a company may also have organisational effects241 and could affect directly the 
position of the creditors. Just how far a limited liability may be justified in groups will 
be dealt with below.
c. Conclusion of the Advantages of the Group as an Organisational Structure
The different properties of the legal person provide for a structure which enables the 
division of an enterprise to form its own centre of economic activity, different from that 
on the top of the group. Particularly important properties in this respect are that the 
subsidiary is a point of legal attribution of rights and duties and that an interest which 
is to be pursued by special company organs is legally ascribed to the company. A 
decentralised group organisation with a semi-autonomous profit centre standing of the 
units and an introduction of market elements into the organisation aims at exploiting 
these qualities for its own economic purposes. In this organisational structure the 
company forms a quasi natural body for a strict alignment of a profit centre to the 
market - even if it is somehow dependent on the top of the group. In such a group in 
which the economic organisation usese the elements of the legal structure, the term of 
the unity and variety of the group no longer only expresses the contrast between the 
variety of legal persons and the unity of the group as a single economic actor, since the
240 See the spin-off of divisions of the AEG AG  in order to sell them to other enterprises as they 
no longer fitted the strategy of the parent Daimler-Benz AG, which wanted to concentrate on technology 
for different means of transport, FAZ, 4 December 1993, p. 14.
241 cf. Debus (1990), supra note 159, p. 169f., 172; cf., on the other hand, the examples of 
Daimler-Benz AG, apud Theisen (1991), supra note 17, p. 55, and of MAN AG , apud Buhner (1987), 
supra note 153, p. 41 f.; both groups are formed as "management holdings" in order to exploit the 
organisational advantages of the group, but they are formed by the use of control contracts so that the 
parent company is liable for the debts of the subsidary (AktG § 308); thus the organisational advantages 
of the group do not necessarily seem to depend on the separation of liability.
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term shows the points in between which the group can oscillate: in the group there are 
a variety of centres of economic activities which can be held together with a certain 
degree of unity by the top of the group.242 Without the legal personality of the group 
members, in the form of a uniform company, the units could not free themselves from 
the centre in this way and perform this function.
The group structure increases the flexibility243 of the enterprise on three 
different levels. First, the subsidiary as a profit centre which is much smaller than the 
enterprise gains flexibility as it is closer to the market and can react faster to changes 
in the environment. The legal structure of each subsidiary can be designed with regard 
to its specific purpose. Second, the structure of the group is more flexible as it is not 
only fixed to organisational direction, but internalizes market elements. Third, the group 
as a whole gains flexibility as it can change the composition of subsidiaries and can 
therefore change the fields of business according to strategic needs and can make joint 
ventures in specific fields with suitable partners. In such a flexible concept for 
enterprise organisation by a group form, the single units must be given some autonomy 
and must have a somehow independent standing from the centre as otherwise the units 
would not be separable from the group and the flexibility of the whole group could not 
be achieved. This also tends towards a greater market orientation of the subsidiaries and 
to a less frequent use of hierarchical means.
IV. Conclusions to the Economic Section
The legal structure of the group of companies is suitable for the economic organisation 
of an M-form enterprise. The subsidiaries, as legally independent companies, take the 
place of divisions and have a profit centre standing; they are given a wide degree of 
autonomy. The general management in the M-form is replaced by a group management,
242 Teubner (1991), supra note 40, p. 198-200; Hommelhoff (1982), supra note 15, p. 227-233; 
Pausenberger (1975), supra note 151, column 2235, 2243.
241 See for flexibility as need of enterprises at the time being and the relvance of flexibility in the 
different fields of the enterprise activity Meffert, "Größere Flexibilität als Unternehme ns konzept", 
Zeitschrift ß r  betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung 37 (1985), p. 121 ff.; for an analysis of the organisational 
flexibility of different legal forms as subsidiaries see Hommelhoff (1991), supra note 220, p. 119ff.
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normally that of the parent company. Through this type of management, which manages 
all the members of the group on a unified basis, the group may act as a uniform 
economic actor and can exploit the advantages of internal organisation/firm coordination 
over market coordination, thus furthering cooperation and the pooling of resources in 
order to exploit economies of scale and scope, economies on transaction costs, and the 
advantages which the organisation offers as a holder of knowledge.
In order to achieve the advantages of internal organisation in the organisational 
form of an M-form enterprise, those of combining high integration with a far-reaching 
decentralisation, group managements have to coordinate their subsidiaries and to limit 
their autonomy to a certain extent. The responsibilities are in principle divided along a 
line running between strategic and operative management; thus group managements are 
responsible for the strategic questions of the whole group and the subsidiaries, while the 
managements of the subsidiaries are responsible for the operative side, particularly for 
everything that is closely related to the specific markets of the subsidiaries. The other 
area assigned to group management is that of financial management, which is closely 
connected to the strategic field and forms a basis for both planning and the control 
mechanisms in the M-form. In contrast to the above, the financial area is often more 
centralized. The instruments used to direct the management of the subsidiaries are 
seldom the classical hierarchical ones such as instructions, but include more indirect 
measures such as budgets, programmes, committees and meetings, a comprehensive 
accounting and auditing procedure as a basis for planning and control, and the 
appointment of the management of the subsidiary. Informal devices such as committees, 
programmes, and meetings are used to transfer information between the subsidiary and 
the parent (and vice versa) and among the subsidiaries themselves, as well as to further 
close cooperation between the subsidiaries. Control is also not directly exercised by 
monitoring the whole activity of the subsidiary, but mainly by controlling its profits. In 
addition, other fields of management are sometimes coordinated or centralised if 
advantages can be achieved by this, especially economies of scale and scope. For the 
continuous coordination of the subsidiaries, e.g. with regard to transfer prices, they are 
themselves mostly responsible, without any interference from the central management. 
Hierarchical instruments are also replaced by market mechanisms, internal markets
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allocate resources to the best internal use, and the subsidiaries are exposed to external 
markets which partly take over the direction and control o f them.
The interventions of the central management find a limit in the logic of the 
profit centre concept. The tasks attributed to the subsidiaries, the competences of their 
management, and the responsibility o f the management for the subsidiary’s profit must
coincide. If the interventions of central mangement exceed this limit and a wide degree>
of autonomy for the subsidiary and its management is not maintained the profit centre 
structure will not work. Instead of giving rise to a clear and transparent structure, an 
opaque, decentralised organisation emerges in which competences and responsibilites 
are not clearly attributed, success or failure cannot be assigned to those responsible, and 
control of the subsidiary through arbitrarily determined profits (or losses) is not 
possible.
in order to remain in the logic of the concept, on the other hand, the profit 
centre must be aligned to the market; as a profit centre the subsidiary has to develop a 
self-interest to prove itself in the market by being successful and making profits there. 
Thereby while the (management of the) profit centre pursues its own interests, it 
pursues at the same time the interest of the group to maximize overall profits, and it 
pursues its entrepreneurial interest within the framework of that of the group. Thus, the 
position of the subsidiary in the group is not only determined by a hierarchical 
relationship in relation to the central group management, but also to a great extent by 
a market relationship: it is exposed as a separate unit to the external market, and within 
the organisation also market elements are integrated so that internal markets arise.
The economic logic therefore provides for a high degree of autonomy for the 
subsidiaries, and the legal company form of each subsidiary stabilises the autonomy and 
the independence of each economic unit and profit centre. Thus, the economic 
organisation may reap the benefits from the legal structure of the company.
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C. Efficient Law for the Group
I. The GmbH as an Affiliated Company in the Group
The objectives of company law when dealing with groups were defined above in order 
to establish an efficient legal framework for the group. Two aspects o f efficiency have 
to be taken into consideration, on the one hand the efficient working of the group as an 
organisation, and on the other, an efficient relationship between the group or its member 
companies with the external parties which have a stake in the member companies. In 
the latter case, the standing of the creditors o f the affiliated company will be analysed. 
The goal is therefore to establish a legal framework which makes the exploitation of 
economies by the organisational form of the group possible, without shifting burdens to 
other parties and externalising costs in so doing.244 In legal terms, the goal is to 
establish legal provisions which will form an adequate organisational structure for the 
group and which, on the other hand, will protect the interests of external parties, here 
the creditors. The law for groups therefore has to be organisational as well as 
protective. These two aspects of the law for groups do not necessarily have to be 
pursued separately, since the Fixing of a certain structure by company law may also act 
as a safeguard for interests which require such protective measures; therefore 
organisational law and protective law may coincide.245 The criterion for evaluating the 
law in both respects remains that of efficiency.
The main topic of the analysis is the law of the German G m bH  as an affiliated 
company. It will be assessed whether the law allows an efficient organisational structure 
for a group with an affiliated GmbH  to form. The efficiency of the group as an
244 cf. for efficiency in both respects as goals of a law for groups Kallfass (1991), supra note 16, 
p. 48; Assmann, "Der faktische GmbH-Konzern", in Lutter et al. (eds.), Festschrift WO Ja h re  GmbH- 
Gesetz (1992), p. 734; Kirchner, "Ansätze zu einer ökonomischen Analyse des Könzernrechts", Jahrbuch  
für Neue Politische Ökonomie 3 (1984), p. 250.
245 ln general for the two objectives of the law for groups, i.e. organisational and protective law, see 
Schmidt, Gesellschaftsrecht (1991), 2nd ed., p. 400-404; Druey (1980), supra note 14, p. 289; Lutter, "Zur 
Aufgabe eines Könzernrechts: Schutz vor Mißbrauch oder Organisationsrecht?", in Druey (ed.), Das St. 
G alter Konzernrechtsgespräch (1988), p. 228-232; for the concrete relationship between organisational 
law and the protection of the creditors of the affiliated company, Hommelhoff, "Konzernpraxis nach 
‘Video'", Der Betrieb 45 (1992), p. 314.
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organisational form depends above all on the possibility o f performing unified 
management, thereby influencing the management of the subsidiary by hierarchical 
means to a certain extent. The above described structure will be taken as the model for 
the efficient organisation of an enterprise with a minimum of hierarchical elements. The 
organisational concept will be compared to the legal concept of the GmbH, and of 
particular interest will be the question whether the extent to which the organisation uses 
hierarchical elements jn  its dealing with the affiliated company, and the means used in 
order to establish the hierarchical relationship are compatible with the legal concept.
This organisational structure is also taken as a basis in order to analyse the 
position of the creditors of the affiliated company. The crucial point with regard to the 
creditors is the limited liability of the single member companies of the group and 
therefore the separation of liability between the group members. There are two main 
questions when examining this field. One question is how the positions of the creditors 
are transformed if their company is a member of a group which is organised in the 
organisational form as described above; hence, it is to evaluate whether the legal 
instruments for the protection of the creditors in a company with limited liability are 
still sufficient in a group that is organised in this way. In the analysis organisational law 
will be also included, the organisational law may be protective (towards the creditors) 
at the same time. The more general question is whether the limited liability of 
companies in a group organised according to the above described concept can still be 
justified, or whether even in such a decentralised organised group there are no more 
viable economic reasons for granting limited liability to each company in the group.
In Germany there is no statutory legal regime for groups with a GmbH  as an 
affiliated company; this kind of special regime exists only in regard to public limited 
companies, A G s (AktG  §§ 291 ff.). The law for groups with a GmbH  as subsidiary is 
divided into two main sections. On the one hand, there are groups which are formed 
according to contracts; their legal treatment is based on an analogy to the provisions for 
the A G . On the other hand, there are de facto groups for which judge-made law has 
been developed. The legal consequences differ significantly between these two types of 
groups, especially in the two areas here relevant. In a first step, the group formed
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v> £be examined with regard to both questions. XC^
a c c o r d i n g  t o  a  c o n t r a c t  w i l l  b e  e x a m i n e d ,  w h i l e  in  a  s e c o n d  s t e p  t h e  d e  f a c t o  g r o a i W ^ T *
II. The G m bH  in a Group based on a Contract
The parent can base the subsidiary relationship with a GmbH  on a control contract, 
which is drawn up as an enterprise contract between the two companies. The control 
contract is often combined with an agreement to transfer profits.246 If a control 
contract is concluded between the parent undertaking and subsidiary company, they 
form associated undertakings and it is assumed that they form a group (Konzern) under 
a unified management.247 There is agreement that for a GmbH  whose affiliation is 
based on a control contract the appropriate statutory provisions for the A G  must be 
applied by analogy.248
The agreement on a control contract interferes strongly with the structure of the 
subsidiary company24* and is dependent on certain conditions, particularly on the 
consent of the shareholders o f both the companies involved.250 Two legal 
consequences of the fixing of a control contract are relevant in this context.
The first consequence is the legalization of performing unified management over 
the companies in a group (AktG  § 308 (1)). The directors of the affiliated company are 
obliged to comply with the instructions which the directors of the dominant enterprise 
issue to them; nevertheless, the organisational structure of the subsidiary is not
246 There are other types of enterprise contracts (AktG § 292) and the "Eingliederung" (AktG
§ 3t9ff.) as a further form of parent subsidiary relationship which is even more far-reaching than the 
agreement on a control contract; however, only the group based on a control contract is exemplified as 
the main alternative to a de facto group.
247 AktG §§ 15, 18 (1) 2nd sentence.
2** The relevant provisions are AktG §§ 291-310; see BGHZ 105, 324 - Supermarkt; BGH NJW  
1992, 1452 - Siemens; Emmerich/Sonnenschcin (1993), supra note 186, p. 468.
249 With the control contract, the organisational structure and objectives of the company are altered, 
see Zöllner, "Inhalt und Wirkungen von Beherrschungsverträgen bei der GmbH", Zeitschrift ß r  
Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht 21 (1992), p. 174, 177.
250 AktG §§ 29If.; see in detail with particularities for the GmbH BGHZ 105, 324 - Supermarkt; 
BGH Neue J uristische Wochenschrift 1992, 1452 - Siemens; Emmerich/Sonnenschetn (1993), supra note 
186, p. 471 f.
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completely eliminated, its directors are still responsible for its management in general. 
The right to issue instructions holds in all areas relating to the conduct of the 
subsidiary's business. Instructions may be issued by the dominant enterprise, even if 
they are detrimental to the dependent company, as long as they serve the interests of the 
group; in this respect the subsidiary's directors can only refuse to carry out the 
instructions if they obviously do not serve the group interest. These instructions should 
not be contrary to the law, morals, provisions of the subsidiary’s statute, or the control 
contract itself. Further limits have been developed in the academic debate; instructions 
may not lead to the insolvency of the affiliated company and the parent company may 
not withdraw the liquidity necessary for the survival of the subsidiary.231
In comparing this very far-reaching authorization to determine the subsidiary’s 
management with the above described structure of decentralised organisation, it has to 
be acknowledged that this structure does not rely only on instructions in order to 
influence the subsidiary’s management but on other, more indirect, management 
devices. The implementation of the goals of strategic management in plans, budgets, 
and programmes, the continuous coordination of the subsidiaries, and the decision about 
the centralization or coordination of special fields which belong to the subsidiary's 
business may all be described as "instructions”. All the informal measures to adapt the 
company activities and interests to the group activities and interests, such as joint 
committees and a comprehensive accounting and auditing procedure, there are some 
doubts as to whether they can be described as instructions. Nevertheless, in the 
organisational concept described these measures are very important in order to align the 
member companies to the goals of the group (or vice versa). Finally, instructions can 
be completely substituted by interlocking directorates. Hence, the question emerges 
whether the concept of the control contract is compatible with more indirect 
management devices such as those in a decentralised structure.
231 See in detail with partly controversial opinions Koppensteiner, Kölner Kommentar zum 
Aktiengesetz (1987), 2nd ed., § 308, note 17-39; Geßler, in Geßler et al. (eds.), Kommentar zum 
Aktiengesetz (1973), § 308, note 31-59; Zöllner (1992), supra note 249, p. 186-192; for the survival of the 
company as a limit of the right to issue instructions OLG Köln, Die Aktiengesellschaft 1990, 490, 492.
U S !  *  ^^
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The concept o f a group based on a control contract makes the very close 
relationship of a group possible. The concept changes the structure of the company, 
since the company is no longer focused upon its own self-interest, and the group 
interest may become the permanent guideline for the activity o f the company,252 
particularly where the group interest and company interest are no longer separable in 
the concrete activity o f  the subsidiary. Material limits regarding the domination of the 
subsidiary occur only as a result o f the above described limits on the right to issue 
instructions, especially the self-interests o f the subsidiary are limited to not being very 
seriously damaged and not being led into bankruptcy. Within these very wide limits, a 
very detailed determination of the subsidary’s business activities is also allowed.
As the informal measures do not really affect the self-interest of the 
subsidiary, there is agreement on the fact that they are permitted.253 Interlocking 
directorates are more problematic as the exercise of competences in the organs of 
different companies are no longer separated. Conflicts of interests may arise since the 
directors of the affiliated GmbH  are obliged to verify if the instructions do not exceed 
their legal limits.254 However, in a group based on contract, the company interest of 
the subsidiary is replaced by the group interest255, and as this is also relevant for the 
management of the parent company, the director(s) are obliged to pursue the group 
interest in both companies. Only once these have gone beyond the limits of the right to 
issue instructions, may conflicts of interests appear.
In the organisational structure described, however, the actual purpose of 
interlocking directorates is to ensure that the subsidiary’s interest are better taken into 
account by formulating group policies and enforcing them at the level of the subsidiary. 
Since this structure has been established to ensure that the best policies for the group 
and the subsidiary are pursued, conflicts of interests, at any rate those going beyond the 2345
232 Geßler, ibid., note 74-76; Koppensteiner, ibid., note 48f.
233 Emmerich/Sonnenschein (1993), supra note 186, p. 85, 349f.; for this result with respect to a 
comprehensive accounting and auditing procedure sec Scheffler (1991), supra note 195, p. 260f.
234 See AktG § 310; Geßler (1973), supra note 251, note 66; Koppensteiner (1973), supra note 251, 
note 45.
235 See Hoffmann-Becking, "Vorstands-Doppelmandatc im Konzern'', Zeitschrift für Handelsrecht 
150 (1986), p. 575, 582.
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wide limits of the right to issue instructions, should rarely occur in this structure. If 
they do, the director must avoid infringements of the duties towards the respective 
company, particularly towards the affiliated company.256 Thus, the predominant view 
is that interlocking directorates are permissible in a group based on a control 
contract.257
Therefore, the term "instruction" is interpreted in such a way as to include all 
the instruments by which the parent influences the subsidiary and creates a unified 
management over the companies. Thus, all instruments are in general allowed in a 
group based on a control contract, but, on the other hand, they should not exceed the 
limits which are outlined for "instructions".258
On the other hand, German company law has taken steps to protect the assets of 
the dependent company in the interest of the creditors. It has not imposed any direct 
liability on the parent company for claims against the dependent company but it has 
established the statutory obligation for the dominant company to balance the dependent 
company’s annual deficit (AktG  § 302). The deficit may be made good out of free 
reserves only in so far as the latter were created during the existence of the control 
contract. The right to compensation arises as soon as the balance sheet is drawn up. The 
creditors of the dependent company can require the company to charge and assign its 
claim to compensation. In this way an indirect liability is imposed on the dominant 
company. This method of safeguarding the assets is supplemented by certain obligations 
to create the statutory reserves in the dependent company (AktG  § 300), by laying down 
precise rules on the possibilities to transfer profits, and by additional safeguards for the 
creditors of the affiliated company if the contract is terminated (AktG  § 303). A direct 
liability on the part of the parent is not established with this system; nevertheless, the 2367
1 0 4
236 See OLG Köln ZIP 1993, 110, 114; Emmerich/Sonnenschein (1993), supra note 186, p. 359.
237 Affirmative for the permissibility of interlocking directorates (at least) in contract based groups 
(for dc facto groups below) OLG Köln ZIP 1993, 110, 114 with in this respect affirmative comment by 
Timm, ibid., p. 117; Emmerich/Sonnenschein (1993), supra note 186, p. 349f., 358f.; Hommelhoff, 
"Konzern mode Ile und ihre Realisierung im Recht", in Druey (ed.), Das St. Galler Konzernrechtsgespräch 
(1988), p. 124f.; Hoffmann-Becking (1986), supra note 255, p. 582; Streyl, Zur konzernrechtlichen 
Problematik von Vorstandsdoppelmandaten (1992), p, 171 f.
^  See Emmerich/Sonnenschein (1993), ibid.
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creditors seem to be rather well-protected against the additional dangers which appear 
for them in a group.239
At first glance, the law for an affiliated GmbH  in a group which is based on a 
control contract seems to fit rather well the above-stated criteria for evaluating a law of 
groups, giving enough leeway for an efficient organisation of the group and an efficient 
protection of the creditors. However, the legal structure of the group based on a control 
contract is rather closer to that of a uniform enterprise, and realizes to a lesser extent 
the specific pattern of a decentralized group organisation. The legal structure changes 
the model of the group, giving less variety and more unity.
This can be seen especially in the right to issue instructions to the directors of 
the subsidiary. In the above-described decentralised organisational structure, the 
business activity of the subsidiary is directed more by indirect measures, whereas the 
direction of the subsidiary through instructions, which are in addition legally binding 
and can be enforced in court according to the concept of a control contract, is based on 
the image of a strictly hierarchical organisation between parent and subsidiary. The 
subsidiary is seen less as a real centre of economic activity; while the parent can 
entirely determine its business activity by instructions, the limits of this right are not 
very relevant for normal business activity.
The same can be pointed out with regard to the provisions of the parent's 
liability, i.e. the installing of an obligation on the parent to balance the annual debts of 
the subsidiary. Even if no direct liability of the parent for the subsidiary is assumed, in 
effect the parent is held responsible for the losses of the subsidiary, thus the separation 
of liability in a group is almost completely eliminated. As a result, the parent has to 
bear the consequences of the subsidiary's economic failure and the parent's directors are 
held directly responsible for this by their shareholders. The elimination of the 
subsidiary’s limited liability may have direct organisational consequences in that the 259
259 See for the system and detailed criticism Koppensteiner, Kötner Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz 
(1987), 2nd ed., preliminary note, § 300, note 3ff.; Emmerich/Sonnenschein (1993), supra note 186, p.
286-305.
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parent will increase its control over the subsidiary and the subsidiary will be granted 
less autonomy - in other words, the group will not be organised in such a decentralised 
form.260 261 The elimination of the liability separation between the companies also 
illustrates that the statutory model is a group in which room for the autonomous 
responsibility of any economic risks on the part o f the subsidiary does not exist; instead 
the parent is obliged to shoulder the economic risks as it is viewed as having full 
control over the subsidiary. This leads to a further consideration of the notion of 
efficiency in this field: whether it is necessary to abolish the limited liability of 
affiliated companies in order to establish an efficient relation with the creditors, or 
whether limited liability can also be justified for reasons of efficiency as a basis for the 
separation of liability between companies in a group. Accordingly, the extension of 
liability on the parent for the protection of creditors may abolish the efficiency effects 
of limited liability. This problem will be dealt with further on.
The predominant legal feature of the group based on a control contract is 
therefore not that of a decentralised organisation with several centres of economic 
activity, as it is described above, but rather the centrally directed group with only one 
centre of economic activity at the top. The model which legally corresponds to a 
decentralised structure is therefore seen in the de facto group in the economic 
literature.-*11 This does not mean, however, that a group form based on a control 
contract cannot be chosen for such an organisational structure of this type. The form of 
a contract based group (with an agreement to transfer profits) used for a decentralised 
structure may be chosen for tax reasons in particular as in this case profits and losses 
between different companies in a group can be set off.262 Nevertheless, it is important 
to note that a very close group organisation is possible within German company law 
since groups which want to rely on directly hierarchical means more heavily than used 
in a decentralised organisation do not have to act unlawfully or transform themselves 
into a uniform company. They can choose the contract based group as the legal form
^  Debus (1990), supra note 159, p. 168-171.
261 See Bteicher (1992), supra note 158, column 1163f.
261 Korperschaftssteuergesetz §§ 14, 17; see Emmerich/Sonnenschein (1993), supra note 186,
p. 189-197.
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which fits their organisational needs and guarantees at the same time the standing of the 
creditors of the affiliated company.
III. The G m bH  in a de facto Group
In order to analyse whether the law of de facto groups for a G mbH  as an affiliated 
company complies with the above-stated criteria of efficiency in both respects, it is first 
necessary to look at the legal structure of the GmbH. The protection of the creditors 
will be analysed afterwards on the basis o f the organisational legal structure of the 
GmbH.
1. Legal Structure of the G m bH  with regard to its Standing in the Group as
an Affiliated Company
The GmbH  is a company with its own legal personality and limited liability. These two 
components of the GmbH  give rise to several implications, and in order to analyse the 
legal structure of this company form it is first and foremost fruitful to look at the 
characteristics of the legal person in the concrete form of the GmbH.2b3
The GmbH, as a company and legal person, is an independent legal entity, 
distinct from its shareholders. Company law defines an organisational order for the 
company which is independent from its members and their composition. Events 
regarding its members do not generally affect the company, and one special 
characteristic is that the company can survive its members. The shareholders are not 
able to act directly for the GmbH ; instead, the law (and the articles of the company in 
question) establishes an organisational structure for the company with organs which 
have abstractly defined competences. The organs take decisions for the company, 
manage it, and can also represent it; thus it can be concluded that the company is able 
to act by means of its organs. In the GmbH  two organs are installed in principle, the 263
263 cf. with regard to the different approaches to defining the elements and/or the essence of the 
legal person Wiedemann (1980), supra note 13, p. 191-204; Flume, D ie Juristische Person (1983), p. 1- 
31; interestingly, they differ in their approaches.

108
directors and the shareholder assembly. The principal competence of the directors is 
first and foremost to manage and represent the company,264 within the limits drawn 
by the law, the company’s articles, and the instructions issued by the general assembly. 
The directors do not have to be shareholders but can be third persons. The shareholders 
exercise their rights in the G m bH  especially in the shareholders assembly 
(Gesellschafterversammlung) -GmbHG  § 48- which normally decides by a majority of 
the equity {GmbHG  § 47). A main competence of the shareholders assembly is the right 
to issue instructions to the directors - within certain limits.265 Other organs can be 
facultatively installed, particularly a supervisory board266 or other controlling organs. 
Thus, the organisational order of the company is in principle detached and independent 
from its members, while the shareholders form a functional part of the organisation and 
only have participation rights in the organ(s).267
The company is subject of attribution of assets and equity capital. The 
company’s assets are separated from the assets of its shareholders, and represent a 
separate fund which is attributed only to the legal personality of the company, only to 
be used for the fulfilment of the claims of its creditors. The independent patrimonial 
structure forms another element -besides the separate organisational structure- in order 
to establish the company’s independence from its members and its being a separate 
legal entity. The separate fund of the GmbH  is linked with the limited liability of the 
company, even if this is not necessarily construed as an obligatory element of the legal 
person.268
These elements -the separate organisation and assets of the company- are held
264 Gesetz betreffend die Gesellschaften mit beschränkter Haftung, Gesetz vom 20. April 1892 
(RGBL S. 477), in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 20. Mai 1898 (RGBL S. 846), with all 
following amendments, hereinafter cited as GmbHG, §§ 35ff.
265 See in detail Hüffer, in Hachenburg, GmbH-Gesetz (1990), 8th ed., § 45 note 15f., § 46 
note 4.
266 GmbHG § 52; a supervisory board is mandatory if it is required by the codetermination laws.
267 See for a deeper-reaching focus on the organisation as the essence of the legal person and a 
view according to which the organisation as a collectivity is more detached from the shareholders, 
Teubner, "Enterprise Corporatism: New industrial Policy and the ‘Essence’ of the Legal Person", 36 
American Journal o f  Comparative Law  (1988), p. 137ff.
2M See the French law according to which partnerships with unlimited liability of the members are 
also granted the status of a legal person and see Wiedemann (1980), supra note 13, p.220f.
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to g e th e r  by  the o b je c t iv e s  o f  the co m p a n y . T h e  g en era l o b je c t iv e s , w h ich  are la id  d ow n  
in th e  co m p a n y ’ s in co rp o ra tio n , in clu d e  th e  s u b je c t  m atter o f  th e  e n te rp rise ’ s  a c tiv ity  
and , in the c a se  o f  th e  co m p a n y  as a  b u s in e ss  o rg a n isa tio n , the p ro fit  o rien ta tio n  o f  th e  
co m p a n y , as th is  n o rm a lly  fo rm s th e  c o m m o n  purpose fo r  the jo in in g  to g eth er o f  its  
m e m b e rs  into a c o m p a n y .269 T h e  g u id e lin e s  fo r  the c o n c re te  b u s in e ss  a c itiv ity  o f  the 
co m p a n y  fo rm s the co m p a n y  in terest, w h a t -v ery  b ro ad ly  s p e a k in g - a im s at the 
> re a liz a tio n  o f  th e  c o m p a n y ’s o b je c tiv e s  in  a certa in  p e rm a n e n ce . G iv en  its  sp e c ia l 
o b je c t iv e s  and its  ow n  in terest, the co m p a n y  fo rm s an a u to n o m o u s in terest cen tre . T h e  
o rg a n isa tio n a l stru ctu re  o f  the com p an y  is e s ta b lish e d  to pursue th is  in terest, and th e  
a ss e ts  o f  the co m p an y  h av e  to be em p lo y e d  in  the com p an y  in te re s t. T h e  o rg an s o f  the 
co m p a n y  m ust th e re fo re  pursue the co m p a n y  in terest. T h is  is firs t  an d  fo re m o st true fo r  
the co m p a n y ’s  d ire c to rs , as the o rg an  w h ic h  m anages and rep resen ts  the co m p an y  
(GmbHG  § 3 5 ) . T h e y  are  o b lig ed  to carry  o u t th e ir a c tiv ities  a c c o rd in g  to the o u tlin es  
la id  dow n by the co m p a n y  in terest and c a n  b e  held  liab le  for n e g le c tin g  their d uty .270
T h ere  is m uch co n tro v ersy  as to w h ic h  institu tion  is re sp o n sib le  fo r  d efin in g  the 
co m p a n y  in terest, and w h at the su b stan tiv e  c o n te n t  o f  the in terest is ; in p articu lar, there 
is co n tro v ersy  o v e r  the identity  o f  the g ro u p s w h ose in terests h a v e  to be taken  into 
a c c o u n t by d e fin in g  the in terest. O n e bod y o f  op in ion  hold s that th e  com p an y  in terest 
is d eterm in ed  o n ly  by the in terests o f  the sh a re h o ld e rs , thu s the p ro fit  o rien ta tion  o f  the 
co m p a n y  in the in terest o f  the sh a reh o ld ers  stan d s in the foreg rou nd  o f  the co m p an y  
in te re s t.271 T h e  se co n d  bod y o f  o p in io n  s e e s  instead the co m p a n y  its e lf  as  the 
in stitu tio n  w h ich  is the re fe re n ce  poin t o f  the com p an y  in terest. T h is  rep lacem en t o f  the 
sh a reh o ld ers  in terest b y  the se lf- in te re s t  o f  the en terp rise  c a u s e s  essen tia l sh ifts  in 
m e a n in g  w hen the co m p a n y  in terest is  u sed  as a  guide fo r  c o n c re tiz in g  duties o f  c a re  
and the fid u ciary  d u ties o f  the c o m p a n y ’s  o rg an s . E v en  i f  the co m p an y  in terest is 
d e fin e d  on ly  by  the p ro fit  orien ta tio n  o f  th e  co m p a n y , instead  o f  fo cu s in g  on the p ro fit
269 Hueck, in Baumbach/Hueck, GmbH-Gesetz (1988), 15th ed., § 1 note 5; see for a detained 
discussion including economic considerations and aspects of economic order, Wiedemann, "Grundfragen 
der Untemehmensverfassung", Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht 4 (1975), p. 413-417.
According to GmbHG § 43; cf, Schneider, in Scholz, GmbH-Gesetz (1978/83), 6th ed., § 43 
note 59-63.
271 See e.g. for a very straightforward statement of this opinion for the GmbH  Schneider, in 
Scholz, GmbH-Gesetz (1978/83), 6th ed., § 43 note 62.
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o rien ta tio n  in th e  in te re s t o f  the sh a re h o ld e rs , the stan d p oint is s h ifte d  to a m o re  lo n g ­
term  p ersp ectiv e  o f  m a k in g  p ro fits . T h is  is  b e c a u s e  the c o m p a n y ’s o rg a n isa tio n a l s e l f -  
in te re s t is  d ire c ted  to w ard s its  ow n  se lf-p re s e rv a tio n  through m a k in g  p ro fits , w h e re a s  
th e  in terest o f  th e  sh a re h o ld e rs  is o fte n  d ire c te d  m ore tow ard s sh o rt-te rm  p ro fits  -  th e  
in terest in p reserv atio n  o f  the co m p an y  b e in g  a ch iev ed  b y  co n tin u o u s p ro fitab ility  w h ich  
a ls o  (a t least p artly ) c o v e rs  the in terests  o f  o th e r  g rou p s in v o lv ed  in  the co m p a n y .272 
S u c h  a le g a l in terp re ta tio n  c o rre sp o n d s  m u ch  m ore c lo s e ly  w ith  the e c o n o m ic  
d escrip tio n  o f  th e  s p e c if ic  g o a l o f  an  e n te rp r ise , that is to  say  th e  ach iev em en t o f  lo n g ­
term  profits in ord e r to p re serv e  th e  e n te rp rise  as an o rg a n isa tio n  in  the m arket.
F u rth erm o re, o th e r  in terests , b e s id e s  the p ro fit-o rie n ta tio n  o f  the co m p an y , can  
b e  in tegrated  in to  th e  co m p an y  in te re s t, w h ic h  is  no lo n g er e ith e r  d irectly  o r o n ly  
d eterm in ed  by the in te re s ts  o f  th e  sh a re h o ld e rs , but a lso  b y  th e  in terests o f  the 
c o m p a n y ’s em p lo y e e s , by  co n su m er in te re s ts , and  by the in terests  o f  the g en eral p u b lic  
(e .g .  e c o lo g ica l in te re s ts ). T h e  com p an y  in te re s t  is then n o rm ally  con v erted  in to the 
en terp rise  in terest w h ich  m ay co v e r  all the in te re s ts  o f  the grou p s in v o lv ed  in the so c ia l 
a sso c ia tio n  "e n te rp r is e " .273 T h e  in terests o f  th e  e m p lo y e e s  -e sp e c ia lly  the p reserv ation  
o f  the en terp rise  and th e ir  jo b s -  have to b e  tak en  into a cco u n t in  the enterp rise in terest 
acco rd in g  to the co d eterm in atio n  law s: in G m b H s w hich are su b je c t  to these law s o w in g  
to th e ir s ize , a su p erv iso ry  board has to b e  form ed  in clu d in g  rep resen tativ es o f  the 
e m p lo y e e s .274 In this ap p ro ach , the co m p a n y  in terest is on ly  in se co n d  place d efin ed
272 Similarly Flume (1983), supra note 263, p. 58, who measures all interests in the company/ 
enterprise involved on the given company interest which is directed towards the self-preservation of the 
enterprise by its profitability; unlike Wiedemann (1980), supra note 13, p. 626, who focuses on the 
determination of the company interest by the shareholders, as they secure the profit orientation of the 
company. However, it remains to ask why the shareholders arc not more interested in short-term 
speculative profits instead of long-term profits which build a basis for the future existence of the 
enterprise.
273 See for the difference between company interest and enterprise interest with different remarks 
Westermann, "Rechte und Pflichten des mitbestimmlen Aufsichtsrates und seiner Mitglieder", Zeitschrift 
für Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht 6 (1977), p. 222-224; Rehbinder, "Das Mitbestimmungsurteil 
des Bundesverfassungsgerichts aus unternehmensrechtlicher Sicht", Zeitschrift fü r Unternehmens- und 
Gesellschaftsrecht 8 (1979), p. 481-484; for the whole complex of "enterprise law" see Raiser, D as 
Unternehmen als Organisation (1969), passim, especially p. lllff.; for different approaches to define the 
enterprise interest see Flume (1983), supra note 263, p. 57f.; for producing a link between the company 
as legal person and enterprise under keeping the categories of company law see Flume, ibid., p. 48-50.
27* Ulmer, "Der Gläubigerschutz im faktischen GmbH-Konzern beim Fehlen von 
Minderheitsgesellschaftern", Zeitschrift für Handelsrecht 148 (1984), p. 396, 409f.
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b y  su b stan tiv e  c r ite r ia ; m o re  im p o rtan tly  it  resu lts  in th e  se ttin g  up o f  a p ro ced u re fo r  
in teg ra tin g  th e  d iffe r e n t  in terests  in to  the c o n v e rg e d  co m p a n y  in te re s t, w h ich  re m a in s  
th e  g u id e fo r  th e  c o m p a n y 's  a c t iv ity .273
T h e  co n s id e ra tio n s  reg ard in g  w h o se  in terests  are  to  b e  in clu d ed  into the 
co m p a n y  in terest and h o w  it sh o u ld  b e  d e fin e d  are not d ire c tly  re lev a n t fo r  th is  stu d y ; 
th e  d ec is iv e  q u e stio n  fo r  us is  rath er w h eth er  co m p an y  o b je c t iv e s  and in terest 
n e c e ssa r ily  req u ire th at the co m p a n y  p u rsu e s  its b u sin ess  a c tiv ity  in d ep en d ently  or, to  
put it in an oth er w ay , w h eth er  e c o n o m ic  in d ep en d e n ce  is a n e ce ssa ry  co n stitu en t o f  th e  
co m p a n y  form  "G m b H ". T h is  q u e stio n  is  re la te d  to the p rev io u s d iscu ssion  b e ca u se  a 
co m p a n y  in terest w h ic h  co u ld  b e  d e term in ed  by  and  w as at the d isp osal o f  the 
sh areh o ld ers  w ou ld  n o t s e t  any fu n d a m en ta l co n stra in ts  on  a co m p a n y ’s fo rm in g  a 
m em b er o f  a grou p - i f  a ll the sh a re h o ld e rs  w ere  in ag reem en t. O n the o th er hand, the 
d e fin in g  o f  an in terest fo r  an au to n o m o u s co m p a n y  co u ld  se t lim its  to the m em b ersh ip  
o f  a com p an y  in a g ro u p .
T h e  c la s s ic a l v iew  is that co m p a n y  o b je c t iv e s  and  co m p an y  interest a im  at the 
in d ep en dent ac tiv ity  o f  the co m p a n y , th is  is a lso  sta ted  for the GmbH.216 S u ch  an 
in d ep en dent, au to n o m o u s a c tiv ity  p re su p p o se s an in terest o f  the com p an y  itse lf , w h ich  
fo rm s the u ltim ativ e g u id e lin e  fo r  the c o m p a n y ’s a c tiv ity . A c c o rd in g  to this v iew , the 
co n cre tiz a tio n  o f  the in terest o n ly  tak es p la ce  w ithin  the c o m p a n y ’s organ s free o f  
"e x te rn a l"  in terests and the d e c is io n -m a k in g  in the com p an y  m ust o n ly  take p la ce  in the 
in terest o f  the co m p an y  itse lf , w ith o u t ta k in g  into a cco u n t p erso n al o r -p a rticu la riy - 
g ro u p  in terests . S u c h  a v ie w  w ou ld  o b je c t  to the d eterm in atio n  o f  the c o m p a n y ’s 
a c tiv ity  by any sp e c ia l in terests  o f  th e  sh areh o ld ers - o f  the private (m a jo r ity )  
sh areh o ld ers , as w ell as o f  en terp rises  as p a re n t co m p a n ie s . T h e  co m p a n y , a cco rd in g  to 
th is v iew , is c o n c e iv e d  as a se lf-su sta in in g  en tity . *76
173 See Teubner (1995), supra note 224; Lasfce, "Unternehmensintcresse und Mitbestimmung1', 
Zeitschrift für G esellschafts- und Unternehmensrecht 8 (1979), p. 173ff., 196ff.; Brinkmann 
Unternehmensinteresse und Unternehmensrechtsstruktur (1983), passim.
776 Zöllner, in Baumbach/Hueck (1988), GmbH-Gesetz, 15th ed., annex II, note 8.
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H o w ev er, th is v ie w  o f  in d ep en d en t e c o n o m ic  a c tiv ity  as a n e ce ssa ry  c o n s titu e n t 
o f  the co m p an y  form  c a n n o t b e  su sta in ed . T h is  ca n  be se e n  w ith  reg ard  to the c o n c r e te  
s tru ctu re  o f  th e  GmbH. T h e  GmbH  ca n  b e  a  o n e-m a n  co m p a n y 277; a p lu ra lism  o f  
in te re s ts  on  th e  part o f  the sh a reh o ld ers  is  d iff ic u lt  to im m a g in e  in th is c a s e . A s  th e  
sh a re h o ld e r  a sse m b ly  -in  th e  c a se  o f  a o n e -m a n  co m p a n y , the o n ly  sh areh o ld er- c a n  
issu e  in stru ctio n s to th e  d ire c to rs  fo r  the c o m p a n y ’s m an ag em en t, the m a jo rity  o r  e v e n  
th e  o n ly  sh areh o ld er, w h e re  there is  o n ly  o n e , c a n  im p o se its v iew  and in terest on  th e m . 
T h e  d irecto rs are  not g iv e n  the le g a l m e a n s  to w ith stan d  the le g a liz e d  p o w er o f  th e  
sh a re h o ld e r(s ). From  th is  it is co n c lu d e d  re a lis tic a lly  that th e  GmbH d o es n ot 
n e c e ssa r ily  pursue an o v er-in d iv id u a l in te re s t, but that it can  b e  used to pursue v ery  
in d iv id u a l  i n t e r e s t s . 278 T h e  o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e  o f  th e  GmbH  c a n n o t  
c o u n te rb a la n ce  the p o w er o f  the s h a re h o ld e r (s ) , i f  the sh areh o ld ers  are n o t sp read  
w id e ly  - as in the p u b lic  co m p an y . T h is  does not m ean that a le g a lly  fix e d  
o rg a n isa tio n a l stru ctu re  is u n n ecessary , o n ly  that the c o n c re te  o rg an isa tio n a l stru ctu re  
o f  the GmbH is not a b le  to n eu tra liz in g  th e  fac tu a l in flu en ce  o f  the sh areh o ld ers in the 
m o st co m m o n  use o f  th is co m p an y  fo rm .279
T h e  lim ited  fo rc e  o f  the c o n c e p t, w h ic h  requ ires an in d ep en d ent e c o n o m ic  
a c tiv ity  fo r the co m n p a n y , can  a lso  b e  se en  in the co n stra in ts  to  w h ich  the e x e rc is e  o f  
the sh a re h o ld e rs ’ r ig h ts are su b je c t. In an in d ep en dent co m p a n y , the sh areh o ld ers are 
b o u n d  to the co m p an y  in terest (d efin ed  as th e  in terest o f  an in d ep en d ent co m p a n y ) and 
e x e r c is e  their rig hts by  fo llo w in g  o b je c t iv e s  w h ich  are co m m o n  to  a ll sh a reh o ld ers. T h is  
c o n c e p t  is secu red  by the fid u ciary  duties o f  the sh areh o ld ers tow ard s the co m p an y  and 
the o th er sh areh o ld ers , and they are  im p o se d  on the sh areh o ld ers  to ensure that th e  
co m p a n y  is d irected  o n ly  in its ow n (c o m p a n y ) in terest. T h u s , the criterio n  fo r  
d eterm in in g  the su b sta n ce  o f  the sh a re h o ld e rs ’ fid u ciary  d u ties is the co m p a n y
377 See GmbHG § 1. The foundation of a private limited company as a one-man company is in all 
Member States of the European Community admissible, see 12th EC Directive on the harmonistion of 
company law, 89/667/EEC - OJ EC No L 395, 22.12.1989, p. 40. It had to be transformed into national 
law until the 1st January 1992, Art. 8 of the directive.
279 Westermann, in Scholz, GmbH-Gesetz (1978/83), 6th ed., introduction note 5.
279 Westermann, ibid.
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interest.280 With regard to the formation and business activity of a group, the fiduciary 
duties of the majority shareholder function as a protection for the minority. During the 
formation of a group, the fiduciary duties require under certain conditions that the 
shareholder assembly agrees to the company becoming dependent on a group; the 
criterion for controlling the shareholder resolution is the company interest.281 When 
doing business in the group, the parent is obliged by fiduciary duties not to influence 
the affiliated G m bH  in such a way that it is damaged. If this should hapen, the minority 
shareholder(s) or the company can sue the majority for damages -the compensation is 
paid to the company- or can make an application for an injunction.282
A cco rd in g  to th e  m o st w id e ly  a c c e p te d  op in ion , the co m p a n y  in terest as a 
c r ite r io n  to d eterm in e th e  fid u ciary  d u ties o f  the s h a re h o ld e rs )  fo rm s  o n ly  a g u id e lin e  
fo r the p ro tectio n  o f  m in o rity  sh a re h o ld e rs , s in c e  co n stra in ts  o n  sh areh o ld ers are not 
v a lid  fo r the o n e-m an  co m p an y  and i f  ail th e  sh areh o ld ers c o n se n t to the m easu re .283 
T h e  F ed era l C ou rt (BGH) has even  sta ted  e x p lic it ly  that a co m p a n y  interest w h ich  is 
in d ep en dent o f  all sh a reh o ld ers  and co u ld  b e  a basis fo r  the f id u cia ry  duties o f  all 
sh areh o ld ers  tow ards the com p an y  is not to  b e  ack n o w led g ed .284 S c h o la rs  c la im  that 
due to the stru ctu re o f  the GmbH , the in te re s t o f  the sh areh old ers ta k e s  p re ce d en ce  o v e r  
the in terest o f  th e  c o m p a n y .285 T h e  o th er o p in io n  also  ta k e s  the f id u cia ry  duty o f  the
:au Fiduciary duties of shareholders towards other shareholders arc generally accepted since BGHZ 
65, 15ff. - ITT.; see in general for fiduciary duties in the GmbH and the different intensity with which 
they limit the exercise of shareholder rights Immenga, "Bindung von Rechtsmacht durch Treuepflichten”, 
in Lutter et al. (eds.), Festschrift WO Jah re  GmbH-Gesetz (1992), p. I89ff.
281 In detail highly controversial, see with further references Emmerich/Sonnenschein (1993), supra 
note 186, p. 107-110.; Lutter/Hommelhoff, GmbH-Gesetz (1991), 13th ed., annex § 13, note 10f.; 
Emmerich, in Scholz, GmbH-Gesetz ( 1993), 8th ed., Vol. 1„ annex "Konzemrecht", note 100-112.
282 Generally accepted since BGHZ 65, 15, 18f.; see Emmerich/Sonnenschein (1993), supra 
note 186, p. 440-444.
285 Zöllner, in Baumbach/Hueck, GmbH-Gesetz (1988), 15th ed., appendix II, note 8; 
Lutter/Hommelhoff, GmbH-Gesetz (1985), 13th ed., annex § 13 note 13; Emmerich in Scholz. GmbH- 
Gesetz (1993), 8th ed., Vol. 1, annex "Konzemrecht", note 113; Flume (1983), supra note 263, p. 128; 
and see all the scholars in favour of the permissibility of the qualified de facto group with an affiliated 
GmbH , see Emmerich/Sonnenschein (1993), supra note 186, p. 453 footnote 91 with further references.
284 BGH, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1993, p. 194.
285 Flume (1983), supra note 263, p. 61; see, on the other hand, Teubner (1995), supra note 224, 
who makes a distinction between "normative" and "actual" (enterprise) interest, where the "normative" 
interest is the same for all legal forms of enterprises, and the "actual" interest depends on the form. 
However, it is not clear how the "normative" interest should be enforced if the "‘actual* interest" inherent 
in the respective company structure does not provide for the means to enforce it and how the "normative" 
interest can be established for the GmbH (it may be even more difficult for partnerships) if positive law
Uli I u u uu ■ ui.
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shareholder(s) to the company seriously and makes allowances for other determinants 
of the company interest as the interests o f the creditors and the interests o f the 
employees, as defined in the codetermination laws and therefore different according to 
the size of the company. The minimum content of the company interest is the self- 
preservation o f  the company according to the interests o f both groups o f 
stakeholders.286 The first body of opinion does not find that there are any constraints 
inherent in the company interest in the use of a GmbH  as a subsidiary, thus an 
indepedent company interest is not deemed to be an indispensable constituent of the 
GmbH. Constraints on the affiliation of the G mbH  are derived only from the aim of the 
company interest to protect minority shareholders; however, these constraints will not 
be dealt with in this study. According to the second body of opinion a self-interest of 
the company necessarily belongs to the company in the GmbH  type, but is reduced to 
the general interest o f the company in its self-preservation.287 This does not in 
principle hinder the use of a GmbH  as an affiliated company in general; the necessary 
interest in self-preservation and a certain amount of independence may fit the economic 
considerations for the relevant interest of a business organisation rather well as shown 
above. Therefore, the GmbH  can be used as an affiliated company according to both 
opinions.
The legal implication of the formation of a legal person is that it is a point of 
attribution of rights and duties, especially o f property rights. The decision whether a 
social construct is granted legal capacity depends on the positive law and the lawmaker 
can decide whether or not to grant legal personality. In the same way, the extent of the 
legal capacity is determined by the positive law288, while the legal capacity of the 
legal person and its separateness from its members will be limited to the role of the 
company’s legal personality in legal relations, and to the extent to which it is necessary
d o e s  n o t  p ro v id e  f o r  a s p e c ts  o f  s u c h  a  " n o r m a t iv e "  in t e r e s t ;  a  d e d u c tio n  fro m  th e  e s s e n c e  o f  th e c o m p a n y  
and / or o f  th e  le g a l p e r s o n  m a y  b e  to o  a b s t r a c t .
M  S e e  U lm e r  ( 1 9 8 4 ) ,  s u p r a  n o te  2 7 4 ,  p . 4 1 6 - 4 2 0 ;  H o m m e lh o f f  ( 1 9 8 2 ) ,  s u p r a  n o te  1 5 , p . 2 5 6 ;  K . 
S c h m id t  ( 1 9 9 1 ) ,  s u p r a  n o te  2 4 5 ,  p . 1 0 1 2 .
287 R e u te r , Münchener Kommentar zum BGB  ( 1 9 7 8 ) ,  v o l .  I ,  in tr o d u c t io n  §  2 1  n o te  9 ,  a l s o  f o r  th e  
c o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  a  la c k  in  th e  s e l f - in t e r e s t  o f  th e  le g a l  p e rs o n
T h e r e  is in  g e n e r a l  n o  n e e d  to  g r a n t  th e  c o m p a n y  a n  u n lim ite d  le g a l  c a p a c i t y  a s  th is  is  g iv e n  to  
n a tu ra l p e r s o n s , e v e n  i f  t r a d it io n a l ly  th e  l e g a l  c a p a c i t y  o f  th e  le g a l p e r s o n  is  a l ig n e d  to  th e  le g a l  c a p a c i t y  
o f  th e  n a tu ra l p e r s o n , s e e  A n tu n e s  ( 1 9 9 1 ) ,  s u p r a  n o te  1 9 ,  p . 8 4 .
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for its activity.289 In the same way, the limited liability may be limited: limits may 
derive from the role o f this institution in economic activity and from legal elements 
which form the conditions for the acknowledgement of the limited liability.290
To conclude, the GmbH  as a legal person is intended to be independent from its 
members to a certain extent, in the sense of the "ideal whole" of the legal person.291 
The elements o f the legal person are oriented towards a rather independent activity of 
the company: the legal fixing of an organisational structure, the separating of a fund for 
the company’s activity, and the granting o f legal capacity to a separate entity. However, 
the concrete organisational structure of the GmbH  does not secure the independence of 
the company effectively as one of its organs, the shareholder assembly, is given 
primacy over the other, the directors, by the right to determine the management of the 
company to a wide extent by means of instructions. Furthermore, the model of the 
GmbH  as somehow independent towards its shareholders is in conflict with the use of 
the company in reality. The GmbH  is mostly chosen for medium-sized firms in which 
the shareholders normally know each other and have a strong influence on the way the 
business is run; often the shareholders also provide the directors of the company. 
Therefore factual aspects also weaken the separation of company and shareholders. The 
tension between the general elements of the legal person and the concrete structure of 
the GmbH , including its factual use, can also be seen on the company interest.292 In 
principle, the (independent) self-interest of the company is approved; however, it is only 
got into effect if minority shareholders have to be protected by it. A completely 
detached company interest from its shareholders is not accepted; moreover, it is difficult 
to see how such an interest could be achieved without the support of an adequate 
organisational structure. Further limits for the company interest are only favoured to 
protection of the creditors. In general, autonomy is no longer seen as a decisive element
^  S e e  W e s t e r m a n n , in  S c h o lz ,  GmbH-Gesetz ( 1 9 7 8 / 8 3 ) ,  6 t h  e d . ,  in tr o d u c t io n  n o te  6 ;  W in t e r ,  in  
S c h o lz ,  GmbH-Gesetz ( 1 9 7 8 / 8 0 ) ,  6 t h  e d . ,  §  1 3 ,  n o te  1 1 - 1 3 ;  R e u te r , Münchener Kommentar zum BGB 
( 1 9 7 8 ) ,  V o l .  1 ,  in tr o d u c t io n  §  2 1 ,  n o te  7 f .
290 W in te r ,  in  S c h o lz ,  GmbH-Gesetz ( 1 9 7 8 / 8 3 ) ,  6 t h  e d ., §  1 3  n o te  2 4 f . ;  R e u te r ,  ib id ., n o te  1 0 .
291 S e e  F lu m e  ( 1 9 8 3 ) ,  s u p r a  n o te  2 6 3 ,  p . 4 9 ,  w i t h  r e fe r e n c e  to  S a v ig n y ;  a l s o  ta k in g  u p  th e  
m e ta p h o r  o f  th e  " id e a l  w h o le "  T e u b e r  ( 1 9 8 8 ) ,  s u p r a  n o te  2 6 7 ,  p . 1 5 0 - 1 5 2 .
292 T h e  s a m e  te n s io n  c a n  b e  s e e n  in  th e  le g a l  m o d e l  o f  th e  GmbH b e tw e e n  l im ite d  l ia b i l i t y  a n d  th e  
d o m in a n t  p o s it io n  o f  th e  s h a r e h o ld e r s ,  s e e  W e s t e r m a n n ,  in  S c h o lz ,  GmbH-Gesetz ( 1 9 7 8 / 8 3 ) ,  6 th  e d . ,  
in t r o d u c t io n  n o te  I f .
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of the legal person.293
2. The Profit Centre in the Form of a Legal Person and a GmbH
In principle, the legal structure o f the G m bH  seems to be very well suited for use as an 
affiliated company in a group. Especially the right of the shareholder assembly to issue 
legally binding instructions for the directors allows the group management to exert 
influence on the subsidiary's management. Thus the business of the GmbH  can be 
determined and the management competences of the directors can be limited to a large 
extent, e.g. shareholders may install reservations of consent for certain management 
d ecisio n s.294 The shareholder assem bly also has com prehensive control 
competences.295 Another advantage of the GmbH  as a legal form is that there are 
very few mandatory laws for the design of the company’s articles with regard to the 
internal relationship, so that the articles o f the company can be designed very precisely 
for the purposes of the company, including its position in a group.296 The concrete 
structure of the GmbH  is therefore advantageous for its use as a member of a group; the 
question remains whether the above-described economic organisation of a group is 
compatible with the elements of the legal person in the form of a GmbH. To put it 
more concretely, what needs to be analysed is whether the elements of the G m b H s 
legal structure are compatible with the position of a semi-autonomous profit centre 
which is partly directed and controlled by the strategic group management.297
The profit centres form separate units in the enterprise, as such they are clearly 
separated from the other parts of the enterprise for economic reasons. This fits the legal 
status of a company as a separate legal entity. In general, the internal economic 
organisation can also be adapted to the organisational structure of the company, the 
management of the profit centre is formed by the directors of the GmbH , and the group
S e c  fo r  th e  le g a l  p e r s o n  in  g e n e r a l  R e u te r ,  Münchener Kommentar zum BGB  ( 1 9 7 8 ) ,  v o l .  1 , 
in t r o d u c t io n  §  2 1 ,  n o te  9 .
2<M S e e  K o p p e n s te in e r ,  in  R o w e d d e r  ( e d , ) ,  GmbH-Gesetz  ( 1 9 8 5 ) ,  §  3 7  n o te  1 9 - 2 2 ,  2 5 .  
m  GmbHG §  4 6  N o  6 ;  c f .  K o p p e n s te in e r ,  i b id . ,  §  4 6  n o te  2 7 - 2 9 .
2% S e c  GmbHG §  4 5 .
297 S e e  fo r  a  s u m m a r y  o f  th e  im p o rta n t  f a c t o r s  o f  th is  s t r u c tu r e  B  I V .
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management or its representatives constitute the shareholder assembly (including, o f 
course, possible minority shareholders).298
The profit centre is also intended to form independent assets, especially as one 
of the main controlling devices in its structure is the return on investment. Thus it lies 
in the nature of a profit centre that precisely fixed assets be assigned to it for its 
disposal as a separate fund. In principle, the requirements of the economic structure 
with regard to separate assets match those of the legal structure of the legal person as 
a G m bH }99
The profit centre structure attributes to each profit centre a self-interest as 
otherwise the aims of the actual goal of a profit centre, to make profits for this unit, 
could not be achieved. The management and the subsidiary are directed and controlled 
in fact by the profits, so that the self-interest of the unit in the market is kept. On the 
other hand, the interest and autonomy of the affiliated company are altered in several 
strategic respects. The group management determines strategic decisions and naturally 
looks after the interest o f the group, especially in the fields of the business activities o f 
the subsidiary, degree of indebtedness, amount of investments, profits to be achieved. 
In this way, the interests of the subsidiary are transformed by the group: its interest is 
only pursued in the strategic framework set by the group interest and determined by the 
group management. The subsidiary/profit centre is granted autonomy within these limits 
for concrete presence in the market. In fact, the reduced autonomy of the subsidiary’s 
management seems to suit the legal structure of the GmbH. The main factor which 
determines the interest of the company, its profit orientation as an actor in the market, 
corresponds to the goals and purposes of a profit centre. In the legal structure of the 
GmbH , the actual company interest is very reduced, if there are no dissenting minority 
shareholders (which will not be assumed here). The strategic heteronomy of the 
company also seems to lie in the structure of a GmbH . The shareholder assembly is 
given primacy in the structure of the company by its right to issue instructions to the
F o r  p o s s ib le  p r o b le m s  w ith  r e g a r d  to  th e  s t a f f i n g  o f  th e  d ir e c to r s ,  e s p e c ia l ly  in t e r lo c k in g  
d ir e c t o r a t e s ,  s e e  b e lo w .
S e e  fo r  fu r th e r  a n a ly s i s  o f  th e  c o m p a n y ’s  s e p a r a te  fun d  a n d  lim ite d  l ia b i l i t y  b e lo w .
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directors; therefore, the shareholders normally take the structural/strategic decisions for 
the company. As the GmbH  does not form a public company with a normal widespread 
of shareholders, the influence and the interest of the single shareholder is not 
neutralized. Therefore the view of the company as a self-sustaining interest and 
autonomy centre does not greatly correspond to the structure of the GmbH. The lack of 
real autonomy of the GmbH  as an affiliated company in a group seems to make only a 
slight difference in comparison to an independent GmbHf dominated by a private 
shareholder; this can also be seen in the reduction of the company interest in the Gm bH  
to the interest of the shareholders.300 Nevertheless, it needs to be acknowledged that - 
besides the lack of structural autonomy to achieve an independently formed company 
interest- the general interest of the profit centre and that of the company, i.e. to make 
profits for the unit, match each other.301
A main feature of the GmbH  as a legal person is that legal rights and duties can 
be attributed to it. The economic structure is formed in such a way that a profit centre 
has direct access to the market and its purpose is to be directly aligned to it as well as 
to have a certain independence of standing within it. The profit centre therefore handles 
all legal relations with the market and according to the economic structure, the 
consequences of its business activity are to meet itself. The attribution of rights and 
duties to the GmbH  as a subsidiary corresponds to the economic structure, which 
assigns the results o f the business activity first and foremost to the unit concerned; the 
group or the parent as "superior authority" not only uses the subsidiary as a "dummy" 
or "puppet" behind which the higher levels of the group act as "wire-pullers". Focusing 
on such a standing of the company does not mean that the affiliated GmbH  has in all 
circumstances to be the final point of attribution of rights and -especially- duties, thus 
that always treating it as a "normal" (i.e. independent) company, but that because the 
parent exerts influence the need for the attribution of the consequences of this influence
3‘,°  S e e  fo r  a  d i f f e r e n t  v ie w  o f  th e  s i tu a t io n  o f  in te r e s ts  in th e  a f f i l ia t e d  G m b H  in  c o m p a r is o n  to  a n  
in d e p e n d e n t  G m b H  e .g .  U lm e r  ( 1 9 8 4 ) ,  s u p ra  n o te  2 7 4 ,  p . 3 9 6 .
wl S e e  in h o w fa r  th e  o r g a n ia t io n  u s e s  th e  l e g a l ly  d e f in e d  c o m p a n y  in t e r e s t  f o r  e c o n o m ic  r e a s o n s  
B  I I I  3  a ;  fo r  th e  d a n g e r s  c a u s e d  b y  th e  g ro u p  f o r  th e  a s s e ts  o f  th e  s u b s id ia r y  s e e  b e lo w .
WBMWWWJWUMijUWlinWIIIHIWW1m m
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to the parent m a y  a r is e .302
A c c o rd in g  to  th is e c o n o m ic  s tru ctu re , the le g a l p e rso n , in the fo rm  o f  a GmbH , 
can  b e  se e n  as re la tiv iz e d 303 in  a g ro u p , as a p ro fit c e n tre  stan d in g  is  a ss ig n ed  to  th e  
com p an y  w ith  o n ly  lim ited  a u to n o m y . D e sp ite  the lim its  o n  th e  c o m p a n y ’s a u to n o m y , 
the c o n ce p t k e e p s  the m ain e le m e n ts  o f  the le g a l p e rso n ; it  is  seen  as a body w ith  its  
ow n o rg a n isa tio n , a s s e ts ,, an d - e s p e c ia lly  its o w n  s e lf - in te r e s t  n e ce ssa ry  w h ic h  is 
n ecessa ry  to fo rm  a g u id elin e  fo r  th e  u n it as  a p ro fit  c e n tre . T h e  e c o n o m ic  s tru c tu re  
n eed s e x a c tly  th e se  a ttribu tes fo r  th e  p ro fit cen tre  u nits, th e re fo re  it e x p lo its  th e  le g a l 
o rg an isa tio n a l stru ctu re  fo r  its  o w n  e c o n o m ic  p u rp o ses and there is  an e c o n o m ic  
in cen tiv e  to k eep  the - le g a lly  in ten d ed - sep ara ten ess o f  th e  le g a l person  (in  the fo rm  o f  
a GmbH) -  w ith in  certa in  lim its . T h ro u g h  this e c o n o m ic  c o n c e p t  the le g a l p e rso n  is 
re la tiv iz ed  and red u ced  in its  fu n ctio n  as sep arate bod y an d  au to n o m o u s in terest c e n tre , 
but on th e  re la tiv iz e d  level th e  e c o n o m ic  stru ctu re m a in ta in s  the attribu tes o f  th e  le g a l 
person - th is c o n c e p t  is ap p rop riate  fo r  the GmbH, a s  it is  a lread y  re la tiv ized  in its  le g a l 
stru ctu re and d o e s  not really  c o rre sp o n d  to the m od el o f  th e  le g a l p erson .
3, Personnel Policy
V ery  im p ortant fo r  the e n fo rc e m e n t o f  a uniform  g rou p  p o lic y  is the p erson n el p o lic y  
in the grou p , i.e . th e  s ta ffin g  o f  the su b s id ia ry ’s m a n a g e m e n t. T h e  sh areh o ld er a ss e m b ly  
d ecid es ab ou t the d irecto rs o f  the co m p a n y  by m a jo rity  reso lu tio n  (GmbHG § 4 6  N o  5 ) ,  
they are p erso n a lly  d ependent on the sh areh o ld er a sse m b ly  and can  b e  rem o v ed  from  
their p osition  at any tim e {GmbHG  § 3 7 ) .304 A s the p aren t n orm ally  d o m in a te s  the 
sh areh o ld er a ss e m b ly , it c a n  e n fo rc e  its w ish es w ith  reg ard  to the s ta ffin g  o f  the 
m an ag em en t and in this w ay  e n fo r c e  the grou p  p o licy  and largely  d eterm in e  the 
su b s id ia ry ’s b u sin e ss  p o licy . T h e re fo re , already w ith  reg ard  to the p erson n el p o lic y  it
3 0 2  See for this Teubner, "Die ‘Politik des Gesetzes’ im Recht der Konzernhaftung", in Festschrift 
Steindorff ( 1990), p. 26Iff.; the same for franchising networks see Teubner, "‘Verbund’, ‘Verband’ Oder 
‘Verkehr’?", in Zeitschrift fur Handelsrecht 154 (1990), p. 295ff., 309ff.
3 0 3  See already for the rclativation of the legal person in a group Raiser (1964), supra note 2, 
p. 54.
3 0 4  Deviations regarding appointment and removal of the company’s directors are possible 
according to the articles of the company.
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is q u estio n ab le  w h e th e r  the m in im u m  in d ep en d en ce  o f  th e  su b sid iary  co m p an y  a s  a  
legal form  is k e p t. T h is  a rea  is o f te n  a ls o  d iscu ssed  w ith  reg ard  to  th e  fo llo w in g  
problem , th e  p ro te c tio n  o f  c re d ito rs .
T h e  m ain  p ro b lem  in th is  re s p e c t  a re  the in te r lo c k in g  d ire c to ra te s . T h is  m e a n s  
that at le a s t on e d ire c to r  o f  th e  su b sid ia ry  is a lso  d ire c to r  o f  th e  p arent; h e th e re fo re  h as 
a dual m an d ate . T h is  m ay le a d  to c o n f lic ts  o f  in terests  and d u ties in the a c c o m p lish m e n t 
o f  the d ire c to r ’s  d u tie s  w ith  th e  re s p e c tiv e  co m p a n y ; o r -to  e x p re s s  the p ro b lem  in  te rm s 
o f  stru ctu re o f  th e  co m p a n y - it m ay  le a d  to  a  la ck  o f  se p a ra tio n  b etw een  the in te re s ts  
o f  the p aren t and o f  the su b sid iary  o r  to  a  p red o m in an ce  o f  th e  p arent in terests to w a rd s 
the su bsid iary  a s  b o th  d ire c to ra te s  a re  c ry s ta lliz e d  in o n e  s in g le  p erso n .305 A s  a 
co n seq u en ce  the p ro h ib ition  o f  su ch  a stru ctu re  and/or th e  e x te n sio n  o f  lia b ility  are 
d iscu ssed .306
T h e re  a re  no statu tory  le g a l p ro v is io n s  w h ich  p ro h ib it in te rlo ck in g  d ire c to ra te s , 
the only ru les a b o u t the in c o m p a tib ility  o f  o f f ic e s  re fe r  to  m e m b e rs  o f  the su p erv iso ry  
board (AktG § 1 0 0 )  and from  th e se  p ro v is io n s  n oth ing  can  b e  d eriv ed  fo r  dual m a n d a te s  
o f  d irecto rs. T h e  q u estion  w h eth er in te r lo c k in g  d ire c to ra te s  p er se  d isto rt the s tru c tu re  
o f  the co m p an y  in a w ay w h ich  is u n a cce p ta b le  is c o n tro v e rs ia l fo r the AG, w h ile  fo r  
the GmbH it is g en era lly  a cce p te d  th at at least p artia lly  in te rlo ck in g  d ire c to ra te s  are 
co m p atib le  w ith  th is co m p an y  form  as the GmbH g ran ts the sh areh o ld ers p er se  a 
greater in flu e n ce  on the c o m p a n y .307 T h e  d ire c to rs  are o b lig e d  to co m p ly  w ith th e ir
ws Interlocking directorates may cause problems on different levels; the joint conduct of business 
and joint representation by the directors of the subsidiary and of the parent may be distorted by 
interlocking directorates and the control of the subsidiary’s directors by a supervisory board which 
consists of directors of the parent may be dubious, see for the arising legal problems in the AG Martens, 
"Die Organisation des Konzern Vorstandes", Festschrift für Heinsius (1991), p, 525-527; Hoffmann- 
Becking (1986), supra note 255, p. 571-574.
** For interlocking directorates as a trigger for the form of the qualified de facto group with an 
affiliated GmbH (qualifiziert faktischer Konzern), see Emmerich/Sonnenschein (1993), supra note 186, p. 
402f.; for the permissibility of such a form see Emmerich/Sonnenschcin ibid., p. 445-449; with regard to 
interlocking directorates as a trigger for the extension of liability see affirmative Sacker, "Zur Problematik 
von Mehrfachfunktionen im Konzern", Zeitschrift für Handelsrecht 151 (1987), p. 59ff.; contrary to an 
automatic extension of liability Lindermann, "Doppelmandat gleich Haftungsdurchgriff?", D ie  
Aktiengesellschaft 1987, p, 225ff.
JOT See even BGHZ 115, 187, 195 - Video; Lindermann, ibid., p. 235; in the same direction Sacker 
ibid., p. 6 8 . The problem is shifted to the question whether the interlocking directorates trigger an 
extension of liability or are simply a sign of dominant influence.
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duties tow ard s b o th  c o m p a n ie s , th u s th ey  have to p u rsu e th e  in terest o f  the r e s p e c tiv e  
com p an y fo r  w h ic h  they  are  a c tin g . A n y  c o n flic t  o f  in te re s t is  m itig ated  i f  the p a re n t  is  
the on ly  sh a re h o ld e r , a s  th e  su b s id ia r y ’s  co m p an y  in te re s t can  -to  a g re a t e x te n t -  b e  
d eterm ined  by th e  p arent.308 T h e r e fo r e , the e x e rtin g  o f  in flu e n c e  in  b o th  c o m p a n ie s  is 
not n e ce ssa rily  s e e n  as b e in g  co n tra ry  to the in terest o f  th e  resp ectiv e  co m p a n ie s  an d  to 
the d u ties o f  th e  d ire c to rs , b u t o n ly  in asm u ch  a s  the in fr in g e m e n t o f  duties an d  the 
d am agin g  o f  c o m p a n ie s  le a d s to an u n law fu l sta tu s .309 310
T h is  re su lt o f  the le g a l d iscu ss io n  can  be su p p orted  b y  the o b je c tiv e s  o f  th e  
e c o n o m ic  s tru c tu re . In te r lo c k in g  d ire c to ra te s  a re  a m e a n s  fo r  m a in ta in in g  th e  
su b sid iaries  in a grou p w ith  a d ecen tra lised  grou p  stru ctu re . T h e  in terest o f  the 
su bsid iary  is to b e  taken  in to  a c c o u n t in the form u lation  o f  the grou p p o lic y ; th e re fo re , 
in that la rg e  a re a  in w hich  g ro u p  in te re s t and com p an y  in te re s t corresp on d , the in te re s t 
o f  the su b sid ia ry  can  b e  b e tte r  se e n  at the grou p le v e l, and a further re a c h in g  
d eterm in ation  o f  the co m p a n y  in te re s t by  a su pposed  p red o m in an t g rou p  in te re s t can  
even  b e  av o id ed . In o rg a n isa tio n a l re sp e c ts , in terlo ck in g  d ire c to ra te s  -in  a p ro fit c e n tre  
o rg an isa tio n - a re  o n ly  ch o se n  if  the d ire c t in tegration  o f  th e  su b sid iary ’s  in terest h as a 
high s ig n if ic a n c e  in the g ro u p  and i f  it d oes not seem  to b e  n ecessary  to fo rm u la te  the 
group p o licy  as d etach ed  fro m  a d ire c t  con trib u tio n  o f  th e  su b sid iaries , in order to  av o id  
n eg otia ted  c o m p ro m ise s  in fa v o u r o f  partial in terests and to  the d am age o f  the o v e ra ll 
group p o lic y .3111
T h e  sa m e  c o n flic t  rea p p ea rs  w ith  regard to  the s ta f f in g  o f  the su b s id ia ry ’ s  
organ s w ith  p e o p le  w ho "re p re se n t"  the in terest o f  th e  p arent. T h e  op in ion  th a t the 
parent m ay not sen d  p eo p le w h o rep resen t its in terest in th e  sh areh old er a sse m b ly  d oes 
not se em  to h a v e  b een  put fo rw a rd ; n either d o es the o p in io n  that the parent is  not 
a llow ed  to ap p o in t the d ire c to rs  a c c o rd in g  to its p re fe re n c e s  ( fo r  the GmbH). D o u b ts  
have arisen  w h e th e r  -in  an AG - the p aren t as a m a jo rity  sh areh o ld er can  appoint a ll the
3 0 8  See above C III 1. Similar Hoffmann-Becking (1986), supra note 255, p. 575.
3 4 ,9 See for the AG OLG Köln ZIP 1993, 110, 114; with in this respect affirmative comment by 
Timm, ibid., p. 117.
3 1 0  See v.Werder (1989), supra note 198, p. 43; see also the example of Du Pont above, 
footnote 1 1 0 .
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m em b ers o f  th e  su p erv iso ry  b o ard  o r  w hether n eu tral p e o p le  o r re p resen ta tiv es  o f  
m inority  sh a re h o ld e rs  are a ls o  to  b e  ap p o in ted .311 In p r in c ip le , the sam e p ro b lem  m ay  
appear fo r  a GmbH  w ith  a su p e rv iso ry  b oard . D ire c t  s ta tu to ry  p ro v isio n s w h ich  o b je c t  
to the a p p o in tm en t o f  re p re se n ta tiv e s  o f  the parent fo r  the su p erv iso ry  b o a rd  c a n n o t b e  
found, as g rou p s in  G erm an  la w  are p riv ileg e d  (w ith in  g ro u p s on e  person  can  h o ld  up 
to 15  se a ts  in su p erv iso ry  b o a rd s  in ste a d  o f  10  in n o n -a sso c ia te d  co m p an ie s  (AktG § 
1 0 0  (2 )  2 n d  s e n te n c e ) ) .312 M o re o v e r , a p artial p reven tion  o f  th e  p aren t’s  rep resen ta tio n  
in  the su p erv iso ry  b o ard  w o u ld  d ire c tly  h ind er the fo rm a tio n  o f  a group ev en  in a v ery  
d ecen tra lised  fo rm , as the a p p o in tm e n t o f  m em b ers o f  the su p erv iso ry  board  is o n e  o f  
the m ain fa c to rs  fo r  a ch ie v in g  a u n ifo rm  group p o licy  - o th e rw ise  the cen trifu g a l fo rc e s  
in a g ro u p  c o u ld  p rev en t a u n ifo rm  m a n a g em en t in  the grou p (e s p e c ia l ly  i f  
rep re se n ta tiv e s  o f  the e m p lo y e e s  a re  m em b ers  o f  th e  su b s id ia ry ’ s su p erv iso ry  
b o a rd ).313 A s th e  s im p le  de fa c to  g ro u p  is g en era lly  se en  to be a llo w ed 314 and the 
ap p o in tm en t o f  th e  m em b ers o f  the su p erv sisory  board  d o e s  not n ecessa rily  lead to  the 
total su bo rd in atio n  o f  the co m p a n y  th e  p red o m in atin g  o p in io n  g iv e s  the p arent the rig h t 
to appoint " its "  rep re se n ta tiv e s  fo r  the org an s o f  the c o m p a n y .315
T h e  co n c lu s io n  that in a grou p person al lin k s are n o t p er se  forb id d en  c a n  b e  
su pported  by an ex a m in a tio n  o f  o th e r  legal ord ers. In F ra n c e , leg a l p erson s can  
th e m se lv es be m em b ers  o f  th e  ad m in istra tiv e  board  or o f  the su p erv isory  board  o f  a
3 1 1  OLG Hamm NJW  1987, 1030. 103If. - Banning; and see the proposals by Hommelhoff (1988), 
supra note 257, p. 122-124.
3 1 2  Similar provisions exist in French law for the appointment of members of the board or the 
supervisory board of the société anonyme, the maximum number of mandates in the organs is more 
flexible for groups, see Loi 1066 art. 92, 111, 127, 136 and Ripert/Roblot/Germain (1993), supra note 11, 
note 1270.
3 1 3  See as an example the unsuccessful takeover of East-German steel mills by the Italian 
entrepreneur Riva, one of the reasons for the failure was the wish of the unions to appoint a "neutral" 
chairman of the supervisory board according to their preferences, FAZ from 30 April 1994, p. 14.
114 See for an argumentation taking the permissibility of the de facto group as a starting point 
especially Hommelhoff (1982), supra note 15, p. 110-112; for a more detained analysis with regard to the 
statutory provisions of the AG see Kropff, in Geßler et al. (ed.), Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz (1976), § 
311 note 7-20. For an argumentation more from the concrete legal norms and not from the general 
permissibility of the de facto group Emmerich/Sonnenschein (1993), supra note 186, p. 376; de facto 
groups with an affiliated GmbH are generally held for allowed see Emmerich/Sonnenschien, ibid., p. 
436ff.
3 1 5  Very critical with regard to the decision of the OLG Hamm Timm, "Grundfragen des 
"qualifizierten" faktischen Konzerns im Aktienrecht", Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1987, p. 977ff.; 
Lindermann (1987), supra note 306, p. 237ff.
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société anonyme,316 in this fu n ctio n  th ey  are m o stly  re p re se n te d  by  th e ir  d ire c to rs . In 
G reat B r ita in , c o rp o ra te  b o d ie s  c a n  b e  ap p oin ted  a s  d ire c to rs  so  that c o m p le te  c o n tro l 
o f  a su bsid iary  is  m a in ta in e d .317 A c c o rd in g  to th e se  le g a l o rd e rs , the p aren t as d ire c to r  
o f  a su b sid iary  h a s  to  c o m p ly  w ith  th e  d u ties w h ic h  a d ire c to r  u su ally  h as to ta k e  c a re  
o f  tow ard s h is  c o m p a n y ; a n e c e s s a r ily  ap p earin g , s tru ctu ra l c o n f lic t  o f  in terests  is  not 
co n c e iv e d  in th is  c o n stru ctio n  b y  F r e n c h  and E n g lish  la w .
4. Financial Management
T h e  sep aration  o f  o n e  e c o n o m ic  a c to r  in to  d iffe re n t leg al p e rso n s  w ith  th e ir ow n equ ity  
cap ita l,-th e  p o s s ib ility  to ra is e  c re d its  fo r  each  s in g le  co m p a n y  on  the b a s is  o f  th is , and 
to grant cred its  o r  equ ity  ca p ita l fro m  on e co m p an y  to a n o th e r , ch a n g es the fin a n c ia l 
s itu a tio n  c o m p le te ly  from  th a t o f  a u n ifo rm  c o m p a n y .318 H o w e v e r, the w id e r 
p o ssib ilities  fo r  an abuse o f  f in a n c ia l m ean s o w in g  to th e  m ore co m p lex  fin a n c ia l 
situ ation  in a g ro u p  w ill n o t b e  e x a m in e d  as in th is  re s p e c t  it  is  only  re lev an t fo r  the 
study w h eth er and to w hat e x te n t th e  fo rm  o f  a GmbH  a s  an  a ffilia te d  com p an y  a llo w s 
the p re se n ce  o f  a u n iform  f in a n c ia l m a n a g e m e n t in  th e  g rou p . T h e  f in a n c ia l 
m an agem en t o f  a grou p c a n  b e  m o re  or le ss  c e n tra liz e d , h ow ev er, the grou p  
m an agem en t h as to se t ce r ta in  stan d ard s in ord e r to  e n fo r c e  the grou p  p o licy  and  to 
control the f in a n c ia l situ ation  o f  the grou p  as a w h o le . T h e  se ttin g  o f  standards a s  the 
return on  in co m e  w h ich  is to b e  a c h ie v e d  by the su b s id ia ry , a certa in  d eb t-eq u ity  d eg re e  
w hich is not to  b e  e x c e e d e d , and an en d o w m en t w ith e q u ity  cap ita l d oes n ot rea lly  
seem  to a ffe c t the fu n ctio n in g  o f  the co m p an y .
; T h e  d e c is io n  o f  the g ro u p  m a n a g em en t ab ou t the u se o f  the su b s id ia ry ’ s p ro fits  
(b y  reso lu tion  o f  the sh a reh o ld er a sse m b ly , GmbHG §  4 6  N o 1) can  be se e n  as
•M* It depends on the concrete structure of the company, for the company with a board system see 
Loi 1966 art. 91, in the company with a supervisory board the legal person can be one of its members, 
but cannot be a director of the company, see for the Société Anonyme L o i 1966 art. 135 and art. 120 (3) 
and Ripert/Roblot/Germain (1993), supra note 11, note 1269; the director(s) of a Société á  Responsabilité 
Limitée has to be a natural person, L oi 1966 art. 49 (1).
517 See CA 1985 s. 289 (1) b; but this may lead to the liability of the parent in the light of the 
Insolvency Act 1986 s. 213, 214; sec Gower (1992), supra note 9, p. 110-115; 143.
3I* See for the different possible effects with an ornate terminology Schneider (1984), supra 
note 205, p. 501-506.
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problematic, since it is a decision about whether the profits must be distributed or can 
be kept. By this the parent can decide about the future investments and future 
performance o f the subsidiary. Using the above-described internal capital market, the 
group management can distribute the earnings of one group member to another if the 
projects of the latter promise a higher yield. This may seem to be unfair319 as it may 
be disadvantageous for the subsidiary which has actually made the profit, but in the 
framework set by the law shareholders are free to use the profits of the company as 
they wish. Limits especially derive from the fiduciary duties of the parent as majority 
shareholder towards the GmbH  and minority shareholders. Fiduciary duties can require 
that the GmbH  distributes an adequate part of its profits, but also, on the other hand, 
that parts of its profits be allotted to the reserves if this is necessary for future 
investments.320 However, this problem does not refer specifically to the group but is 
a general problem of the relationship between majority and minority shareholders; in 
addition, such fiduciary duties can only be asserted if minority shareholders exist in the 
GmbH. The need of the subsidiary for new equity capital or capital in other forms (e.g. 
bank loans) is also in the same way treated. The parent, in general, is not obliged to 
attribute new capital to the subsidiary, at least no more so than any other (majority) 
shareholder.321 Therefore, in principle, the subsidiary does not have a right to equal 
treatment with regard to the distribution of financial means, since the parent is free to 
decide to which subsidiary it wants to allocate further resources.322
Greater objections have arisen regarding the centralization of financial functions, 
such as the centralization of the procurement of capital and -especially- a uniform cash- 
management. Through measures as these the independent existence of a company can 
be endangered, especially if the parent and the group as a whole finds itself in financial 
difficulties, or if the subsidiary is severed from the group. In a decentralised group 
structure, therefore, only the long-term need for capital is centralized or centrally
319 Very critical Antunes (1991), supra note 19, p. 114.
320 See Goerdeler/Welf, in Hachenburg, GmbH-Gesetz (1992), 8th ed., § 29 note 62-67, 71-75.
321 See Schneider (1984), supra note 205, p. 529; an obligation to allocate capital can derive from 
the fiduciary duties of the shareholders if for the continued existence of the company an increase of the 
equity capital is necessary, see Rowedder, in id. (ed.), GmbH-Gesetz (1985), § 13 note 15.
322 Schneider, ibid., p. 534f.
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directed, as a central long-term financing of this type does not affect the subsidiary to 
a great extent as the company can take this entrepreneurial function over again in a 
short time. The absorption of liquidity by a central cash-management causes greater 
problems, as in the very centralized form of a central cash-management the single 
company does not have any liquidity at its own disposal; this leads in the case o f any 
financial difficulties on the part of the parent/the group to automatic difficulties for the 
subsidiary. In a de facto group it is thus absolutely necessary that the subsidiary holds 
sufficient liquidity at its disposal as otherwise its standing as an entity with a certain 
interest o f self-preservation and with a certain independence cannot be upheld.323 The 
short- and medium-range need for capital must therefore be at least partly covered by 
the subsidiary itself, and the subsidiary must maintain its own relations with banks, 
while the parent may support it by giving securities and providing for a uniform 
banking policy.324
In general, the GmbH  should not become totally dependent on the parent in 
financial respects, thus the centralizing of the financing function and a central cash- 
management is only to a certain extent compatible with the form of a GmbH. 
Dependence on the parent is especially relevant in times of crisis, but, in normal times 
also, a complete dependence of the affiliated company in financial respects can lead to 
a total dependence also in other respects.325
A related problem is that of the credit ties between companies in a group. Group 
members can grant each other credits out of their separate funds; thus the group is less 
dependent on bank loans and is able to economize on interests. The central cash- 
management provides also a system of credits granting, as the liquidity deficit o f some 
companies is balanced by the surplus of others and some companies thus grant short- 
range credits to others. In the granting of credits from one company to another several 
dangers lie. First, the profit centre principle may be distorted if the usual interest rates
313 See Schneider (1984), supra note 205, p. 533-535.
314 Reintges (1988), supra note 184, p. 677-679; Schneider, ibid., p. 498f.
i2S cf. considerations by Goerdeier/Welf, in Hachenburg, GmbH-Gesetz (1992), 8th ed., § 29 note
7 5 .
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5. Accounting and Information
One important device to form a unified group management is that of the informational 
ties between the companies in the group, by a group-wide uniform accounting and 
auditing procedure and by more informal informational links, such as meetings, 
committees, and the distribution of plans and programmes. If the information is 
necessary for drawing up consolidated group accounts, the subsidiary is explicitly 
obliged by statute to deliver the information (HGB § 290 (3)).* 330 Moreover, in the 
GmbH , a comprehensive right of information is granted to all shareholders (GmbHG  § 
51a), and thus the parent can demand also information from the subsidiary.331 As a 
further justification for the informational flow between parent and subsidiary, the 
permissibility of the de facto group is in general used.332 Nevertheless, as these 
informational and coordinative links do not really touch upon the independent activity 
of the subsidiary and no objections arise directly from the statutory provisions333 these 
elements of the economic organisation are compatible with the legal concept of the 
GmbH.
6. Shift of Entrepreneurial Functions from the Subsidiary to Other Group 
Members
A further measure which can endanger the existence of the company as an enterprise is 
the shift of entrepreneurial functions away from the subsidiary - by centralization at the 
level of the parent or by attribution to a subsidiary. By centralizing functions the 
affiliated company may become dependent on the parent or other subsidiaries if it is not 
able to run its business without the entrepreneurial function taken over by the other 
group members. In particular, the company may be affected by the consequences of a
’’Einige Elemente der konzemrechtlichen Sonderregefungen in Frankreich", in Mestmäcker/Behrens (eds.), 
Das Gesellschaftsrecht der Konzerne im internationalen Vergleich (1991), p. 184f.
330 See also the exception from the equal treatment of all shareholders of an AG with regard to 
information AktG § 131 (4) 3rd sentence.
331 cf. Hüffcr, in Hachenburg, GmbH-Gesetz (1991), § 51a note 31.
331 Krieger, in Münchener Handbuch der AG (1988), § 69 note 33 with further references; 
Scheffler (1991), supra note 195, p. 259.
333 More difficult is the situation in the AG as AktG § 131 (4) 1st, 2nd sentence and § 93 (1) 2nd 
sentence seem to be rather contrary to such an interpretation.
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crisis of the parent or the other group member. The solution for this case must be the 
same as that used in the centralization o f the financial management, that is to say, 
functions may be centralized as long as the company does not become completely 
dependent on the group or as long as the function can be built up again if necessary - 
i.e. in the case o f a crisis in the group or if the group integration of the company is
dissolved. This also corresponds to the economic requirements of a profit centre, as>
whoever takes the responsibility for the profit must have those competences in order to 
determine all the elements which are relevant for the profit; a coerced centralization of 
functions without other alternatives may lead to a distortion of the profit centre result. 
However, this problem may have become less acute since over the few last years, due 
to the formula "lean management and production", it has become normal for companies 
to shift entrepreneurial functions to other entreprises - such a shift must also be possible 
in the group and the subsidiary is secured as there has arisen a market for these 
functions.
7. Conclusion
The standing as a profit centre is compatible with the form of a legal person and the 
company form of a GmbH. The status of the GmbH  is maintained in the economic 
structure with regard to all aspects of the legal person; it has its own organisation, its 
assets are separated from the assets o f other companies in the group, and an interest is 
attributed to the company as a profit centre. Especially with regard to the latter element, 
the transformation of the company in a group can be seen: the company interest is no 
longer autonomously determined within the company, but a pecuniary interest is 
attributed to the company within the framework of the group interest. In this way, the 
legal person is also relativized in other aspects, since the GmbH  is given a semi- 
autonomous and semi-independent status; however, such a relativized legal person is 
needed by the economic structure in order to exploit economic objectives. The means 
of achieving unified management are in general compatible with the legal structure of 
the GmbH , limits on the single devices derive from the necessary degree for an 
independent existence of the corporate body - these devices may not lead to a complete 
absorption of the GmbH  in a group, and special precautions may have to be taken for
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the case of a crisis of the group or o f a detachment of the company from the group.
IV. Extension of Liability in a De Facto Group With Affiliated GmbH
"There is no such thing as unlimited liability. ,,m
A further point to examine is the position of the creditors in a de facto group with an 
affiliated GmbH. The position of the creditors is to analyse with regard to efficiency - 
as it has been done for the organisation of a group and its legal limits through the 
concept of the company. In order to judge the efficiency o f the creditors’ position, it 
has to be decided whether the safeguards for the creditors established by company law 
also cover the risks arising from a group structure, or whether the creditors have to face 
unpredictable risks or to bear externalities caused by the group structure, thus 
necessitating additional safeguards. Dangers for the creditors may derive on two levels 
from the structural changes which the group causes for the legal concept of the 
company. First, the group may render the provisions which establish the legal person as 
a separate body with the attributes mentioned above ineffectively. These provisions of 
organisational law are to some extent linked with the limited liability of the company 
and serve to protect the creditors. Second, the provisions for the separate patrimonial 
fund of the company may be undermined by the group structure.
The protection of creditors in a group will be studied according to the recent 
jurisdiction of the Bundesgerichtshof (BGH)> according to which the liability for an 
affiliated GmbH  can be extended to the parent if a qualified de facto group {qualifiziert 
faktischer Konzern) is formed. By defining such a special group organisation, the BGH 
draws a line beyond which the limited liability of the subsidiary is eliminated and 
liability is extended to the parent. It will be proposed that the extension of liability to 
the parent can be defined along the lines given by the above-described economic 
organisational model.
Woodward, “Limited Liability and the Theory of the Firm“, Journ al o f  Institutional and  
Theoretical Economics 141 (1985), p. 610.
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The negative effects which these decisions have brought about in the business 
world affected335 also underline the necessity for a clear-cut limitation for an 
organisational group structure, compatible with the company law concept and preserving 
the limited liability of the single company. The business practice needs security with 
regard to the legal consequences which a chosen group structure may have - as well as 
in regard to liability questions. Only once it has this security can the parent predict the 
risk it runs with the formation of a group, align its behaviour towards the affiliated 
company according to the criteria which cause an extension of liability, and determine 
which legal group structure fits its organisational preferences, and, therefore, whether 
it must place the group on a control contract if the organisational concept is not 
compatible with a de facto group. Hence, an efficient organisational structure for the 
group not only requires that it be possible to perform a minimum of unified 
management over the group members, but also that the consequences of such a group 
structure with regard to liability be predictable. These two variables, security and 
predictability, therefore form part o f the efficiency of the organisational structure.
In a second step, the result will be examined with regard for the economic 
considerations for limited liability. On the one hand, the necessity for an extension of 
liability to the parent is disputed as this function can be taken over more efficiently by 
the market. On the other, it is doubtful whether there still is a rationale for the limited 
liability of a single company in a group. This means that within -a group there are 
barriers of liability and the question is whether -in the absence of any justification for 
the privilege of limited liability for group members- the parent or the whole group 
should be liable for the debts of each of its members (in which dogmatic way soever 
this result is achieved).
J3i cf. e.g. Wassner, "Ein Schatten mit beschrankter Haftung", FAZ from 6  December 1993, p. 15;
K.Schmidt, "Zum Stand des Konzemhaftungsrechts bei der GmbH", ZIP 12 (1991), p. 1329, "out of wide 
parts of the medium-size industry would be made an empire of qualified de facto groups"; Lutter, "Das 
System des GmbH-Konzernrechts", in Hommelhoff et al. (eds.), Der qualifizierte faktische GmbH- 
Konzern (1992), p. 196, "presumption of dishonest behaviour for wide parts of the German medium size 
industry in the form of GmbHs".
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1. Concept o f the Qualified De Facto Group According to the B G H
In general, the G m bH  is a company with limited liability; thus it is only the assets of 
the company which are liable for the debts of the company, and its shareholders are not 
responsible for the debts of the company if the equity capital is fully paid (GmbHG  § 
13). This is also valid for companies or enterprises as shareholders of an affiliated 
GmbH , since they are not automatically responsible for the debts o f the subsidiary. 
However, the B G H  fixes a liability o f the parent enterprise for the debts of an affiliated 
GmbH  in qualified de facto groups. This solution is achieved by a (partial) analogy to 
the provisions for groups, in which the affiliation of an A G  is based on a control 
contract (AktG  §§ 302, 303).336 Thus, the parent is directly liable to the creditors of 
the subsidiary G m bH  if the subsidiary is wound up and there are no bankruptcy 
proceedings owing to the lack of property of the bankrupt company (according to AktG  
§ 303). Otherwise, the parent meets only an internal obligation to make good the losses 
of the subsidiary (AktG  § 302), and this claim can be put forward by the official 
receiver. The exact extent to which the parent is liable is still under discussion337; 
however, in principle it can be said that in a qualified de facto group the parent has to 
take over the subsidiary’s losses or is directly liable for its debts.338
To assume a group -also a qualified de facto one- presupposes that the dominant 
shareholder is an enterprise (AktG  § 18); being an enterprise is therefore a condition for 
the extension of liability. However, a natural person can also be an "enterprise'1 in this 
sense if other business activities are pursued beside the running of the business of the 
GmbH  at hand.339
3 3 6  See BGHZ 95, 330, 346-348 - Autokran; BGHZ 107, 7, I5ff. - Tiefbau; in the former decision 
also an analogy to AktG § 322 was touched upon, but in later decisions it was no longer considered, cf. 
the considerations by Stimpel, "Haftung im qualifizierten faktischen Konzern", Zeitschrift für  
Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht 20 (1991), p. 145f.
3 3 7  e.g. for one-man companies as subsidiaries, see in detail for all contested problems Assmann 
(1992), supra note 244, p. 704ff.; Stimpel (1991), ibid., p. 156ff.
33<t Very straight forward in this respect without leaving room for exceptions K. Schmidt, 
"Verlustausgleich im qualifiziert faktischen Konzern", tn Hommelhoff ct al. (eds.), Der qualifizierte 
faktische GmbH-Konzern (1992), p. 109ff.
3 3 9  See for the broad definition of "enterprise" in this respect BGHZ 95, 330, 337 - Autokran; BGH 
JZ  1993, 575, 577 - TBB; proceeding from BGHZ 69, 334, 337f. - Veba; critical K. Schmidt, 
"‘Konzernhaftung' nach dem TBB-Urteil - Versuch einer Orientierung", ZIP 14 (1993), p. 550f,
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In principle, the BG H  does not subject all groups with an affiliated GmbH  to an 
extension of liability but only qualified de facto groups; qualified de facto groups 
therefore have to be defined more narrowly than simple de facto groups - for which a 
unified management is the criterion.340 The main problem regarding qualified de facto 
groups is therefore to delimit them from simple de facto groups - this has to be done by 
bearing in mind the drastic consequences of a qualified de facto group, that is the 
extension of liability to the parent.341 Thus, in principle, the declaring, of a group to 
a qualified de facto group should be the exception, while the simple de facto group 
should be conceived as the rule. The difficulty of delimiting qualified de facto groups 
can already be seen in the difficulty o f defining a group - within the vague definition 
of the group by the term "unified management", a further distinction of which has to be 
made in order to determine the qualified de facto group.
In order to delimit the qualified de facto group several criteria are used - often 
side by side. The common starting point is the definition of the Arbeitskreis GmbH- 
Reform  from 1972, according to which the qualified de facto group is characterised by 
a serious -that is, substantially comprehensive and temporarily continual- impairment of 
the self-interest of the affiliated company,342 The serious impairment of a company’s 
self-interest is presumed for every group, therefore the presumption of a qualified de 
facto group is dependent on a unified management as the constituent of the group. 
Whereas this presumption can be refuted, the Arbeitskreis sets up further factual 
presumptions which cannot. These presumptions are so far-reaching that it is impossible 
to conceive a group organisation which does not form a qualified de facto group.343 
The BGH  jurisdiction took this definition as a starting point in its first relevant decision
1 4 ,1 According to AktG § 18 which is valid also for the GmbH\ for a view which tends to tie the 
extension of liability on the unified management in a group see Ulmer, "Vermutungs- und Beweisfragen: 
Qualifizierungsvermutung; Kausalitätsgegenbeweis", in Hommelhoff et al., Der qualifiziert faktische  
GmbH-Konzern (1992), p. 77f..
3 4 1 To a qualified de facto group further consequences may be also tied, especially with respect 
to the protection of minority shareholders, see Lutter, "Der qualifizierte faktische Konzern", Die 
Aktiengesellschaft 1990, p. 181 f.
3 4 2 Arbeitskreis GmbH-Reform, Thesen und Vorschläge zur GmbH-Reform (1972), Vol. 2, p. 49f., 
59, 67.
3 4 3  Arbeitskreis GmbH-Reform (1972), ibid., p. 59f., 6 8 .; see the assessment of these proposals by 
Deilmann, Die Entstehung des qualifizierten faktischen Konzerns (1990), p. 59-61.
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- the A utokran  decision from 1985 .344 To the continual and comprehensive 
management of the parent the B G H  connects a factual presumption that the interest of 
the affiliated companies in a group is neglected and that their business activity is 
determined by the group interest. The parent can refute this presumption by showing 
that the director o f an independent G m bH  acting according to his duties would have run 
the company’s business in the same way.345 In this judgement as a point of 
comparison the department o f a single enterprise is also presented; according to this 
criterion, which is often used among scholars, a qualified de facto group is given if the 
GmbH  is run as the department of a single enterprise.346
In the second decision -the so-called Tiefbau decision from 1989- the B G H  
no longer stresses the interest criterion, but adheres to the criterion which serves as a 
presumption, the continual and comprehensive performance of management, and holds 
it sufficient for this criterion if a centralized management in the financial area is formed 
by the dominant enterprise.347 However, the BG H  alteres the way of disproving this 
presumption, which can be refuted if the dominant enterprise shows that the losses are 
not caused by the direction o f the parent’s management but by other causes.348
In the next decision -the so-called Video judgement from 1991- the BG H  
focuses more on the dangers for the affiliated company caused by putting aside the 
interest of the company in favour o f the group interest. If the dominant enterprise 
performs a comprehensive management of the affiliated GmbH , the putting aside of its 
interest is presumed (as in the Autofcra/i-decision) and also the parent’s management as 
the cause for the GmbH’s losses.349 A decisive step is made in this decision as for the 
(at least) majority shareholder and only director of a GmbH  who also runs another 
business the above-stated presumption is valid; thus, he is seen to perform a 
comprehensive (group-) management of the affiliated G mbH  and it is presumed that the
344 BGHZ 95, 330ff. - Autokran.
345 BGHZ 95, 330, 344 - Autokran.
346 Sec BGHZ 95, 330, 341, 344f. - Autokran; regarding this criterion with further references see 
Dcilmann (1990), supra note 343, p. 62f.
347 BGHZ 107, 7, 18, 20 - Tiefbau.
3441 BGHZ 107, 7, 19 - Tiefbau.
BGHZ 115, 187, 193f. - Video.349
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interest of the affiliated GmbH  is put aside.350 The (theoretical) possibility of refuting 
this presumption is sustained with the same criterion as in the Tießau  case; in addition, 
interesting remarks are made about what can be alleged to refute the presumption. The 
presumption cannot be refuted by showing that the company is gone bankrupt because 
of normal business risks, only by demonstrating that the losses of the GmbH  are caused 
by exceptional circumstances - the normal economic risk is therefore in any case shifted 
to the parent.351 As it seems to be- impossible for the dominant enterprise to avoid 
such a succession of presumptions, the decision in fact installs a liability for the 
majority shareholder and only director of an affiliated G mbH  if he also runs another 
business.352
. In its fourth and to date final relevant decision -the so-called TBB  case from 
1993- the BGH  corrects the liability concept. The reason for the liability of the parent 
enterprise is no longer primarily seen in the comprehensive and continual performance 
of management. Liability is accepted if the dependent company is treated in a way 
which shows an objective abuse of the position of the shareholder. This is the case if 
the dominant enterprise performs the (group-) management in such a way as to not 
adequately take the interest of the affiliated GmbH  into consideration, without allowing 
the possibility of isolating disadvantages for the GmbH  caused by single measures and 
compensating them individually. Adequate consideration for the interest of an affiliated 
company is lacking in the case of a one-man company if the company cannot settle its 
debts because of the influence exercised in favour of the group interest. The BG H  
stresses that the reason for the liability cannot be found in the performance of continual 
and comprehensive (group) management, from this not even a presumption for an 
inadequate consideration of the interest of the affiliated GmbH  can be derived. The 
plaintiff has to assert and to prove facts according to which it seems to be plausible that 
the management has impaired the interests of the GmbH  in favour of the group interest 
beyond any single disadvantages which can be concretely compensated.353 This is
3ffl BGHZ 115, 187, 195 - Video.
351 BGHZ 115, 187, 196f.- Video
3 5 2  See for this nearly inescapable chain of presumptions especially Altmeppen, "Grenzenlose 
Vermutungen im Recht der GmbH", Der Betrieb  44 (1991), p. 2225ff.
3 5 3  BGH Juristenzeitung 1993, p. 578 - TBB.
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e sp e c ia lly  the c a s e  i f  the in te rfe re n c e s  on the p art o f  th e  p arent le a d  to a c o n fu s e d  
situ ation  w ith reg a rd  to th e  p atrim o n ia l statu s o f  the a f f il ia te d  co m p a n y .354 In  th e  c a s e  
at hand the BGH  d o es n o t d eem  a cen tra l c a sh  m a n a g e m e n t to b e  s u ff ic ie n t  fo r  
a ccep tin g  a q u a lif ie d  de fa c to  g rou p  - ev en  i f  th e  co m p a n y  assu m es re sp o n sib ility  for 
the d eb ts o f  o th e r  grou p  m em b ers as lo ng  as the d e b ts  o f  each  co m p a n y  c a n  b e  
attribu ted  p re c ise ly  and the risk s  ca u se d  by  assu m in g  lia b ility  fo r  o th er group m e m b e rs ' 
debts are se cu re d  by  re se rv e s  in the b a la n ce  sh e e t. T h e  la tter  co n d itio n  m ust o n ly  b e  
co m p lie d  w ith  i f  th e  o b lig a tio n s  fo r o th er grou p m em b ers  h a v e  b e c o m e  so  im p o rtan t as 
to d irectly  a f fe c t  th e  p a trim o n ia l s itu a tio n  o f  the c o m p a n y .355
A lso  in th e  last d e c is io n  the c r ite r io n  w h ich  is m a in ly  used am o n g  sc h o la rs  is 
touched upon. T h a t  is , the sta tu s o f  a q u a lified  de fa c to  g ro u p  is g iv en  i f  the co n tro l and 
in flu en ce o f  th e  d om in an t en terp rise  have reach ed  such an in ten sity  that s in g le  -h arm fu l- 
m easu res can  n o  lo n g er b e  in su la ted .356 T h e  reaso n  fo r  th is  crite rio n  is  fou nd in the 
no lo n g er w o rk in g  o f  o th er co m p e n sa tio n  m ech a n ism s. T h e  co m p en sa tio n  sy stem  o f  the 
AktG § §  3 1 1 - 3 1 8  fo r  de fa c to  grou p s w ith  an a ffilia te d  A G  can  no lo n g e r by ap p lied  as 
it is o n ly  o r ie n ta te d  tow ard s s in g le  in te rfe re n ce s  w h ic h  can  b e  es tim a te d .357 358 T h is  
argu m ent is s o m e tim e s  a lso  used  fo r  the GmbHm \ h o w e v e r, it se e m s to b e  c lo s e r  to 
the stru ctu re o f  the GmbH to  fo cu s on  the co m p en sa tio n  m ech an ism  o f  the GmbH  itse lf  
w hich co m p e n sa te s  harm  ca u sed  by the (m a jo r ity -)  sh a re h o ld e r  and d om in an t en terp rise  
v ia  im p o sin g  fid u c ia ry  d u tie s .359 T h is  sch e m e  a lso  on ly  w o rk s  for s in g le  in terv en tion s 
w h o se  harm  c a n  b e  e s t im a te d .360 H o w e v e r , th is  c r ite r io n  is a ls o  c a p a b le  o f  
in terp re ta tio n : in s te a d  o f  fo c u s in g  o n  the p o s s ib ility  o f  c o m p e n sa tin g  h arm fu l 
in terv en tion s, th e  d en sity  o f  in terv en tio n s can b e  d eem ed  to b e  the m ain  poin t o f  th is 
criterio n  and th e re fo re  the to ta l lo ss  o f  (m an ag em en t) au to n o m y  o f  the GmbH.361
354 BGH ibid., p. 577, 578 - TB B .
355 BGH ibid.
356 See Emmerich/Sonnenschein (1993), supra note 186, § 20  IV  2; Deilmann (1990), supra note 
343, p. 63-65; K. Schmidt (1991), supra note 245, p. 1018; comprehensiveiy Hoffmann-Becking (1989), 
supra note 255, p. 69, 73ff.
357 cf. only Hommelhoff (1982), supra note 15, p. 138ff.
358 Deilmann (1990), supra note 343, p. 63-65.
359 See for this system above C III 1.
340 Also BGH Juristenzeitung 1993, p. 577  - TBB.
341 See for such an interpretation of the criterion K.Schmidt (1991), supra note 245, p. 1018.
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V a rio u s  c r ite r ia  h a v e  th e re fo re  b een  used  to d e s c r ib e  the q u a lifie d  de fa c to  
g ro u p .362 T h e  tw o  m ain  c r ite r ia  se e m  to b e  the c o m p re h e n s iv e  and c o n tin u a l 
m an ag em en t o f  th e  su b sid iary  by  the top  o f  the g ro u p  and the n e g le c tin g  o f  the 
a ffilia te d  c o m p a n y ’s  s e l f  in teres t. T h e  c rite rio n  w h ich  c o m p a re s  the GmbH  w ith  the 
departm ent o f  a  s in g le  co m p a n y  c a n  b e  v iew ed  as a  p a rticu la r  fo rm  o f  th e  p a re n t’s 
m an ag em en t o r  th e  o rg a n isa tio n  o f  the grou p .363 W ith  regard  to the fin a l cr ite r io n  
m en tion ed  a b o v e , the d en sity  o f  th e  p a re n t’s m a n a g e m e n t is su ch  that a co m p e n sa tio n  
o f  s in g le  (h a rm fu l)  in terv en tio n s is im p o ss ib le , a lso  th e  c o n sid e ra tio n s  about th e  e x te n t 
o f  the p a re n t’ s  m a n a g em en t play th e  m ost im p o rtan t ro le . T h e  d escrip tio n  o f  the 
phen om en on  "q u a lif ie d  de fa c to  g ro u p " is  m ade even  m o re  d iff icu lt  as in the f irs t  three 
ju d g em en ts  th e  c r ite r ia  are  co m b in e d  in a c o m p le x  w a y . In th ese  ju d g e m e n ts , a  so - 
ca lled  Doppeltatbestand  is co n stru cte d , w h o se  m ain c r ite r io n  ca n  be seen  in the 
co m p re h e n s iv e  and co n tin u a l (g ro u p -) m an ag em en t ev en  i f  it on ly  fo rm s a p resu m p tion  
for the su b sta n tia l e le m e n t o f  the lia b ility  p re co n d itio n s , that is the n eg le ctin g  o f  the 
a ffilia te d  c o m p a n y ’s in terests . T h e  p resu m p tion , on th e  o th er hand , can ag ain  be 
rebutted  by se v e ra l e le m e n ts  (se e  th e  cr ite r ia  sta ted  a b o v e  in the Autokran and Tiefbau 
ca se s ) w h ich  n e ith er d ire c tly  re fe r  to  the crite rio n  fo r  the presum ption  n o r to  the 
su bstan tia l c r ite r io n .364 In the la s t  d ecis io n  on ly  th e  crite rio n  fo cu ssin g  on  the 
n eg le ctin g  o f  th e  su b s id ia ry ’ s in terests  rem ain s, the co m p re h e n s iv e  and co n tin u a l group 
m an ag em en t n o  lo n g er fo rm in g  a p resu m p tion  for n e g le c tin g  the se lf- in te re s t  o f  the 
a ffilia te d  c o m p a n y , but o n ly  a (n o t  c ru c ia l)  in d ic a tio n .365 T h is  s im p lifica tio n  and, at 
the sa m e  tim e , the m ore n arrow ly  d e fin e d  co n d itio n s fo r  e s ta b lish in g  a grou p  lia b ility  
have fou n d  c o n s e n t  am on g  sc h o la rs ; the in terest fo rm u la  as c ru c ia l m ean s for assu m in g
**  There is agreement that the elements used to define the qualified de facto groups still lack 
clarity, see Zöllner, in Baumbach/Hueck, GmbH-Gesetz (1988), 15th ed., annex Konzernrecht, note 30; 
Kubier, "Haftungstrennung und Gläubigerschutz im Recht der Kapitalgesellschaften", Festschrift für  
Heinsius (1991), p. 423; Westermann, "Der Tatbestand des qualifizierten faktischen Konzerns", in 
Hommelhoff et al., Der qualifizierte faktische GmbH-Konzern (1992), p. 39f.
365 Interpreting the criterion in the same way by K. Schmidt, "Verlustausgleichspflicht und 
Konzemleitungshaftung im qualifizierten faktischen GmbH-Konzem", ZIP 10 (1989), p. 549f.
* *  See for criticism and clarification of the underlying concepts Stodolkowitz, "Die Haftung im 
qualifiziert faktischen GmbH-Konzem nach der Rechtsprechung des BGH", ZIP 13 (1992), p. I524f.
363 See the authoritative interpretation of the BGH concept by one of the judges Stodolkowitz
(1992), ibid., p. 1519, 1522; and see in this respect the very clear statement of the remark to the TBB
decision by Lutter, "Anmerkung zur TBB-Entscheidung", Juristenzeitung 1993, p. 581.
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th e  p a r e n t ’ s  l i a b i l i t y  h a s  a l s o  b e e n  w e l c o m e d .366 A s  th e  f o r m u la  o f  th e  
’’co m p re h e n s iv e  an d  c o n tin u a l m a n a g e m e n t"  h a s  b e e n  u sed  in p ra c t ic e  th is  n ew  
co n d itio n  fo r  a ss u m in g  lia b ility  h as su re ly  to  b e  a sse sse d  p o s itiv e ly . A c c o rd in g  to  the 
(co n tested ) d o m in a n t o p in io n , i f  a t  le a s t  the f in a n c ia l a rea  is  c e n tra liz e d  ’’u n ified  
m an ag em en t" a s  req u ired  f o r  the d e fin itio n  o f  a  grou p in  AktG  § 1 8  ( 1 )  is  g iv e n ;367 
acco rd in g  to th e  Tießau  d e c is io n  th is  lead s a t th e  sa m e  tim e  to a q u a lifie d  d e fa c to  
group, w h ich  a ssu m e s th e  lia b ility  o f  the parent fo r  the d ebts o f  the su b s id ia ry . 
A cco rd in g ly , e v e ry  grou p  se e m s  a lre ad y  to  en ta il the c o n d itio n s  for a q u a lifie d  d e fa c to  
group. N e v e rth e le ss , s in c e  the v e ry  ab stract c r ite r io n  w h ich  a lso  fo c u se s  on  the 
n eg lectin g  o f  th e  su b s id ia ry ’s  in te re s t n eed s to b e  d efin ed  m o re  p re c ise ly , the q u estion  
rem ains w h eth er b y  d o in g  that the co n stitu e n t fo r  d e fin in g  a grou p  -a  u nified  
m anagem ent o v e r  m e m b e rs- can  b e  d ism issed  so  e a s ily .368
T h e  g e n e ra l co n c e p t o f  the BGH  has b e e n  in terp reted  by sc h o la rs  in d iffe re n t 
w ays - a lterin g  a cco rd in g  to the d iffe r in g  ap p ro ach es o f  th e  BGH . O ne body o f  s c h o la rs  
puts forw ard  th e  in terp re ta tio n  o f  a ssu m in g  the p aren t’s re sp o n sib ility  as lia b ility  fo r  an 
(il le g a l)  co n d u ct o f  b u s in e ss .369 T h e  ju s t if ic a t io n  o f  the lia b ility  is se e n  in the h arm fu l 
putting aside o f  the in terest o f  the a ffilia te d  GmbH in fa v o u r  o f  the g rou p  in terest by  
acts o f  the p aren t. T h e  fo c u s  o f  th is  op in ion  lie s  on the im p airm en t o f  the c o m p a n y ’s 
in terest and o f  th e  co m p an y  itse lf. T h e  parent is only  h e ld  lia b le  i f  it has in frin g ed  its 
duty fo r a p ro p er grou p m a n a g e m e n t.370 T h e  o th er ap p ro ach  v iew s the trig g er for an 
ex ten sio n  o f  lia b ility  on th e  parent as ly in g  in the o rg a n isa tio n a l sta tu s - i f  the grou p  
m anagem ent e x c e e d s  a ce rta in  d e g re e  o f  in ten sity . D a m a g e s  o f  the a ffilia te d  GmbH ,
See previous footnote and the summary of the ''Heidelberger Konzernrechtstage" by Kleindieck, 
"Haftung im qualifizierten faktischen GmbH-Konzern", GmbH-Rundschau 1992, p. 575 , 583; 
Westermann, "Das TBB-Urteil - ein Neuansatz bei der Haftung wegen qualifizierter faktischer 
Konzernierung?, ZIP (14) 1993, p. 556; K.Schmidt (1993), supra note 339, p. 551; Ulmer (1992), supra 
note 340, p. 70, 74.
367 See Koppensteiner, Kölner Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz (1988), 2nd ed., § 18 note 20f.
m  See also the not very enlightening considerations by Stodolkowitz (1992), supra note 364, 
p. 1522, by which other factors the high degree of central management which now only serves as an 
indication could be completed or substituted.
m  Interpreting the two first decisions of the BGH according to the two different concepts K. 
Schmidt, (1989), supra note 363, p. 545ff.
m  Lutter/Hommelhoff, GmbH-Gesetz (1991), 13th ed., annex § 13 note 16; Lutter (1990), supra 
note 341, p. I82f.; id. (1993), supra note 365, p. 580f.
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cau sed  by  th e  p are n t in fa v o u r o f  th e  group, a re  not re q u ire d  in ord er to  a ssu m e  th e  
liab ility  o f  th e  p aren t. A c c o rd in g  to  th is  c o n ce p t, the p a re n t is  held  lia b le  fo r th e  risk s  
and d an g ers w h ic h  it p ro d u ces fo r  the a ffilia te d  co m p a n y  b y  a  high d e g re e  o f  
cen tra lize d  m a n a g e m e n t, m ak in g  it im p o ssib le  to  co n tro l s in g le  in te rfe re n ce s .371 T h is  
op in ion  is  c r it ic iz e d  as in tro d u cin g  a s tr ic t  lia b ility  w ith o u t any statutory b a s is .372 A n  
op in ion  ly in g  in  b e tw een  th e se  tw o  h o ld s a high d eg ree  o f  cen tra liz e d  m a n a g em en t in 
a group fo r  s u f f ic ie n t  as e x te n d in g  th e  liab ility  o n  the p a re n t, b u t le av e s the p are n t the 
p o ssib ility  to  p ro v e  that it  is  n ot re sp o n sib le  fo r  the lo s s e s  o f  the su b sid ia ry .373 It  is  
not the g o a l o f  th is  a n a ly s is  to a s s e s s  w h eth er th e se  c o n c e p ts  f it  the BGH  ju r is d ic tio n ; 
how ev er, the w a y  in w h ich  they fo rm  a b asis  fo r  e s ta b lish in g  a sp e c ia l group lia b ility  
w ill b e  a s s e s s e d  b e lo w .
2. Legal Rationale for a Special Group Liability
T h e  d iv erse  fo rm u la s  for the q u a lif ie d  de facto  GmbH g ro u p  and their in terp retation  in 
d ifferen t c o n c e p ts  d isp lay  u n certa in ty  about th e  ju s t if ic a t io n s  for a sp e c ia l grou p 
liab ility ; a c c o rd in g  to the d iffe re n t cr ite r ia  for e s ta b lish in g  the p aren t’s lia b ility , the 
ra tio n ales fo r  a sp e c ia l g rou p  lia b ility  m ay also v ary . T h e  c ru c ia l qu estion  rem ain s w hy 
the sa feg u a rd s o f  the co m p an y  law  co n cep t fo r the p ro te c tio n  o f  cred ito rs no lo n g er 
fu n ction  in -c e r ta in -  group o rg a n isa tio n s , d escrib ed  as q u a lif ie d  de facto  d o m in atio n , so 
that as a ra d ic a l so lu tion  the e x te n s io n  o f  lia b ility  to the parent is req u ired . B y  
ascerta in in g  th e  u nd erly in g  ra tio n a le  fo r estab lish in g  a g ro u p  liab ility , the c r ite r ia  for 
d efin in g  the q u a lif ie d  de fa c to  g ro u p  can  a lso  b e  a ssesse d .
In  its ju d g e m e n ts , th e  BGH  re fe rs  very g e n e ra lly  to  the c o n flic t  o f  in te re s ts  
w hich is ty p ic a lly  inherent in the grou p  fo r the cou rt. In an indep endent co m p an y  the 
in terests o f  a ll the co m p an y , the sh areh o ld ers and -a t le a s t  partly- the c re d ito rs  are 
orien ta ted  to w a rd s  a w e ll-b e in g  o f  the co m p an y , w h e re a s  a d om inant e n te rp rise  -
371 See K. Schmidt (1991), supra note 335, p. 1328f.; Assmann (1992), supra note 244, p. 698-703; 
Deilmann (1990), supra note 343, p. 125-127, 158-160.
m  Stodolkowitz (1992), supra note 364, p. 1521; Westermann (1993), supra note 366, p. 556.
373 See Ulmer, "Veriustübernahme als konzernspezifischer Kapitalerhaltungsschutz", Die 
Aktiengesellschaft 1986, p. 128.
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inclu ding a d o m in a n t sh a reh o ld er w ith  further b u sin ess in terests- m ay lin e u p  the 
co m p an y ’s  b u s in e s s  w ith  its  oth er en trep reneu ria l in terests .374 In the f in a l ju d g e m e n t 
(TBB), th e  BG H  s ta te s  th e  u n d erly in g  reason  m ore ca u tio u sly . T h e  c o u rt s t il l  
a ck n o w led g es th e  d a n g e r  o f  a  c o n f lic t  o f  in terests in  the grou p , but re co g n iz e s  th e  n eed  
for a sp e c ia l g ro u p  lia b ility  o n ly  in c ircu m sta n ce s  in w h ich  the situ ation , b e ca u se  o f  the 
in tensive in f lu e n c e  o f  th e  p aren t, h a s  b eco m e so  u n clear th a t individual in terv en tio n s 
can  no lo n g e r  b e  in su la te d .375 T h e s e  statem ents m ay se e m  to sh ow  the w a y  fo r  
ju stify in g  an e x te n s io n  o f  lia b ility  to  the parent; h ow ev er, they  are too g en era l an d , in 
their d e scrip tio n  o f  th e  stru ctu ra l d an g ers  fo r le g a l co n cep ts  caused  by the grou p , too  
uncertain to fo rm  a b a s is  to d efin e  th e  particu lar form  o f  group for w h ich  a sp e c ia l 
group lia b ility  s e e m s  to b e  n ecessa ry .
Y e t  a n o th e r  ap p ro ach  se e k in g  a leg a l rationale to hold ing the p arent lia b le  
in a q u a lifie d  d e fa c to  grou p  w ith  an  a ffilia ted  GmbH, e x a m in e s  the p ro v isio n s w h ich  
estab lish  the lia b i l i ty  o f  a  parent in a group based  o n  a con tro l co n tra ct in  the 
Aktiengesetz an d  w h ich  are  applied  in analogy fo r  the q u a lifie d  de fa c to  grou p . T h e  
cru cial p o in ts  in th e se  p ro v isio n s a re  the right o f  the p arent to issue (ev en  h a rm fu l) 
in stru ction s to  th e  su b sid ia ry  and th e re fo re  to e x erc ise  a h ig h ly  cen tra lized  m an ag em en t 
(AktG §  3 0 8 ) ,  an d  the rig ht o f  n o n -co m p ly in g  w ith  the p ro v isio n s for the m ain ten a n ce  
o f  cap ita l o f  th e  su b sid ia ry  ( c f .  AktG §  2 9 1  III) - these rig hts b ein g  co n n e cte d  w ith  the 
duty o f  th e  p a re n t to b a la n c e  the annu al losses o f  the su bsid iary  (AktG § 3 0 2 ) . In its 
first th ree  d e c is io n s , the BGH  tries to  d ev elo p  the e lem en ts fo r  holding th e  parent lia b le  
in a de fa c to  g ro u p  through the re la tio n  betw een these asp ects  for the law  o f  a c o n tra c t-  
based g ro u p .376 H o w ev er, it seem s to b e  d iffcu lt to d erive e x a c t req u irem ents fo r  the 
parent’ s lia b ility  in a de facto  g ro u p  (the requ irem ents o f  "q u a lifie d  de fa c to  
d o m in a tio n ") in co m p a riso n  to th ese  elem en ts o f  liab ility  in a co n tra ct-b a sed  g rou p . 
First, in a g re e in g  on  a co n tro l c o n tra c t  it is not a certa in  (e .g . h ig h ly  c e n tra liz e d )
374 BGHZ 95, 330, 334f. - Autokran; BGHZ 115, 187, 190 - Video; in the decision BGHZ 107, 7ff. 
-Tiefbau- considerations about the rationale are not made.
375 BGH, Juristenzeitung 1993, p. 577 - TBB .
376 BGHZ 95, 330, 343 - Autokran; BGHZ 107, 7 ,1 7  - Tiefbau; BGHZ 115,187, 193-195 - Video; 
see for the way how to draw the analogy the authoritative interpretation of the judgements by the former 
judge of the BGH Stimpel (1991), supra note 336, p. 151-154.
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organisational structure which is fixed but only the right to issue instructions which is 
given to the parent, so that it cannot be ascertained that according to the purpose of the 
law a specific organisation shall trigger off an extension o f liability. Second, the 
dangers which the provisions for the contract-based group presume to be inherent in this 
organisational structure and which make a group liability necessary are not concretized 
in this concept, so that an easy transfer of these considerations does not seem to be 
possible, in addition, since these elements derive from the law of the A G ,-it is necessary 
to adapt them to the different structure of the GmbH  afterwards. Therefore, as with 
regard to the legal elements of the liability the analogy seems to be somewhat 
artificial377, it does not seem to be convincing to determine the legal rationale of an 
extension of liability only with respect to these provisions. The analogy seems to be 
more useful with regard to the shaping of the details of the extension of liability as a 
legal consequence.378 Therefore, it may be more fruitful to make recourse to the 
general rationale for introducing a group liability379; the reasons for the legislator to 
establish such a liability in the law for the contract-based group will be embraced. The 
general rationale has to be applied to the law of the GmbH; thus it has to be ascertained 
at which point the general legal reasons require the setting-up o f a group liability for an 
affiliated GmbH , as the legal concept of the GmbH  does no more offer sufficient 
protection for creditors.
The justification for a special group liability has to start with the concept of 
limited liability in general.380 The concept of limited liability can be divided into two 
areas, the legal precautions for limited liability as a feature of the company and legal 
person and the general economic rationale for limited liability. At this point, the legal 
provisions will be examined, while the economic rationale will be focused on below. 
The group structure may affect the provisions for the protection of creditors as these
3 7 7  For a critical assessment of the analogy to the AktG in this way see Wiedemann (1986), 
"Spiitlese zu Autokran", Zeitschrift fur Unternehmens- und G esellschaftsrecht 15 (1986), p. 659f.; already 
doubtful with regard to the construction of a double analogy FC Schmidt (1981), supra note 217, p. 472; 
confirming id. (1989), supra note 363, p. 547.
3 7 8  cf. K. Schmidt (1992), supra note 338, p. 117ff.
3 7 9  For establishing an open abstract legal principle as better methodological basis for an analogous 
application of the liability provisions for the contract based group Wiedemann (1986), supra note 376, p. 
659f.
3 8 0  cf. for this starting point also Wiedemann, ibid., p. 670.
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provisions are based on the organisational and patrimonial autonomy of the company, 
and since the group management -as the constituent of the group- limits the autonomy 
of the affiliated company.381 In concrete, the company law concept which secures the 
organisational independence o f the legal person and the provisions which guarantee the 
separate fund of the company, especially those which are concerned with the 
maintenance of the equity capital, may be affected by the group structure. The 
organisational law -here in the form of a GmbH- is connected with the limited liability 
with which the legal person is endowed, and the provisions guaranteeing the 
maintenance of capital stand in a direct correlation to the limited liability o f the 
company. These provisions in the law of the legal person G m bH  have to be examined, 
with regard to which kind of group organisation they lose their efficacy and, thus, for 
which kind of group organisation they do not provide for sufficient protection o f the 
creditors - as a point of comparison the legal model of an independent GmbH  will be 
used in the way this company form is used in economic reality.
a. Protection of the Creditors by Organisational Law
The organisational law of the legal person is also relevant for the protection o f the 
creditors. The law of the G mbH  does not only erect a separate body, designed to be 
organisationally independent from its members, in order to establish a legal person as 
a point of attribution of rights and duties, but this legally constructed body also plays 
a role in the external relations of the company, with regard to the protection of the 
creditors. The separate body forms a basis for the limited liability of the G m bH . 
Therefore the extension of liability to the shareholders/to the parent often uses the same 
criteria as for the -above discussed- question whether the requirements of the legal
m See for a general list for special risks for creditors in a group Landers, "A unified approach to 
Parent, Subsidiary, and Affiliate Questions in Bankruptcy", 42 University o f  Chicago Law  Review ( 1975), 
p. 596f.
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person are kept.382 This task of the concept of a company may be structurally affected 
by the group form causing the -already mentioned- group conflict. This conflict of 
interests is normally described for the public company in German law for the A G .
The most important change of the company structure for the creditors seems to 
come from the transformation of the company interest in the group.383 The company 
interest forms the guideline for the whole business activity of the company, and it 
makes available a standard by which to measure the liability of the directors as well as 
the validity of shareholder resolutions. The primary content of the company interest is 
the profit maximizing principle which is designed to assure the continued solvency of 
the company and to lead to the growth of assets and to the distribution of dividends. 
Thereby, the interests of the shareholders and of the creditors are parallel, since 
pursuing the company interest serves both the interests o f the shareholders and those of 
the creditors.
The company interest is not seen as being influenced by special interests; the 
law of the public company presumes that an independent legal personality is based on 
economic independence. The public company is conceived as having a widespread 
circle of shareholders who have only very limited possibilities of influencing the 
company, by exercising their rights in the shareholder assembly. Common to all 
shareholders is the wish to realize their proprietary interest in the company, but they do 
not have the power to pursue and to enforce special -personal or entrepreneurial- 
interests; therefore, they are interested in the company only as a financial investment 
and their interests are more or less parallel. Conflicts between the shareholders are 
solved by the majority principle, and it is assumed that changing majorities lead to fair 
results. The management, as the centre of power in the company, lies in the hands of 
the directors (Vorstand) and is directly responsible for pursuing the company interest. 
As the directors are independent from the shareholders and direct the business under
w See the discussion about piercing the corporate veil, in general Reuter, Münchener-Kommentar 
zum BGB (1978), Vol.l, introduction § 21 note 1 Off.; for the GmbH, Westermann, in Scholz, GmbH- 
Gesetz (1978/83), 6 th ed., introduction note 5f.
m  See for the transformation of the company interest in the group especially Immenga (1985), 
supra note 160, note 3; Druey (1980), supra note 14, p. 303-313;
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their own reponsibility (AktG  § 76), they are able to manage the company autonomously 
within the limits given by the company interest. In this respect, it is assumed that the 
company is economically independent, and that the independent legal personality is 
based on economic independence. This is the positive side of the separation of 
ownership and control as one of the features of the public company. Hence, the crucial 
point in this model is that the A G  is seen to have no dominant shareholder who can 
pursue a special interest in the company whereas the the directors manage the company 
autonomously and are bound to the company interest so that the interests of both the 
shareholders and the creditors are promoted. Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind 
that this description represents only an ideal model, which depends on the factual 
condition that the shareholders are widespread; the structure of the company also makes 
the dominant position of a majority shareholder possible.384
Typical dangers for this system of relatively harmonious interests arise if the 
company becomes a subsidiary of a group. The parent enterprise, as the dominant 
shareholder, is able to influence the business of the company. The directors of the 
company are no longer independent, only responsible to the assembly of the small 
shareholders and only bound to the company interest, although they depend on the 
dominant enterprise. While the company is included into the unified management o f the 
parent, ownership and control are -in this sense- no longer separated. This, of course, 
affects the company interest as the guideline for the company’s business. The company 
is no longer directed only towards its own interest, but the interest of the group comes 
into consideration. The very purpose of the formation of the group is to combine the 
resources of the group members so that the best for the group as a whole is achieved. 
The pure interest of the company can no longer be isolated; on becoming a member of 
the group, the company interest is aligned to that of the group, and both company and 
group interest are blended.385 In exceptional cases even direct conflicts between the 
group and the company interest may arise. In particular, the interest of the group is 
directed to a maximization of overall group profits, although this may not always be
m  cf. already Mestmacker (1958), supra note 43, p. 119ff.
m  cf. for the transformation of the company interest in a group Druey (1980), supra note 14, 
p. 305-308; Mestmacker (1958), supra note 43, p. 278-280.
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synonymous with maximizing profits for the single affiliated company.386 In these 
situations, the interest o f the parent and the interests o f the creditors are not identical, 
and the dominant enterprise may use its influence on the management o f the subsidiary 
to receive special advantages to the damage o f the creditors. Through the economic 
links between the group members, the unified management of the parent may be able 
to shift profits and assets between the companies, e.g. by the setting of transfer prices, 
the granting o f credits, or by the attribution of new fields of business. Such conduct 
may endanger the position of the creditors of the affiliated company.
These considerations cannot be transferred to the company form of a GmbH  
without changes. The shareholders are much stronger in the framework of the GmbH, 
as the directors are not independent and the shareholder assembly can issue (legally 
binding) instructions on them in all fields of the company’s business activity. As can 
already be seen for the difficulty to transfer shares of a G m bH  {GmbHG § 15 (3), (5)), 
the GmbH  has from the very beginning been conceived as a company with few and 
permanent shareholders, who normally form part of a confidential relationship, and want 
to stay in control of the company and have a comprehensive influence on its business 
decisions. In contrast to the A G , the concept of the G m bH  makes it possible by legal 
means for one (or several) shareholder(s) to determine the business activity of the 
company comprehensively. Limits are set on the shareholders by imposing fiduciary 
duties which make use of the company interest as a substantial criterion on them. 
However, as described above, fiduciary duties are not an effective means for protecting 
creditors because they primarily protect minority shareholders and only as a reflex of 
this do they protect the interests o f the creditors.387 The company interest of a GmbH  
does not counterbalance the domination of the company as it still forms a guideline for 
the company’s management388, but can be largely determined by the shareholders. The 
domination by one (or several) shareholders is therefore inherent in the legal structure 
of the GmbH , the GmbH  providing thereby an instrument for the shareholders to run 
their business in the form of a company. Beside this normal domination by their
,W6
3«7
W8
Very strongly focussing on this point Antunes (1991), supra note 19, p. 132-134.
See above C III 1.
See for the company interest as a guideline for the GmbH*s directors GmbHG § 47.
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shareholders, for a GmbH  in a group the particular point is that the parent pursues other 
entrepreneurial interests and may have more opportunity to shift the profits and assets 
of the company by normal business transactions, whereas a dominating private 
shareholder can only pursue special, private interests.
The question is what the consequences of the different structure of the G m bH  in 
comparison to that of the A G  for the protection of creditors in a group are. On the one 
hand, it could be argued that the creditors have to be especially protected because of the 
shortcomings of the GmbH  structure. It could derive from this that, as the defects of the 
liability rules in the GmbH  have to be balanced in any case, it could be started to do so 
with a special group liability for groups with an affiliated GmbH. On the other hand, it 
seems preferable to argue that for a normal use of a GmbH, which includes a far- 
reaching domination of the company by its shareholder(s), the statutorily provided legal 
means for the protection of the creditors have to be sufficient, and no further means 
have to be developed. To put it in other words, the level of the creditor protection 
cannot be increased to that of the^4G by a special group liability in order to compensate 
for a weakness of the creditor protection which is already inherent in the G m bH  form. 
Therefore, the parent company cannot be prevented from or punished for directing an 
affiliated G m bH  within the limits which are established for a private shareholder. 
However, a special liability for the parent is to establish if it is necessary to cope with 
the additional risk caused by a group, that is the possible mix up with the 
entrepreneurial interests of other group members and the possibilities of influencing the 
profits and assets of the affiliated GmbH  by using the economic links between the 
group members. In order to assess the risk it is also necessary to examine the 
shortcomings inherent in the structure of the GmbH; this should establish to what 
degree the protection of the creditors in the structure of the GmbH  is insufficient 
regarding the additional risks caused by the group structure.
The group also affects the authority structure of the affiliated company. 
Particularly in the>4G, the definition and distribution o f powers between the company 
organs are distorted because in the group the directors of the affiliated company are the 
organ which carries out the group policy, determined by the parent directors, whereas
I!
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the supervisory board and the general assembly of the subsidiary are exposed to the 
domination of the parent enterprise. However, this problem seems to be less severe in 
the GmbH  since -as shown above- the structure of the GmbH  makes a far-reaching 
domination o f the company by the shareholder assembly possible in any case, and the 
checks and balances between the organs in the G m bH  are not very prominent. 
Furthermore, this problem may not be very relevant for the protection of the creditors. 
A shift of the organisational competences horizontally between the different organs and 
vertically to the unified management of the parent would in principle not affect the 
position of the creditors if not the above-shown transformation o f the subsidiary’s 
interest were correlated.389 This is why the criterion of the substantial and permanent 
performance of management for the qualified de facto group has been pushed into the 
background behind the interest criterion. A further reason for this can be found in the 
above-described structure of the GmbH , which already normally provides the legal 
means for the domination of a company by the shareholders.
However, to maintain the organisational structure of the GmbH  may also be 
important for the creditors to a certain extent. The affiliated company is, even when in 
a group, able to pursue a certain self-interest, even though the group interest influences 
the company interest. However, if the parent has completely instrumentalized the 
subsidiary -i.e. the unified managment is very far-reaching and the parent has taken 
over the management of the subsidiary in detail- the subsidiary can no longer be seen 
as a separate body able to pursue its own interest. Without giving the subsidiary 
management some autonomy, the organisational separateness of the company is 
abolished and the subsidiary is exposed completely to the interest of the parent, and the 
organisational structure necessary to build up a self-interest in the economic well-being 
is eliminated. As this self-interest o f the company would also serve the interests of the 
creditors, a total abolishing of the organisational structure of the subsidiary per se 
would impair the interests of the creditors.
UN cf. also Immenga (1985), supra note 160, note 3.
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b. Direct Protection of Creditors by Provisions for the Maintenance of Capital
The most important direct instrument for the protection of the creditors in the company 
is the separate capital fund of the company, which finds its statutory expression and 
guarantee in the principles for the formation and maintenance of the equity capital. 
These provisions form the basis for the separation of the company assets and are the 
necessary correlation to the limited liability of the shareholders.390 However, the 
principle of the maintenance of capital in principle may be structurally endangered by 
the group, that is the statutory provisions may be insufficient to cope with the dangers 
caused by the group for the equity of the affiliated company, since this principle -like 
the whole company structure- is aligned to the activity of an independent company.
The link between a special group liability and the insufficiency of the provisions 
concerning the guarantee capital -or, in the language o f theA ktG , the link between the 
obligation to balance the losses and these provision- is contested by the argument that 
the provisions concerning the equity capital do not deal with the making good of losses. 
According to this opinion, the special group liability serves only to compensate for 
additional creditor risks which emerge from the lack of attention being paid to the 
principle of an organisational separation of the company.391 This opinion fails to take 
notice of the correlation between the organisational separateness of the company and its 
separate patrimony. The direct task of protecting creditors is taken over by the 
provisions securing the separate assets of the company for the creditors, and this 
separate organisation finds its expression in this field in the separate company 
patrimony. The patrimonial order of the company cannot strictly be separated from the 
organisational order. The company as an organisation employs the assets of the 
company for entrepreneurial purposes, whereby the equity capital of the company is not 
frozen as a last security of the creditors but forms the patrimonial basis to finance the 
business activity of the company. The organisational order of the company, the way in 
which the business is run, the checks and balances which exist between the company 
organs, and, above all, whose interest is pursued by the company doing business has an
3'*' Mestmàcker (1958), supra note 43, p. 326. 
Wl K. Schmidt (1992), supra note 338, p. 116.
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impact on the use of the company's assets and its equity. The creditors of the company 
are therefore first and foremost protected by a successful business of the company and 
only in second place by the guarantee capital. Thus, it is not possible to focus only on 
the provisions concerning the capital by coping with the dangers arising from the group 
form392, since these provisions have to be regarded with respect to the transformations 
caused by the group organisation. Nonetheless, the problem of creditor protection 
cannot be reduced to a general discussion about the organisational order of the 
company, as the concept of company law links directly the protection of the creditors 
with the company's separate fund and the provisions about formation and maintenance 
of equity. Therefore, the provisions concerning the equity have to be seen in the 
framework of the concept of the company as a separate body with its own organisation 
and it needs to be analysed whether the provisions concerning the separate fund in this 
framework are insufficient to cope with the dangers caused by the group structure. If 
the protection of the creditors is undermined, a liability of the parent in whatever form 
has to be taken into consideration as a subsititution for this concept - even if the 
provisions concerning the equity do not deal with the making good of losses of an 
extension of liability.
The separate fund is provided by the formation o f a certain equity capital. This 
must be at least 50.000.- DM for the GmbH  (GmbHG  § 5) and is entered into the 
Commercial Register so that creditors can assess the credit-worthiness of the company 
in this point. It is sometimes stated that in groups the member companies are often 
undercapitalized3''3, that is the equity capital is inadequate for the concrete business 
of the company. However, this does not seem to be a structural problem of the group 
itself; it is very often reported that newly founded, independent GmbHs are inadequately 
equipped and have only the minimum capital of 50.000.- DM so that the risk of a 
breakdown in the first economic crisis is fairly high. The difficulty in this respect seems 
to be how to develop a formula to determine an adequate capital structure for the *39
m  Tending to such a view see Ulmer (1986), supra note 372, p. 126; id., "Gläubigerschutz im 
‘qualifizierten’ faktischen GmbH-Konzern", Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1986, p. 1583f.; following 
him in wide parts the BGH  in BGHZ 107, 7, 18 - Tiefbau.
393 See Antunes (1991), supra note 19, p. UOf.

149
business in hand. This problem appears to be similar for both companies which form 
members of a group and independent ones394; it will therefore not be examined any 
further.
The relevant provisions for the maintenance o f capital in the GmbH  can be 
found in G m bH G  §§ 30, 31. These provisions only protect the nominal capital against 
being paid-off to the shareholders - in any form whatsoever. Reserves of the company 
can be distributed if the nominal capital is not affected. In comparison to the A G , the 
principle o f the maintenance of capital in the Gm bH  is less strict; in the A G , all the 
assets of the company are secured against a distribution to the shareholders (AktG  §§ 57 
(1), 58 (5), 62), and only profits as they are shown in the balance sheet may be 
distributed. Reserves can only be distributed if they are dissolved in profits (if they are 
not secured against distribution as statutory reserves or in another form). In both 
companies, shareholders cannot claim the distribution of dividends if losses are not 
made good by profits so that the nominal capital is not touched by the distribution 
{GmbHG § 29). Thus, the creditors can trust in a separate fund of the GmbH  only in so 
far as it is provided by the nominal capital, whereas assets over and above this are not 
guaranteed by the provisions regarding the maintenance of capital. The nominal capital 
is secured against unlawful distribution in whatever form this may happen. A 
distribution of company assets includes every patrimonial advantage which serves the 
direct or indirect benefit of the shareholder and comes from the assets of the company 
and does not comply with provisions for the maintenance of capital; the advantage must 
be passed on to the shareholder because of his status as a shareholder.395 Legal 
transactions violating the provisions for the maintence of capital are invalid396; 
received payments by a shareholder are to be paid back to the company {GmbHG  § 31).
The group structure calls into question the efficacy of these provisions for the
**  A group specific problem may be posed by the fact that the financing of the subsidiary company 
is embedded in a global financial strategy of the group, see Schneider (1984), supra note 205, p. 497-506; 
Antunes ibid., p. I l l ,  but this does not seem to touch upon the function which the formation of the equity 
capital has in the individual subsidiary.
3VS See Wiedemann (1980), supra note 13, p. 440-443. :
Widemann, ibid., p. 442.
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maintenance o f equity capital. These provisions are equally directed against abuses of 
the company’s assets by a private shareholder or by a group. In the case of a private 
shareholder, they are to prevent abuses by shifting company assets into the private 
wealth of the controlling shareholder; typical cases are the granting of credits, the 
paying of pensions or salaries without any obligation to do so, or the selling of property 
belonging to the company for a low price.397 *The situation in a group may differ 
slightly. In a group, a normally wide spectrum of financial and other business linkages 
exists - between parent and subsidiaries and the subsidiaries themselves. Even in 
conglomerate groups at least a uniform financial management is normally performed. 
Using the economic links between the group members, the group management finds 
various opportunities for shifting profits as well as assets between the companies. In 
this respect very critical transfer prices are seen, but other contingencies also exist for 
the group in order to take over assets from a subsidiary, by transferring patents, real 
estate, and know-how to other group members, by entering into contracts with 
inadequate conditions for the subsidiary, or by attributing business oppartunities to other 
group members.39* In performing such business, the parent may abuse the unified 
management by harming the subsidiary, or, to put in the language of abuse, the parent 
may influence the subsidiary through dark channels leading to self-damaging behaviour 
by the subsidiary to the benefit of the parent.3"
The structural effects of the group may be more important in this respect. The 
uniform management establishes financial and business links between the group 
members for entrepreneurial purposes, so that the group forms an economic unity and 
benefits from the advantages which can be achieved by internal coordination between 
the member companies and not from coordination via the market. The treatment of the 
group as an economic unity may render it difficult to identify the results and the assets 
of the single companies.400 In an independent company the market draws a sharp
See Wiedemann, ibid., p. 438ff.
See for a list of critical regarded transactions in a group Emmerich/Sonnenschein (1993), supra 
note 186, p. 22f.; and the careful analysis by Mestmâcker (1958), supra note 43, p. 302-316, 325-336.
In such statements of the legal literature the suspicion which the group often is subject of 
becomes obvious, see e.g. Emmerich/Sonnenschein ibid.
See for a very thorough analysis of this field Mestmàckcr (1958), supra note 43. p. 303-316; 
however, he deals with a rather hierarchical group organisation, predominant at that time.
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distinction between the company and its business partners, thus the assets of the 
company -more precisely the separate fund of the GmbH  as this is defined by law- are 
open to market transactions, whereas they are closed to the shareholders - apart from 
the distribution o f profits. In connection with the economic self-interest of the company, 
it is assumed that a guarantee o f correctness lies in the market transactions so that 
creditors of the company have only to bear the normal risk of business failure in a 
market economy. Private shareholders perform business transactions with the company 
only in exceptional cases, the provision about the maintenance of capital help against 
abuses by private shareholders. In a group business transactions are often performed 
between group members; these transactions are no longer exclusively directed by the 
market, but the allocation of resources is at least partly performed by internal direction. 
It may be rather difficult to transform the effects of internal direction into prices which 
are normally formed freely in the market and to separate the group effects from the 
results of the single companies so that profits and assets of the economic unity group 
can be correctly divided among the individual group members. Internal direction of the 
resources cannot be assumed to have the same guarantee of correctness as market 
transactions. In a group the patrimonial structure of the subsidiary no longer seems to 
be so closed towards the shareholder/parent, but via the group management the parent 
can use the assets of the company without the sharp distinction of the market between 
them. Thus, the function of the separate fund of the company and of the provisions 
about the maintenance of capital is affected, as profits and assets can only be precisely 
determined in relation to the market, not with regard to other coordinative instruments. 
In addition, the exact distribution o f the assets and profits of the group to the indivdual 
companies might not be so important from the point of view of the group management 
since the group management -viewing the group as an economic unity- aims above all 
at maximizing profits and assets in the interest o f the group as a whole, and may even 
shift profits and assets via the economic links between the companies wherever it is 
most useful for the group as a whole without taking into account, the interest o f the 
individual member companies.401 As a consequence of the structural deficits o f the 
provisions about the maintenance o f capital, these provisions are declared invalid in a
Ml For the whole complex see Antunes (1991), supra note 19, p. 107-114.
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group based on contract {AktG § 291 (3)).402
To sum up, the danger for the separate fund of the GmbH  and the provisions 
concerning the maintenance of capital comes from the economic unity of the group 
which leads to a subsititution of the pure market relationship between the companies is 
substituted by an internal management relationship. This is why it is difficult to assess 
the transactions between the companies precisely in market terms and to control their 
compliance with the provisions about the maintenance of capital and the separate fund 
of the company. Nevertheless, it remains to analyse how these dangers are realized to 
the damage of the creditors in the organisational structure of the group under discussion 
- in comparison to the risk they run in a typically independent GmbH.
c. Compatibility of the Organisational Structure with the Legal Requirements 
of Limited Liability
The nature of the group was described above as an organisation standing between the 
market and hierarchy, an organisation able to combine both these characteristics and to 
oscillate between the two points according to its actual needs. The subsidiaries pursue 
their own interest in the market to maximize their profits, while their autonomy is 
limited by hierarchical interferences of the group management in the framework of the 
strategic direction. These characteristics of the economic organisation have to be borne 
in mind when it is asked whether the organisational structure produces additional risks 
for the creditors leading to a lack of compatibility with the legal requirements of limited 
liabiliy. Additional risks for the creditors may result from a transformation of the 
company interest in a group, from a radical change in the authority structure of the 
affiliated company, and from submitting the company to a hierarchical organisation so 
that it is no longer aligned only to the market.
w2 For an unfair seeming result of this see the judgement OLG Düsseldorf, Die Aktiengesellschaft 
1990, p. 490ff.; whether this is also valid for the affiliation of a GmbH by a contract docs not seem to be 
quite clear; see the negative statement in this respect by Emmerich, in Schob., GmbH-Gesetz (1993), 8th 
ed„ Vol. 1, annex "Konzernrecht", note 277.
I >
I I
I )
)
}
L
It
Vi
i
t\
\ _____________ _______________________________ 1
153
The company interest of a GmbH  in a group structured in this way seems to be 
compatible with the interests of the creditors. The subsidiary company as a profit centre 
is still aligned to the profit maximization principle, and it keeps a self-interest to make 
profits in the market. Only in this way can the subsidiary contribute to the goal of the 
group as a whole, that of maximizing overall profits. The subsidiary pursues this 
interest only in the framework which is set by the strategic group management and 
given by the entrepreneurial interest of the group. However, such a strategic 
determination of the subsidiary does not seem to be very different from the 
determination of a GmbH  by its private shareholders, the legal means for which are 
provided in the right of the shareholder assembly to issue instructions.403 The interest 
of the group therefore does not prevent the single subsidiary from pursuing the goal of 
maximizing profits for itself, but subsidiaries are established as subunits in order to 
transfer the profit maximization principle to a lower level, so that already the subunits 
are aligned to the dominant goal o f every economic unit. Thus, in this structure, while 
the interest of the GmbH  seems to be parallel to the interests of the creditors, and in 
general there seems to be no reason for the creditors placing more confidence in a 
parallelism of their interest with an "independent" G mbH , dominated by a private 
shareholder, than in the parallelism with a subsidiary having a rather autonomous profit 
centre standing.
The organisation of a GmbH  as a subsidiary seems to be compatible with the 
requirements for the protection of creditors. In a group organised in this way the 
subsidiaries are integrated into a systematic group management, and they are included 
in the strategic long-term planning and control of the group. In this respect, the 
organisational order of the company is changed. However, it was shown above that a 
mere distortion of the organisational order does not affect the interests of the creditors 
in any particular way if there is no resulting change in the company interest. The limit 
for an organisational change which also affects the position of the creditors was defined 
above as the point at which the parent takes over the management of the subsidiary in
,u3 See for inhowfar to maintain a legally defined company interest is useful for the economic 
structure B III 3 a. See for the general compatibility of the interest of a profit centre in the economic 
structure with the company interest in the GmbH C III 2.
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detail, that is when the parent completely instrumentalizes the company form.404 In 
this case, the G m bH  is not kept as a separate body at all, the principle of organisational 
separateness o f the company is violated, and the GmbH  is no longer able to develop a 
self-interest. In a group organised as described above the GmbH  as a subsidiary is 
directed in part by the group management, but it maintains its own organisation, which 
is responsible for the company. One reason for establishing profit centres is the desire 
to attribute responsibilities and competences in a clear-cut way and to give the 
management o f the subunits the autonomy it needs to exercise its competences. 
Otherwise, the main goal of such a structure, to be able to clearly attribute success or 
failure to the management of the subsidiary, could not be achieved. Therefore this 
structure establishes its own organisation which is to develop the profit principle of the 
subsidiary -as stated above- in the framework of the group interest. There seem to be 
no reasons why such an organisational structure should affect per se the position of the 
creditors.
However, the above-used criterion of the BGH  for delimiting the qualified de 
facto group, that is the performance of comprehensive and permanent management by 
the dominant enterprise, could suit a group organised in this way. The group 
management in this structure is exercised in a permanent way, as otherwise the group 
is no longer in control of the subsidiary and cannot bear the risk. It is questionable 
whether the criterion of comprehensive management is fulfilled if the group 
management limits itself to strategic management decisions. However, as the BG H  in 
the Tiefbau-case already considers the exercise of comprehensive financial management 
sufficient for this criterion and as -in general- a subsidiary can be comprehensively 
directed and controlled by performing strategic management, a so-structured group 
would be to assess as a qualified de facto group according to the BG H . Therefore, this 
criterion in the interpretation of the BGH  does not seem to be suitable for drawing a 
line beyond which an extension of liability on the parent can be established.
The economic organisation provides an incentive for maintaining the function of
c f .  th e  d e s c r ip t io n  by  L u tte r  ( 1 9 9 0 ) ,  s u p ra  n o te  3 4 1 ,  p. 1 8 4 ,  " i f  th e  m a n a g e m e n t  o f  th e  s u b s id ia r y  
is  g o n e  o v e r  to  t h e  p a r e n t  c o m p a n y  in  th e  c o r e " .
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the separate fund of the G m bH  and the provisions regarding the maintenance of capital. 
In a group, the market principle is substituted for internal direction in the area of 
strategic management and partly for the internal exchange o f goods between the group 
members in order to achieve the advantages of close cooperation. Any influence in the 
strategic respect does not seem to affect the working o f the separate fund, the results, 
and the assets o f the company very much; more problematic are the financial and 
business links between the companies.The exchange of goods can be influenced by the 
group management, but the organisation with autonomous subunits having a profit 
centre standing only works if the units are as much as possible exposed to the market 
and if, within the group organisation, the market principle is dominant. A deviation 
from the market principle results in an unclear and confused structure and makes a 
clear-cut attribution of competences and responsibilities impossible. Hence, there is an 
organisational incentive largely to establish the market principle for the relations 
between the companies, and to distribute the results o f the group as a whole to the 
group members according to their individual results.405 The economic incentive to 
maintain the legal structure is intensified as such an organisation seems to be the only 
feasible one for an enterprise with multiple products and business fields in several 
markets.406
The separation on capital which is invested in the company has a function in the 
economic structure also. The most decisive factor for strategic management is to 
determine the yield of the subsidiary which is fixed in relation to the invested capital - 
it is therefore also called the return on investment (ROl). For this, the invested capital 
which is employed for entrepreneurial purposes in the company has to be determined 
precisely; as a result already organisational reasons reject an uncontrollable shift of 
assets and profits. Thus, the laying-down of the invested capital in the organisational 
structure fulfils the same function as the separate fund in the legal structure of the
4ns Arguing for an incentive of the group to keep a profit centre structure Posner, "The Rights of 
Creditors of Affiliated Corporations", 43 University o f  Chicago Law  Review (1976), p. 51 If.
4 1 ,6  cf. Mestmácker (1958), supra note 43, p. 308f., who already considered such a structure but did 
not deal with it in detail as he could not immagine that a group would introduce such a structure only in 
order to perform a correct account. To make such efforts only for a correct account in a group really 
seems to be improbable, but to introduce and keep such a structure for necessary organisational resons 
seems to be plausible.
H
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may also have positive effects for the creditors: in order not to reduce the credit 
worthiness o f  the other subsidiaries and the group as a whole, the group may support 
(because of such market forces) a subsidiary in difficulty.
In general, such an organisation of the group seems to be compatible with the 
concept of the protection of creditors provided for by company law; however, what is 
more doubtful is the compatibility of the single measures of the group management with 
the interests o f the creditors. A highly centralized financial management in the group 
may especially affect the position of the subsidiary’s creditors as it may completely 
distort the result of the individual subsidiary and leave no room at all for autonomous 
decisions, as well as the concrete determination of transfer prices within the group, in 
general a mixture of the assets of the different companies, and so on. The limits of 
these management instruments are shown above with regard to the keeping of the 
company structure. An exceeding of the structure assessed on the concept of company 
law with regard to the creditors justifies an extension of the liability on the parent; in 
this case, the dangers arising from the group structure for the protection of the creditors 
are apparent. However, the legal concept of the company with regard to the creditors 
does not make a special group liability which is simply tied to the performance of 
unified management by the parent necessary.
d. Compatibility of the C riteria for the Qualified De Facto Group with the
Findings
The criteria for delimiting the qualified de facto group must be assessed according to 
the legal rationale found for a special group liability and its application to the economic 
organisational structure of the group. Two main criteria have been described, on the one 
hand the comprehensive and permanent management of the parent and, on the other, the 
lack of attention paid to the subsidiary company’s interest.
The criterion which focuses on the notion of a comprehensive and permanent 
management has already been rejected above as suitable since it seems to be nearly 
impossible to delimit this in regard to the unified management, which -as the
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GmbH and the provisions about the maintenance of capital: they attribute a fixed capital 
to the unit in order to enable it to pursue entrepreneurial success which is assessed by 
the result of the invested capital in the market.
In comparison to an independent GmbH  in a typical use the situation of a G m bH  
as a subsidiary in a group structured in this way does not seem to be structurally worse 
for the creditors.407 Because of the company structure, the creditors can only have 
confidence in the availability of the guarantee capital as it is entered in the Commercial 
Register; assets which exceed the nominal capital can be redistributed to the 
shareholders. In a GmbH  with private shareholders such a distribution may occur for 
private expenses in particular. In a GmbH  as a subsidiary, organised according to the 
structure described, the creditors can have confidence in the attribution of a fixed 
capital to the subsidiary and that it will not be withdrawn afterwards, as the group will 
want to pursue entrepreneurial purposes with it and to keep the organisational structure 
working. In the same way, the creditors can trust the company to pursue a profit 
maximization goal. The mere equity capital, in whose existence the creditors can only 
trust in the GmbH , does not offer protection for the creditors on a high level. Normally, 
the main security of the creditors does not consist of the legally defined separate fund, 
but is given by the general profitability of the company, by the self-interest of the 
company to continue performing business and staying in the market, and by the 
reputation of the company in the market. Weaker influences of internal direction on the 
transactions which are in principle performed according to the market principle between 
the companies may affect the provisions about the maintenance of capital but do not 
affect the position of the creditors to any great extent if the working of the legal 
provisions is embedded in other factors protecting the creditors. And, in principle, the 
group structure offers strong incentives to provide for a strict separation of the capital 
and a correct distribution of the profits among the subsidiaries so that the legal 
provisions will be complied with. As one other factor, the economic unity of the group 107
10 7 Going further and denying a serious need for a specific protection of creditors in a GmbH  group 
as the bankruptcy statistics especially shows the winding up of independent GmbHs Zöllner, in 
Baumbach/Hueck. GmbH-Gesetz (1988), 15th ed., annex I "Konzcrnrechl", note 25; Kiibler (1991), supra 
note 352, p. 422.
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constituent of the group- already is very difficult to define.408 Furthermore, a 
decentralized group structure also falls in with this criterion, although the legal rationale 
of a special group liability does not require it to be introduced for such a structure. This 
criterion -with regard to the GmbH- does not focus on the point at which the legal 
precautions for a protection o f the creditors become insufficient and the additional 
dangers arising from the group structure in comparison to an independent G m bH  
become apparent. Only if the management of the subsidiary is to a very wide extent 
performed by the parent will such a shift of the management per se endanger the 
position o f the creditors, and may also trigger off an extension of liability on the parent.
A more suitable criterion can be found in the second, which deals with the 
ignoring of the interest of the subsidiary by the parent. It would appear to be too 
abstract to be applied directly, therefore the way in which the interest of the subsidiary 
has to be ignored for an extension o f liability on the parent must be established. The 
insufficiencies o f the legal concept for the creditors -these form the basis of the need 
for a special group liability- require a delimitation for a special group liability along the 
lines whether the company as an organisational unit is still primarily aligned to the 
market or whether it is only a bodiless instrument for pursuing the (market) interests of 
the parent.409 If the subsidiary is still aligned to its market and employs its capital for 
maximizing profits for itself in the market, it cannot be said that the interests of the 
subsidiary are completely ignored even if the entrepreneurial direction of the GmbH  is 
taken over by the group management in strategic respects. The qualified de facto group 
can therefore be delimited by the test indicating whether the affiliated GmbH  still exists 
as a subject in the market or whether the alignment of the company to the market is 
largely distorted by internal direction so that profits (or losses) and assets o f the 
company are only the result of an arbitrary distribution within the group performed by 
the group management. For a concretization of this test the above-described criteria can 
be referred to in order to see the way in which a profit centre should be established and
^  See above A.
** cf. also the criteria by Landers (1975), supra note 381, p. 621-623, for determining whether the 
company is operated as a viable business.
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managed.410 A deviation from the model of a group organisation in which the 
subsidiaries are treated along the market principle would lead to an extension o f liability 
on the parent, single measures in this respect could already indicate a non-compliance 
with such a structure and would trigger off a liability o f the parent.
This criterion in the above-proposed interpretation can be applied to the cases of 
the BGH. The arbitrary shift o f the movable cranes between the companies, the 
devouring of all the profits of each subsidiary by the factoring company of the group, 
and the lack o f autonomy of the directors o f the individual companies411 in the 
Autokran-case are more than sufficient for extending liability on the parent, as the 
companies are by no means aligned separately to the market; however, a confused 
situation is produced in the group in that the companies can no longer be viewed as 
separate. The simple uniform financial management would not suffice for the 
application of a group liability, as expressed in the T ieß a u  case, although there are 
indications for an instrumentalization of the company in order to cover up the debts of 
the parent and other shareholders;412 these facts could justify a group liability as then 
the company would no longer be seen as a self-sustaining actor in the market. In the 
Video case, remarks about a mixture of assets between the different group members413 
could have justified the extension of liability; however, the justification given by the 
BGH , an extension of liability because of the comprehensive and permanent 
management of the only shareholder and director of the company, cannot be accepted, 
as shown above. In the TBB  case, the decision of the B G H  can be supported since a 
uniform cash management performed by the bank for the whole group does not per se 
trigger off a special group liability; however, a group liability is justified if this 
instrument -and the underlying credits to other companies of the group- leads to any 
danger for the activity of the G m bH  in hand.414 In this case, the subsidiary is no 
longer seen as a separate actor in the market, and an economic unity of the group in
4 1 0  See B I I I  b.
4 , 1  BGHZ 95, 330, 336f., 338f.
4 1 1  See the facts of the T ieß au -case and the considerations of the BGH  with regard to GmbHG
§ 30, 31 BGHZ 107, 7-15.
4 1 3  See BGHZ 115, 187, 192.
4 , 4  BGH Juristenzeitung 1993, p. 578 - TBB.
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this form would lead to a complete ignoring of the company with its separate assets, 
interest, and body.
e. French Law
This conclusion is supported by French jurisdiction with regard to groups. French 
criminal law penalizes an*abuse of the company’s assets by the company’s directors; the 
criterion for abuse is the intérêt social.*15 The Chambre Crimnelle of the Cour de 
Cassation has developed a ground o f justification in this field especially for groups; 
according to this financial assistance by one company to another in a group is not seen 
as an abuse of the company’s assets under the following conditions.416 First, the 
companies must form a group which the Cour de Cassation avoids defining more 
precisely; according to other judgements of lower courts, there must be a strongly 
structured economic and financial unity417 - this may be translated by a uniform 
management. According to the Cour de Cassation, the financial transactions have to be 
necessitated by a common economic, social, or financial interest which is assessed with 
regard to a systematic policy for the group as a whole. Second, the financial help must 
be balanced and may not destroy the equilibrium between the activities of each of the 
companies concerned. Third, the Financial aids may not exceed the financial possibilities 
of the company which is charged with these transactions. These conditions have to be 
given cumulative in order to justify financial assistance within groups. The Chambre 
Commercial has not yet confirmed this jurisdiction, but among scholars the opinion is 
predominant that it can be transposed into civil law.4,ii On this ground of justification, 
not only the civil liability of the directors can be excluded, but also all the other
4I* According 1 0  Loi 1966 Art. 437-3 for the S.A. and Art. 425-4 for the S.A.R.L.
4,6 Cour dc Cassation (Chambre Criminelle), judgement from 4 February 1985, Revue des Sociétés 
103 (1985), p. 648ff., especially p. 651 - Rozenblum , with note by Bouloc; confirmed by judgement from 
13 February 1989, Revue des Sociétés 107 (1989), p. 692ff. - Duval, with note by Bouloc; further 
references by Pariente, "Les groupes de sociétés et la responsabilité pénale des personnes morales", Revue 
des Sociétés 111 (1993), p. 249f.
417 Especially the decisions of the Tribunal corrcctionel dc Paris, judgement from 16 May 1974, 
Recueil D alloz Sirey 1975, jurisprudence, p. 37 • Willot; and of the Tribunal de Grande Instance dc 
Mulhouse, judgement from 25 March 1983, Recueil Dalloz Sirey 1984, jurisprudence, p. 285ff. - 
Schlumpf, with note by Ducouloux-Favard; see also the references by Bouloc, "Droit Pénal et Groupes 
d’Entrcpriscs", Revue des Sociétés 106 (1988), p. 188.
4,8 See Guy on (1993), supra note 9, p. 149.
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provisions which establish the parent’s liability by focusing on the company interest. 
Whether by compliance with these criteria all other possibilities for assuming liability 
of the parent are excluded does not seem to be clear.419
Contrary to the above-shown criteria for the qualified de facto group in German 
law, two points in particular need to be mentionend. First, the performance o f unified 
management according to a systematic group policy is not seen as critical in French law 
but is one o f the conditions for privileging the group in this respect. Thereby, the 
rejection of the criterion which ties the extension of liability only on the comprehensive 
and permanent management is supported. Second, the qualifications of the subsidiary’s 
treatment for privileging the group are remarkable. The interest of the company is 
redefined: it is not defined either as that of an independent company or quasi 
completely put at the disposal o f the shareholders/the parent; instead a company interest 
within the group is defined. The company can claim adequate consideration within the 
framework of a coherent group policy, its assets are still protected as the financial 
transactions in the group should not endanger the existence of the company and there 
must be an equilibrium regarding these transactions. The company interest is therefore 
shaped by the group interest, but a self-interest o f the company is upheld as the 
company forms a separate body in the framework of a systematic group policy. This is 
lined up with the well-being of all group members and as the patrimony of the company 
remains separate from the other group members, it is protected against any damage 
which is not balanced within the systematic group policy. An interest of this type 
remains the guideline of a company which is seen as the member of a group but at the 
same time as a separate body with its own self-interest. Such a view of the company in 
a group seems to be comparable to the profit centre standing of a company. The 
strategic management performs a systematic and coherent group policy, whereas the 
companies maintain their self-interest by making profits in the market. The parent is not 
allowed to exceed the limits beyond which the subsidiary as a separate body with a
*xn Especially relevant in this field are the action en comblement du passif and the extension du 
redressement judicaire according to L o i n 85-98 du 4 Janvier Art. 180, 182; see for excluding the liability 
the rather cautious statements by Lutter, "Zur Privilegierung einheitlicher Leitung im französischen 
(Konzern-) Recht", Festschrift für Kellermann (1991), p. 265f.
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separate patrimony and its own self-interest would be affected. In such an interpretation 
the ground for justification generally defines the limits o f a unified management in the 
group and does not only draw a line beyond which an abuse of company assets takes 
place.
f. Categorizing the Concept
The above-described concept for an extension of liability on the parent has to be 
inserted into the already-mentioned categories of liability owing to the installation of an 
organisational structure or of liability for the conduct of the subsidiary’s business by the 
parent in an abusive way. With the above, an organisational form is presented which 
excludes the extension of liability, and accordingly the extension of liability is tied on 
an organisational structure which exceeds the limits o f the concept above (e.g. a very 
centralized group). However, the limits of the organisational structure are exceeded by 
single management measures, such as fixing transfer prices at an inadequate level, 
causing a mix up of the assets of the different companies, installing a financial 
management which does not leave the subsidiary any autonomy at all, or, in general, 
determining the management of the subsidiary in detail. Therefore, one could say that 
the extension of liability is connected with an organisational structure which is achieved 
through the behaviour of the group management/"’ An extension of liability which 
refers only to an organisational status seems necessarily to have to choose the unified 
management as a starting point; this can be seen as indicating the point at which the 
general transformation of the organisational status of the company takes place.4"1 All 
further organisational concepts with which a liability of the parent could be connected 
result from further-reaching interferences on the part of the group management. There 
does not seem to be a way within the spectrum of unified management to define a 
group organisation which does not the take single management measures of the group 
management into consideration. Thereby the proposed concept provides for an extension 4201
420 Considerations in this direction already by Stodolkowitz (1992), supra note 364, p . 1519; 
Westermann (1993), supra note 366, p. 556f.
421 See e.g. the very thorough analysis by Assmann (1992), supra note 244, p. 718-726, who shows 
that exceptions from the extension of liability do not fit into the concept of liability for an organisational 
status.
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of liability if the limits o f the described organisation are exceeded by any interferences 
of the group management.
3. Economic Rationale for a Group Liability
The limited liability of a company is a way of distributing the risk between the 
shareholders and creditors of a company: the liability of the shareholders is limited to 
the assets of the company, and it is the creditors who bear the risk of the company’s 
winding-up at the end.422 The risk-sharing is not a one-sided legal privilege for the 
shareholders, who externalize the risk of the company’s economic activity on the 
creditors, but the limitation of shareholders’ liability can be justified with regard to the 
appropriateness for the relation between the different interest groups. The holding of 
shares is promoted by a structure in which the shareholders can only loose the money 
they have invested into the company. The creditors, on the other hand, normally 
consciously assume the risk of the bankruptcy of the company as they know about the 
feature of limited liability of their market partner. The creditors assess the risk and 
demand compensation for their risk-bearing in form of a higher interest rate, while the 
debtor obtains the desired limitation of his liability. The risk is therefore internalised 
into the contract by market mechanisms, and there is no externalisation as creditors are 
compensated for assuming the risk arising from the limited liability.422
Nonetheless, the limitation of the shareholders’ liability is simply the standard 
distribution of risk: as in the case of unlimited liability the parties of a contract can 
agree on a contractual limitation of one party’s liability, and the company’s limited 
liability can be extended to the shareholders with their agreement. Market forces can 
therefore cause a change in the company’s standard liability order by the shareholders’ 
taking over guarantees for the debts of the company. If, therefore, the distribution of 
risks according to limited liability does not fit the interests of the different groups in the
See in general Posner (1992), supra note 28, p. 395f; Woodward (1985), supra note 334, p, 601; 
Kiibler (1991), supra note 352, p. 404; Roth, " ‘economic analysis’ der beschränkten Haftung”, Zeitschrift 
für Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht 15 (1986), p. 374;
423 Fundamental Posner (1976), supra note 405, p. 502-507; Easterbrook/Fischel, "Limited Liability 
and the Corporation1', 52 University o f  Chicago Law Review  (1985), p. 104-107; Roth. ibid.
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market, the parties can contract around liability. In this case, the interest rate demanded 
by the creditors is lower as it does not include a surcharge for additional risk-bearing. 
Who it is, in a concrete situation, that takes over the risk for the winding-up of the 
company depends on who the cheapest risk bearer is; thereby, an efficient solution is 
achieved by market mechanisms. The function of company law in this respect is seen 
as providing a set of standard, implied contract terms so that business firms do not have 
to stipulate these terms anew every time they transact, even if they can re-negotiate the 
terms if necessary. The function o f the law therefore lies in economising on transaction 
costs.424 Limited liability is chosen as the standard solution for a company as creditors 
are often seen as those who are the superior risk-bearers425, therefore the limitation of 
liability for the shareholders is normally the efficient solution and would also emerge 
in contractual arrangements directed by market mechanisms.426
The limited liability in a company cannot only be extended by the will of the 
contracting parties, but the distribution of risks can be changed by the court’s ordering 
a piercing of the corporate veil and an extension of liability on the shareholders. By 
installing a special liability in the group, the courts can provide for a legal remedy if 
the market is not able to bring about an efficient overall solution for liability and 
distribution of risk. If efficiency considerations prefer a general liability of the parent 
for the subsidiary’s debts in a group, the legislator should introduce this as a standard 
liability model since such an efficient standard solution helps to economise on 
transaction costs.
According to these considerations, it needs to be analysed whether efficiency 
considerations and the economic rationale for limited liability accomodate the legal 
criterion according to which liability is only extended in certain groups and the above 
described structure is exempted from a special group liability. First, the question 
whether the market can solve the liability questions for groups in -an efficient way so *423
424 Posner (1976), supra note 405, p. 506.
423 For the reasons according to which creditors may be the superior risk bearers with regard to their 
validity for groups see below.
42ft K i i b l e r  ( 1 9 9 1 ) ,  s u p r a  n o t e  3 5 2 ,  p .  4 0 4 .
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that a legally institutionalised group liability is unnecessary will be examined. Second, 
it will be analysed whether the economic rationale for limited liability does not apply 
to the situations in groups so that there should in general be a joint liability of the 
member companies or whether, at least for certain kinds of groups, the limited liability 
of the single member companies can still be justified.
a. Substitution of a Special Liability Rule for the Group by the Market
One body of opinion denies the need for a special liability rule regarding the group, as 
potentially arising problems can largely be solved by the market. Regarding voluntary, 
contractual creditors, externalisations do not appear as they are compensated for taking 
over additional risks. If the law changes later the distribution of risk agreed on by the 
parties in favour of the creditor, e.g. by piercing the corporate veil and extending 
liability on the shareholders, it distorts the efficient solution found by the contracting 
parties and burdens the risk again to the shareholders although the creditors were paid 
for bearing the risk so that they gain a windfall profit. Legal remedies are only 
necessary if the creditor was not able to appraise the risk of default accurately, therefore 
in cases of fraud or misrepresentation. These are cases in which the company 
misrepresents the nature of its activity, its ability to perform, and in general its financial 
condition, or the assets to which it has recourse. Included are such cases in which the 
company performs a riskier project afterwards than the one for which it has achieved 
the loan. As in these cases the creditor cannot calculate the surcharge for the additional 
risk, externalities appear. The law may shift risk distribution afterwards and extend 
liability in these cases as the market did not work correctly and did not achieve an 
efficient solution.427
Another problem for this approach is posed by involuntary creditors, especially 
tort creditors. For these groups the shifting of risk by limited liability is not based on 
a contractual agreement achieved under market conditions, they are not compensated by 
a surcharge for their bearing the risk of the company's default, and thus they may bear
AZ} P o s n e r  ( 1 9 7 6 ) ,  su p ra  n o te  4 0 5 ,  p . 5 2 0 - 5 2 4 ;  E a s te r b r o o k / F is c h e l  ( 1 9 8 5 ) ,  s u p r a  n o te  4 2 3 ,  p . l ! 2 f . ;  
K i ib le r  ( 1 9 9 1 ) ,  s u p r a  n o te  3 5 2 ,  p . 4 1 6 .
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externalities.428 For a protection of these creditors, the approach provides several 
solutions. Piercing the corporate veil is justified for tort creditors more willingly429 or 
-predominantly- mandatory insurance for companies with limited liability is considered 
for tort claimants.430 The group o f the involuntary creditors may include not only tort 
creditors, but also contract creditors whose transactions were too small to negotiate a 
surcharge for the additional risk arising from limited liability, or other groups for whom 
a compensation for the increased risk is normally not provided, such as employees.431
Therefore, a special group liability is not necessary according to this opinion as 
the additional risk caused by the group is appraised by the creditor who is compensated 
ex ante for the increased risk o f default. Only if the additional risk cannot be 
compensated by market mechanisms, because market mechanisms are distorted owing 
to fraud and misrepresentation for voluntary creditors or because a market transaction 
does not take place for involuntary creditors, is a legal protection in the form of 
piercing the corporate veil accepted. Thus, the decisive point for triggering off an 
extension of liability is not the formation of a group, but the standing of the creditors. 
According to this body of opinion a special group liability is viewed as not taking into 
account the working of limited liability in the market, and as unnecessary432, whereas 
piercing the corporate veil for special groups of creditors is seen as justified. Regarding 
these considerations, this approach can be seen as being in line with recent articles 
which argue for an extension of liability on shareholders in favour of tort victims, and 
thus for doing away with the limited liability of the company in this respect.433
4at S e e  f o r  th e  p r o b le m s  o f  l im ite d  l ia b i l i t y  w ith  r e g a r d  to  to r t  v ic t im s  in g e n e r a l  L e e b r o n , " L im ite d  
L ia b i l i t y ,  T o r t  V i c t i m s ,  a n d  C r e d i t o r s " ,  9 1  Columbia Law Review ( 1 9 9 1 ) ,  p. 1 6 0 0 - 1 6 0 5 .
42g S e e  e s p e c i a l l y  K i ib le r  ( 1 9 9 1 ) ,  s u p r a  n o te  , p. 4 0 7 f . ,  4 1 6 f .  4 1 8 ,  4 2 0 ;  id ., " A n m e r k u n g  z u m  T B B -  
U r te i l " ,  Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1 9 9 3 ,  p . 1 2 9 4 f.
410 H a lp e r n / T r c b iic o c k / T u r n b u ll ,  " A n  E c o n o m ic  A n a ly s is  o f  L im it e d  L ia b i l ity  in  C o r p o r a t io n  L a w " .  
3 0  University o f  Toronto Law Journal ( 1 9 8 0 ) ,  p . 1 4 5 - 1 4 7 ;  W o o d w a r d  ( 1 9 8 5 ) ,  s u p ra  n o te  3 3 4 ,  p . 6 0 9 1 ’. ;  
K ir c h n e r  ( 1 9 8 5 ) ,  s u p r a  n o te  4 3 ,  p . 2 2 9 f .
431 S e e  f o r  a  l is t  o f  s u c h  c r e d ito r s  K i ib le r ,  ib id ., p . 4 0 8 f . ;  B lu m b e r g  ( 1 9 8 7 ) ,  s u p r a  n o te  1 1 , p . 7 6 - 7 9 .
412 E s p e c ia l ly  K i ib le r ,  ib id .,  p . 4 2 2 f . ;  K ir c h n e r  ( 1 9 8 5 ) ,  su p ra  n o te  4 3 ,  p . 2 2 9 f . ;  P o s n e r  ( 1 9 7 6 ) ,  s u p r a  
n o te  4 0 5 ,  p . 5 2 4 - 5 2 6 .
433 H a n s m a n n / K r a a k m a n , " T o w a r d  U n lim ite d  S h a r e h o ld e r  L ia b i l i t y  f o r  C o r p o r a te  T o r t s " ,  1 0 0  Yale 
Law Journal ( 1 9 9 1 ) ,  p . 1 8 7 9 f f . ;  a b it  m o r e  r e lu c ta n t  L e e b r o n  ( 1 9 9 1 ) ,  s u p r a  n o te  4 2 8 ,  p . 1 5 6 5 f f „  1 6 0 0 -  
1 6 0 5 ,  1 6 4 9 f . ;  a  r e m a r k  o n  th is  d e b a te  b y  V a g t s ,  " W o h in  m it  d e r  b e s c h r ä n k te n  H a f tu n g  d e r  A k t io n ä r e " ,  
Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht 22 ( 1 9 9 4 ) ,  p . 2 2 7 f f . ;  r e je c t in g  th e  p r o p o s a l  C o o p e r  
A le x a n d e r ,  " U n l im i t e d  S h a r e h o ld e r  L ia b i l i t y  T h r o u g h  a  P r o c e d u r a l  L e n s e " ,  1 0 6  Harvard Law Review 
( 1 9 9 2 ) ,  p . 3 8 7 f f .  A s  it is  n o t th e  g o a l  o f  th is  a n a ly s is  to  e x a m in e  w h e t h e r  lim ite d  l ia b i l i t y  is  ju s t i f i e d  fo r
j
III
I
Ì
)
)
>
« tAMUi j ü î;?j îîu 4. t: i its Aiti tiÿOüthfifl
167
It is to agree with the starting point of this approach that in general market 
mechanisms make the contracting parties internalise risks and avoid externalities even 
if as a general legal rule limited liability is chosen; however, this approach may 
understate the function of the law in relation to the market in this field. According to 
this approach, the law only provides a set of standard provisions which help to 
economise on transaction costs and to form a very rough guideline to determine market 
transactions. Providing its own solutions, the law only intervenes if the actual structural 
conditions for a working of market mechanisms are not given. In all other respects, the 
market is seen as indefinitely flexible, and the creditors as unboundedly able to 
determine all possible risks wherever they come from and to internalize them 
adequately into the contract. However, if the law is viewed only as substituting a 
standard form contract the function of company law will not be taken seriously; in 
reality the function of the legal provisions goes further.414 The legal provisions for the 
company, the installing of a separate body and organisation with a legally protected 
separate fund forms a starting point and a basis for the risk appraisal of the creditors; 
to put it in other words, the institution company as formed by company law is a datum 
for the market. The creditors of a company can be confident that their risk is limited 
and that they are protected at least by these legal provisions, which may be seen as 
covering "normal" risks, since for greater risks additional compensation has to be 
provided by market mechanisms. And they can use the institution of the company with 
its subtle provisions for creditor protection as a basic point in order to assess the 
riskiness of transactions with the company as a market partner.
However, if the legal provisions of a company do not work structurally any 
more, the market does not have a certain legal structure which it can take as given in 
order to appraise the risk of a concrete transaction. Above it was shown, that the 
concept of a company as conceived of by company law is in principle aligned to an 
independent economic activity. The concept can still be thought of as appropriate for 
some forms of groups, but it is structurally unable to grasp other forms of groups as *43
to rt v ic t im s  i t  w i l l  n o t  b e  fo c u s e d  o n  th is  p o in t  a n y  m o r e .
434 S e e  e s p e c ia l ly  R o th  ( 1 9 8 6 ) ,  s u p r a  n o te  4 2 2 ,  p . 3 7 5 - 3 8 0 ;  c r i t i c a l  in  th e  s a m e  d ir e c t io n  A s s m a n n  
( 1 9 9 2 ) ,  s u p ra  n o te  2 4 4 ,  p. 6 9 1 - 6 9 2 .
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these suspend the basic provisions of the concept of the company - the provisions 
securing the separate body, organisation, and fund. A legal remedy for the structural 
legal deficits o f company law for such groups is necessary if the effects of the increase 
of risk for the creditors cannot be balanced by the market. The creditors would no 
longer be able to trust in a certain legal structure fixed by law, instead they had to 
assess every single group structure to see howfar it suspended the provisions for a 
company with regard to the provisions of the creditors and therefore increased the risk 
for the creditors. The calculatory assessment o f the risk caused by the ineffectiveness 
of legal provisions seems to be impossible for the creditors, and this can already be 
seen in the disagreement among lawyers as to how to assess this. As the market is not 
able to take over the function of the law in this respect, the law must provide for legal 
remedies which secure the working of the market and relieve the market. This is exactly 
the precise function of the piercing of the corporate veil in cases in which the 
provisions o f company law do no longer offer sufficient protection for the creditors.135 
If the law provides for such a remedy, it makes sure that the market can take the legal 
structure as a starting point to assess the risks which go beyond those which are 
covered by the legal provisions.
b. Justification of Limited Liability for Subsidiaries in a Group
A further inquiry has to focus on whether the segregation of liability in a group by 
granting limited liability to a subsidiary company can still be justified by reasons of 
efficiency, therefore whether efficiency considerations do not require the elimination of 
limited liability within groups. We are dealing with a GmbH  as an affiliated company 
in a group; in this company a dominant shareholder therefore exists who controls the 
company and performs unified management and, in addition, as a private limited 
company it is impossible for this company form to have its shares traded on the stock 
exchange.435 36
435 W ith  th e  s a m e  re su lt  R o th ,  ib id . ,  p . 3 8 1  f . ;  L e h m a n n , " S c h r a n k e n  d e r  b e s c h r a n k te n  H a f t u n g ”, 
GmbH Rundschau  1 9 9 2 ,  p . 2 0 0 f f . ,  2 0 5  f.
436 A s  a  c o n s e q u e n c e  o f  th e  r e q u ir e m e n ts  o f  fo rm  in  GmbHG  §  1 5  it is  v e ry  d i f f i c u l t  to  t r a n s f e r  th e  
s h a r e s  o n  a  GmbH , h e n c e  th is  c o m p a n y  fo r m  is n o t  a t a it a p t  fo r  a  w id e -s p r e a d  o w n e r s h ip  w ith  
s h a r e h o ld e r s  w h o  th in k  o f  th e ir  s h a r e s  a s  a  p u re  c a p ita l  in v e s tm e n t .
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Most of the advantages which scholars advance to justify limited liability and 
to reject unlimited liability refer to an independent public company and cannot be 
applied to these assumptions.437 All reasons concerning an efficient working of the 
capital market and coming from a wide-spread ownership are not valid for this 
constellation.438 Therefore, increased transaction costs for the shareholders, and 
increased information and monitoring costs with regard to the financial situation of their 
company and the other shareholders’ fortunes are not relevant. Problems with split share 
prices in regard to the different wealth of the shareholders do not emerge. The potential 
unwillingness of the shareholders to allow their company to rely on debt financing as, 
in the end, they would not be able to control the management’s borrowing for the 
company would not be pertinent.439 Increased transaction costs for the creditors as 
they would have to obtain information about and to monitor the financial status of the 
company and the financial status of their creditors in the case of unlimited liability, do 
not emerge - at least not to such an extent as in the public company.440 For the same 
reasons, prosecuting an action against the parent as the responsible shareholder because 
of the winding-up of the subsidiary does not cause such prohibitive transaction costs as 
in the case of prosecuting actions against a large number of indvidual shareholders.441
The central point with respect to limited liability seems to be the attitude of the 
entrepreneurs to risk. Limited liability facilitates innovative and risky investments as 
entrepreneurs do not have to face the risk of loosing all their assets, but only their 
capital invested in the company. As (at least) individuals are normally seen as risk- 
averse, limited liability is the way to encourage individuals to accept entrepreneurial 
risk.442 At first glance, this seems to be especially important for the single trader, as
417 c f .  th e  l is t  o f  e f f i c i e n c y  a d v a n ta g e s  o f  lim ite d  l ia b i l i t y  w h ic h  d o  n o t a p p ly  f o r  g r o u p s  in  g e n e r a l  
b y  B lu m b e r g  ( 1 9 8 7 ) ,  su p ra  n o te  1 1 , p . 9 5 f .  a n d  b y  E a s te r b r o o k / F is c h c l ,  The Economic Structure o f  
Corporate Law  ( 1 9 9 1 ) ,  p . 5 6 f .
4W S e e  f o r  c o n s id e r a t io n s  c o n n e c t e d  w ith  th e  fu n g ib il i ty  o f  s h a r e s  a n d  w ith  th e  c o s t s  fo r  th e  
s h a r e h o l d e r s  H a l p e r n / T r e b i l c o c k / T u r n b u l l  ( 1 9 8 0 ) ,  s u p r a  n o t e  4 3 0 ,  p . 1 2 6 - 1 3 1 ,  1 3 5 - 1 3 8 ;  
E a s te r b r o o k / F is c h e l  ( 1 9 8 5 ) ,  s u p ra  n o te  4 2 3 ,  p . 9 4 - 9 7 ;  W o o d w a r d  ( 1 9 8 5 ) ,  su p ra  n o te  3 3 4 ,  p . 6 0 4 - 6 0 6 .
n<) S e e  L o c b r o n  ( 1 9 9 1 ) ,  s u p ra  n o te  4 2 8 ,  p . 1 5 9 0 - 1 5 9 4 .
440 H a lp c r n / T r c b ilc o c k / T u r n b u ll  ( 1 9 8 0 ) ,  su p ra  n o te  4 3 0 ,  p . 1 3 3 - 1 3 5 .
441 H a lp e r n / T rc b ilc o c k / T u rn b u ll  ( 1 9 8 0 ) ,  s u p ra  n o te  4 3 0 ,  p . 1 3 1 - 1 3 3 ;  W o o d w a r d  ( 1 9 8 5 ) ,  s u p r a  n o te  
3 3 4 ,  p . 6 0 4 ;  L e e b r o n  ( 1 9 9 1 ) ,  s u p ra  n o te  4 2 8 ,  p . 1 6 1 0 f .
442 P o s n e r  ( 1 9 7 6 ) ,  su p ra  n o te  4 0 5 ,  p . 5 0 2 ;  fo r  a d e f in i t io n  a n d  e x p la n a t io n  o f  r i s k  a v e r s io n  s e e  ib id , 
n o te  9 ,  1 0 .
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he can separate his business and his private assets; thus, in case of a bankruptcy of the 
enterprise his private fortune is not affected. This may be even more important for the 
shareholder in a public company as -if he were held liable for the company’s debts- all 
his remaining wealth would be endangered although he -as a passive investor- is not at 
all in control o f the management which causes the risk. He would not be able to 
diversify his risk by holding a portfolio of different stocks and to choose an individually 
appropriate level of risk as all his wealth would be exposed if he were held liable for 
the debts of only one company.443
However, in a group, the situation may be seen as different. Making a parent 
liable for the subsidiary’s debts does not result in unlimited personal liability for the 
parent’s shareholders. Therefore, despite the liability of the parent for the subsidiary’s 
debts, the shareholders can still diversify their risk by holding a portfolio of different 
stocks and, in addition, even the parent company to a certain extent may be in a 
position to diversify its portfolio and to thereby spread the risk.444 This view may be 
underlined by the fact that the parent is in control of the subsidiary. However, if we 
examine a small group with small companies we can see that the situation is 
different.445 If an individual has invested large amounts of his wealth into a single 
company, he will be very reluctant to form a new business in another company if the 
veil of the newly founded company were pierced so that the business risk of the new 
company also endangered the part of his fortune which is inherent in the other 
company. The investor in such a small company or group o f companies is not able to 
diversify his risk, therefore he will be rather risk-averse. The GmbH  is the company 
form which is typically used in this way with only a very few shareholders and often 
as part of a group of such small businesses - as can be seen in the cases of the BGH . 
Therefore, eliminating the limited liability of the GmbH  as an affiliated company in a 
group and establishing a special group liability seems to prevent the formation of new
441 Easterbrook/Fischcl (1985), supra note 423, p. 96f,; Lcebron (1991), supra note 428, p. 1596- 
1605. This is one of the main reasons why creditors are superior risk bearers than shareholders as 
creditors’ liability is always limited and they are able to diversify their risk; according to Leebron, ibid., 
this has only very limited validity with regard to tort victims.
444 Blumberg (1987), supra note 11, p. 95, but only on the basis of its greater wealth and with the 
disadvantages which the development of a conglomerate group carries with it.
443 cf. Lcebron (1991), supra note 428, p. 1627-1630; Posner (1976), supra note 405, p. 512.
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ventures in this constellation. This argument is not excluded, either, by the fact that 
such a shareholder is normally in control of the company: the business risk in a market 
economy is not fully controllable, it may even be increased by state regulation and 
other state interventions in the economy.446 In addition, even in a larger group with 
an affiliated GmbH risk-aversion may be at stake. As the shareholders of the parent can 
normally diversify their risk they expect the company o f which they own shares not to 
be risk-averse, but more risk neutral.447 However, the decisions about new investments 
are taken by the company’s directors as ownership and management are separated. The 
managers are unable to diversify their human capital448, therefore their decisions will 
be determined by risk-aversion. They will not only be risk-averse regarding the 
winding-up o f their company, but a severe loss in one part of the enterprise affecting 
other parts may well endanger their jobs. Hence, the managers of a large company will 
also be reluctant to start a new innovative business whose risk may affect the other 
parts of the business. By setting up a subsidiary for the new venture with limited 
liability in the form of a GmbH, this risk-aversion can be overcome.449
Other efficiency advantages of limited liability may be found in the structure of 
the group. The limited liability of the subsidiaries may support the above-described 
decentralised structure as the parent is not charged with the subsidiary’s whole business 
risk.450 Furthermore, the selling of a subsidiary causes fewer transaction costs if a new 
ordering of the liability between the contracting parties is not necessary.451 Moreover, 
the information costs for the creditors may be lower, since if their debtor is endowed 
with limited liability, they have only to assess the financial situation of the concrete 
subsidiary (and the risk of financial abuses within the group), and in the case of an 
extension of liability they have to assess the Financial situation in the whole group.452
446 See Roth (1986), supra note 422, p. 373; Lehmann (1986), supra note 33, p. 356.
447 See Posner (1976), supra note 405, p. 502, note 9; Easterbrook/Fischel (1991), supra note 437,
p. 29.
44H Easterbrook/Fischel (1985), supra note 423, p.l07f.
449 cf. also the thorough an lysis by Debus (1990), supra note 159, p. 149-158.
4,0 Debus, ibid., p. 166-172; however, it seems to be doubtful whether limited liability is a 
necessary conditon of the decentralised structure, see above B III 3 b footnote 241.
451 Debus, ibid., 172-177.
4SZ Debus, ibid., p. 140-148.
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A further argument for making available limited liability for companies in 
groups can be seen in comparison to independent companies. If subsidiaries are 
appropriately endowed with equity capital and assume the same role as independent 
companies there seems to be no reason to give unaffiliated companies an advantage by 
necessarily establishing a joint group liability.453 If limited liability represents a 
decisive competitive advantage which is also relevant for groups this could in the end 
lead to a disintegration of industry although the size and integration of the enterprise 
lead to efficiency gains which could then no longer be achieved.454
The two main arguments for the justification of limited liability in a group, the 
argument focusing on risk-aversion and the comparative argument, make also the limits 
for the approval of limited liability in groups apparent. The comparative argument is 
only valid if the company arrangement does not increase the risk for creditors over the 
one they would have to bear if the companies were organised as separate ventures; thus, 
only if the protective provisions of company law also grasp the subsidiary. The risk- 
aversion argument can only be applied if the subsidiary has at the end to bear the 
business risk caused by the market.455 The subsidiary only bears such a risk if it is 
aligned to the market and is responsible for its activity in the market; the risk-bearing 
has to refer to the company as a unit as well as to its directors. The company only 
hears a risk if it is adequately capitalized, otherwise all the risk is shifted to the 
creditors and externalized. The directors only bear the risk if they have to decide about 
the activity of the subsidiary in the market and if their personal status depends on the 
company’s success in the market. Therefore, a precondition for such a risk-bearing of 
the company is the granting of a certain degree of autonomy to their directors insofar 
as it is necessary for an activity in the concrete market under their own responsibility.
However, if the subsidiary is not set up as a separate unit in the market, and is 
thus not endowed with an equity capital appropriate for its activity, in the market, and
4SJ Easterbrook/Fischel (1985), supra note 423, p. I l l ;  Roth (1986), supra note 422, p. 373.
4.4 See for a critical analysis Leebron (1991), supra note 428, p. 1615-1619.
4.5 See for exposing the company to the risk in the market as the necessary minimum for granting 
the privilege of limited liability in a market economy and the implications of this principle Lehmann 
(1986), supra note 33, p. 356, 362f.
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if its directors are not granted the degree of autonomy needed for an activity in the 
market under its own responsibility, the parent uses the limitation of the subsidiary's 
liability only to externalize risks and not to create a body which is designed and able 
to bear the risk in the market. In this case, the market no longer controls the company 
and eliminates it as a market participant if it is not successful in the market but the 
subsidiary is a mere instrument of the parent, and in the case of a winding-up o f the 
subsidiary the parent only loses the inappropriate capital invested in the subsidiary and 
the parent’s directors who led the subsidiary into the winding-up proceedings are not 
affected personaly by this.456 Such a structure therefore forms an abuse of the 
institution limited liability, an extension of the liability on the parent is justified.457 *
If, on the other hand, the subsidiaries are given a profit centre standing and 
their directors can decide more or less autonomously with regard to their market, the 
structure seems to be compatible with these conditions: the company as a profit centre 
is responsible for its success in the market, the director(s) are personaly responsible for 
its success and are judged accordingly. Thereby the moral hazard problem caused by 
limited liability is also limited.45* if directors personaly and the subsidiary itself have 
to bear the consequences of a failure in the market, they will avoid excessive risk­
taking. Therefore a profit centre structure shifts the responsibilities to the points where 
they have to be in order to guarantee the working of the legal construction of a 
company endowed with limited liability in the market.451* Furthermore, a certain 
correspondence of interests is secured by this structure. Since the subsidiary and its 
directors have a self-interest of survival in the market, the interests of the creditors are 
also secured against an unlimited neglecting of their interest.460 The limited liability 
of a subsidiary of this type can also be held in comparison to the liability of a natural
15,1 Lehmann, ibid., p. 367f..
1,7 Lehmann ibid; Roth (1986), supra note 422, p. 381; EasterbrookyFischei (1985), supra note 423,
p. 111.
See for the moral hazard problem with regard to parent subsidiary relations Eastcrbrook/Fischel 
ibid.; in general Halpcrn/Trebilcock/Turnbull (1980), supra note 430. p. 140f.
4,0 In this way also Teubner's demand for a correspondence of the point where the decisions are 
taken in a group and the point on which the law connects responsibility for actions seems to be at least 
largely complied with, see Teubner, "Die ‘Politik dcs Gesetzes’ im Rccht der Konzernhaftung", 
Festschrift fur Steindorff (1990), p. 26Iff.
u*} cf. Roth (1986), supra note 422, p. 381.
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person. The creditors of the natural person are secured by its fortune -which can change 
very rapidly- and by a certain correspondence of interests as it is assumed that the 
natural person does not want to institute bankruptcy proceedings. In a certain 
parallelism the creditors of a company are secured by the guarantee fund of the 
company and by a certain correspondence between the interests of the managers and the 
owners of the company;461 these precautions are also valid for a group with a profit 
centre structure. As the liability of a natural person is also limited to its wealth, this 
concept of relativized liability is transformed into limited liability for a company: the 
subsidiary as a profit centre in the form of a GmbH  complies with the fundamental 
points of this concept.
D. Conclusions
i
The efficient group structure with a minimum of unified management has been 
developed as a decentralised, divisional structure with subsidiaries as profit centres 
whose managements take over the operative affairs and are responsible for their 
concrete markets in a fairly autonomous way, while the group management performs 
strategic management, and controls and coordinates the subsidiaries. Coordinating the 
subsidiaries with regard to the goals of the group as a whole, the group management 
achieves the advantages o f the internal direction of the affiliated companies over market 
coordination; these advantages are economies of scale and scope, economies on 
transaction costs, and a better exchange of information between the companies. In 
general, the relations between the companies are governed by the market principle, the 
group management aligns the group members only to the strategic goals of the group 
and otherwise intervenes as little as possible in the subsidiaries’ management. Direct 
hierarchical management means are substituted by more indirect devices, such as the 
performing of financial management, personnel management by appointing the 
subsidiaries’ directors, establishing a comprehensive accounting and-auditing procedure, 
and other coordination instruments.
‘w’1 See for this functional comparison Roth, ibid., p. 378f.; for the interests in the company with 
regard to the creditors see C IV 2 c.
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The legal structure of a G m bH  as an affiliated company does not prevent the 
introduction of an efficient economic organisation of this type. This, o f course, is valid 
if the affiliation of a GmbH  is based on a control contract, but is laso true for a G m bH  
as an affiliated company in a de facto group. In the economic organisation the G m bH  
is seen as a separate body to whom separate assets and entrepreneurial tasks are 
attributed. The subsidiary is aligned to the market and keeps a self-interest which is 
directed to maximizing profits. However, as the company is no longer independent it 
pursues the self-interest only within the framework of the group interest, but the 
interventions of the group management with respect to the strategic direction of the 
company do not exceed the very wide legal limits which are set for shareholder 
influence by the GmbH-Gesetz. Therefore, the standing of a profit centre in the 
economic organisation keeps the legal structure of the G m bH  as a legal person.
In a GmbH  as an affiliated company with this kind of economic organisation, 
the protection of the creditors by the devices of common company law is still sufficient. 
The protective measures provided by organisational law and by these provisions which 
directly secure the separate fund for the creditors function in an economic environment 
of this type. However, this economic organisation also forms the limit beyond which the 
usual devices for the creditor protection no longer work. Therefore, it can be used to 
show up the line beyond which assuming liability for the parent is appropriate. Thus, 
the recent BG H  jurisdiction for extending the liability on the parent of an affiliated 
GmbH  can be justified and, above all, the criteria which trigger off the extension can 
be assessed and concretized. As criterion for the extension of liability not mainly the 
comprehensive and permanent management of the parent is to choose, but it is to focus 
on a serious damage of the subsidiary company’s interest. Such damage to the 
subsidiary’s interest can be defined according to the above-described economic 
organisation. The drawing of such a line within which limited liability can be accepted 
for affiliated GmbHs is also compatible with efficiency considerations regarding limited 
liability. The extension of liability on the parent if the organisation of the group as 
described above is not maintained, belongs to the functions of the law in this field; 
market mechanisms cannot completely replace this function of the law. On the other 
hand, considerations about the efficiency of limited liability do not require the
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elimination of the limited liability of subsidiary companies within groups as limited 
liability can also work in groups, as a positive principle which is socially valuable and 
leads to an efficient allocation of resources.
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